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review

*Rolling Thunder
and the Law of War*

reading—and misreading—history

Run through your mental card file. Select the military problem or national security issue that bothers you most and review it in your mind. Now consider the sources of your factual data and review the assumptions on which your analysis is based. Then reassess your opinion and go over the way in which you formed it.

This exercise probably expended a good bit of your mental energy reviewing the historical record. Even analysis of problems that are essentially quantitative in their dimensions—say our strategic missile basing options considered in light of shrinking Soviet circular errors probable (CEPs)—has a heavy historical component. What are the sources of our information about improved Soviet missile accuracy? How much confidence can we place in them? *How reliable have they been in the past?*

The last question is the cruncher: Even when we consider a problem as antiseptic and rational as the strategic impact of reduced CEPs, our whole approach is—and must be—heavily influenced by the historical record. Turn to a "messy" problem—say counterterrorism or how to fight in a dense electronic countermeasure environment—and the point is even more obvious.

Unfortunately, the historical record has an uncomfortable way of changing. Scholarly persistence and the passage of time put new faces on old facts. Accepted interpretations become outdated, and conclusions, attitudes, and dispositions based on them become obsolete. If our analytical efforts are not to become similarly obsolete, we had better keep a sharp eye on the changing record.

To that end, Hays Parks's lead article suggests a few new twists to the generally accepted interpretations of the air war over North Vietnam. You might show it to your associates who think the war proved that "interdiction doesn't work." The article by Major Leslie Hamblin throws fresh light on accepted theories of deterrence, particularly on the origins and impact of the work of the renowned Bernard Brodie. The third article, by Professor Morris Janowitz, reconsiders American attitudes toward national military service in light of their historical origins. Elsewhere in this issue you will find a reassessment of Soviet attitudes toward women in military service, a case study of the behavior under stress of the military elite of a Warsaw Pact nation—Czechoslovakia in 1968—and an analysis of the Turkish military's impact on internal politics. And mention should be made of Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Porter's analysis of the adequacy of the Code of Conduct for those military captives not accorded prisoner-of-war status; his presentation assumes particular relevance in light of the recent kidnapping of Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier by an Italian terrorist faction.

If you fail to find some surprises, then we miss our bet.

J.F.G.

ROLLING THUNDER AND THE LAW OF WAR

W. Hays Parks

O N 2 March 1965, 104 United States Air Force and 19 South
Vietnamese Air Force aircraft attacked a small military
supply depot and the minor naval base at Quang Khe in North
Vietnam. This effort marked the inauspicious beginning of the
43-month bombing of North Vietnam known as "Rolling Thunder," one
of the most controversial military campaigns in United States history.
In the face of denials by senior civilian officials in the Johnson administra-
tion, USAF pilots and their military leaders complained of unwarranted
restrictions imposed on them by those civilian leaders, not only with respect
to target selection but as to strike parameters.[1] Simultaneously, downed
and captured U.S. pilots were denied prisoner-of-war status by their
North Vietnamese captors and for a time were threatened with trial as war

criminals for their alleged intentional bombing of the civilian population.

The controversy has not abated with the passage of time, and participants have written books with conflicting views of the campaign.[2] During the U.S. hostage crisis in Iran, the mercurial government of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini announced its intention to try one of the hostages, Lieutenant Colonel David M. Roeder, USAF, as a "wartime criminal and mercenary spy," owing to his having flown 100 missions in F-105s over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder campaign. Although Colonel Roeder's trial did not occur in part due to Vietnamese failure to provide witnesses and evidence, the recent return by the Hanoi regime of the bodies of three U.S. pilots emphasizes its intention to prolong the agony for the families of the missing in action until some resolution is reached regarding reparations for war damage in North Vietnam. In contrast, Ronald Reagan vowed during his successful presidential campaign that he would never allow the U.S. military to engage in combat under restrictions such as those experienced in fighting the Vietnam War.

The focal point for much of the controversy over both targeting and bombing is that area of international law known as the law of war. Whereas the Johnson administration declined to authorize the attack of certain targets and imposed unprecedented restrictions on U.S. strike forces ostensibly to protect the civilian population of North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese were quick to allege that the United States was engaged in a campaign of indiscriminate bombing in violation of the law of war. Confusion over the state of the law persists. Draft contingency and operations plans I have seen routinely contain unwarranted restrictions apparently derived from the drafter's experience in Vietnam, misperceived to be based on the law of war. While lecturing at the U.S. military staff colleges, I have noted definite confusion among professional military officers regarding the source of many of the operational restrictions of the Vietnam War. While some of these restrictions may have been the result of law-of-war obligations accepted by the United States, most were not.

THE United States is a nation of rule by law. Every member of the military is bound by oath to discharge his or her duties in accordance with the law, including the law of war. While some may question whether this measure of confidence in the law in the international sphere is warranted, it is essential to understand what the law provides and to distinguish the rights and responsibilities of the law of war from other restrictions.[3] Rolling Thunder provides an excellent vehicle for this comparison.

Rolling Thunder was planned as a program to deny the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a sanctuary from which to carry out its military operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Its objectives were threefold: to reduce the flow and increase the cost of the continued infiltration of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam; to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese people who at the time Rolling Thunder began were under severe military pressure; and to make clear to the North Vietnamese political leadership that so long as they continued their aggression against South Vietnam, they would pay the price in North Vietnam.

Simultaneously, Rolling Thunder was to be an interdiction campaign, a punitive expedition, and a test of will. As part of the then-prevalent United States theory of limited war, however, it was viewed as a limited campaign to avoid widening the war beyond the two Vietnams. Both in published statements and the selective use of air power, the United States made it clear that it had no intention of invading North Vietnam; nor did it intend to destroy the Hanoi regime, compel the North Vietnamese people to adopt another form of government, nor devastate North Vietnam. Nuclear

Led by an EB-66, a formation of F-105s (above) unloads its 750-pound general-purpose bombs in a radar-directed drop over southern North Vietnam in early 1966. . . . The care taken to avoid collateral damage to civilians and property in built-up areas is graphically illustrated by the postattack photograph (left) of an attack on 29 June 1966 of a petroleum storage area near Hanoi.

ONE SPAN DROPPED

Denied access to logistical buildup areas by political consid-
erations, USAF and Navy tactical air power concentrated on
chokepoints along lines of communication (LOC). The Xom
Ca Trang highway bridge (above, right) and the Qui Vinh rail-
road bridge (right) were successfully attacked in April of 1965.
However, note the vehicle tracks leading away from the bridge
in the upper photo, almost surely heading toward a concealed
ferry or underwater ford.

DESTROYED SPAN

The utter frustration of Rolling Thunder implicit in a sin-
gle photograph (below): For lack of better targets, tactical air
power went for bridges—and generally got them. But all too
often the resultant chokepoints were easily bypassed. Here, USAF
fighters had dropped the main span, but North Vietnamese
engineers simply bulldozed two dry fords across the river and
added an underwater ford downstream. Note the numerous
bomb craters around the main bridge and the antiaircraft emplace-
ments near the upper ford.

weapons would not be used; targets in populated areas would not be attacked. Tactical rather than strategic assets would be used in the attacks to emphasize the limited nature of the campaign. Otherwise lawful targets, such as political offices responsible for the direction of the war, would not be attacked. As an interdiction rather than strategic bombing campaign, Rolling Thunder had three broad objectives: to reduce the flow of external assistance being provided North Vietnam; to reduce those military and industrial resources that contributed most to the support of North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam; and to harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and materials from North to South Vietnam. There was early recognition by the Johnson administration that while the main purpose of the air effort would be interdiction, nonetheless complete interdiction was not likely.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were unwavering in their support of the administration's objectives for Rolling Thunder. To implement the campaign's basic tasks, the JCS proposed a bombing program interdicting the North Vietnamese supply system as a whole:

- interdiction of all lines of communication (LOCs) south of 20° north latitude (2 weeks);

- severing of all rail and highway links with China (6 weeks);

- attack of port facilities, mining of Haiphong harbor, and destruction of supply and ammunition dumps (2 weeks); and

- attack of industrial targets outside populated areas (2 weeks).

In support of the proposed bombing program, the JCS identified 94 key fixed targets for destruction, most of them in the northeast sector of North Vietnam. The JCS 94-target list recognized that, rather than being a major manufacturer of war materials, North Vietnam was a conduit for war supplies en route to South Vietnam. The 94-target list was consistent with White House objectives, attacking the heart and arteries of the North Vietnamese military supply system while eschewing political targets, objects necessary for the survival of the civilian population, and otherwise legitimate targets in populated areas. This JCS list was forwarded to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who referred it to his General Counsel for legal review. The General Counsel approved it as consistent with United States obligations under the law of war. Despite this legal clearance, Secretary McNamara and President Johnson accepted neither the recommendations of the JCS as to the stages of the bombing program nor the 94-target list, choosing instead to embark on a limited interdiction campaign that passed through six separate phases and seven bombing halts prior to its conclusion on 31 October 1968.

White House disapproval of the 94-target list revealed areas of fundamental disagreement between the Johnson administration and the military. While the JCS saw the war as a single conflict integrated militarily, geographically, psychologically, and socially, the administration viewed Rolling Thunder as supplementary to rather than complementary of the war in South Vietnam. Whereas Rolling Thunder was represented to be an interdiction campaign, President Johnson used it as a campaign of coercion, a subtle diplomatic orchestration of signals and incentives, of carrots and sticks, of the velvet glove of diplomacy backed by the mailed fist of air power. Rolling Thunder was not a military campaign in the classical sense but a not-so-clearly defined program of "signals" evolving from a politico-military strategy in which the political, including psychological, factors were not only predominant but oftentimes exclusive. Never carefully or fully thought out by the White House, Rolling Thunder became a campaign of on-the-spot adaptation and intermittent intensity.

There were several reasons for this evolution. President Johnson's basic discomfort with the military caused him to rely less on military advice than any U.S. President since Woodrow

Wilson. Vietnam — "that bitch of a war," in his words — drained money from "the woman I loved," The Great Society. Committed to a program of guns and butter without raising taxes or calling up the reserves, he fought the war accordingly. In the eyes of Lyndon B. Johnson and his principal advisers, Rolling Thunder was not a military campaign but "an economical way to impose an awkward inconvenience," though nonetheless one they expected would produce early results.[4] Johnson entrusted the conduct of the war to his Secretary of Defense McNamara, who, though perhaps brilliant in fiscal management, proved anything but efficient in his conduct of Rolling Thunder. In the preceding four years of his tenure as Secretary of Defense, McNamara had substantially downgraded the role of professional military advice in the planning and decision-making process. He not only failed to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with his military subordinates, he created an adversarial relationship with them. He encouraged his civilian subordinates — most of them young academicians with no military experience — to make decisions on military questions without seeking professional advice that was readily available to them. This was particularly true within the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA), which was given the responsibility for the management of Rolling Thunder.[5]

The McNamara-Johnson program for execution of Rolling Thunder manifested its predominately political character by calling for the graduated application of military power over an unspecified period of time, managed internally through geographic prohibitions, target denial, and stringent strike restrictions and rules of engagement. The former ignored principles of war such as mass and surprise and existing military doctrine regarding air power employment, calling instead for a phased campaign — the phases again undefined and unestablished — of air power creeping north from

the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. Gradualism, rather than campaign objectives, was the first divisive point between the military and McNamara-Johnson. Gradualism provided no benefits in the conduct of Rolling Thunder but had several adverse effects. To the international community, it indicated a lack of capability on the part of the United States to halt blatant acts of aggression by a less-developed nation against its neighbor. It allowed communist-socialist elements in many nations the time to organize their opposition to the U.S. "imperialist aggression" against a nation portrayed as fighting for its survival, leading many nations traditionally friendly to the United States to withdraw their support of the U.S. war effort as the campaign dragged on. Gradualism enabled the North Vietnamese to mobilize and organize a force of more than 500,000 civilians to handle LOC damage and movement of supplies; mobilize an additional quarter-million civilians to man antiaircraft defenses; organize and construct a sophisticated, highly integrated air defense system; disperse its military supplies to offset the bombing; and import essential stores to counter anticipated bombing effects (e.g., 2000 generators to offset the loss of power plants). To the North Vietnamese, it manifested a lack of will on the part of the United States leadership. As a people with experience in extended campaigns, the North Vietnamese concluded that their patience was greater than that of their opponent.

The greatest effect of gradualism was to occur in the area President Johnson believed he knew best, the domestic arena. While bombing causes no greater suffering among noncombatants than any other means of war — more innocent civilians died as the result of acts of terrorism by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese during the 1968 Tet offensive than in all of Rolling Thunder — the self-agonizing that has been experienced since the World War II strategic bombing campaigns indicates that the average U.S. citizen has not yet come

to grips from a standpoint of morality with the superiority the United States enjoys in air power. Certainly this was true at the top; gradualism reflected the almost apologetic manner in which President Johnson elected to undertake a major military campaign. Communist propaganda campaigns against U.S. air power in Korea and Vietnam, as well as current Soviet efforts against the enhanced radiation weapon, were and are exploitations of American morality and aversion to war in general in an effort to overcome technological advantages enjoyed by the United States. Gradualism permitted this exploitation; the Johnson administration's distrust of the military led it to believe much of it — or at least to seek to counter it through increased strike restrictions in order to hold together the disintegrating domestic support for the campaign and the war in general. The worst effect of gradualism, however, was that it sought from the American public the one virtue it lacks: patience. Against virtually every principle of war and the unanimous advice of those with the greatest experience, the elected leaders of a nation whose people are accustomed to resolution of any crisis in the length of a thirty-minute television program (including commercials) chose to surrender technological and military superiority and engage in a conflict with a nation accustomed to protracted campaigns and on that nation's terms.

Emphasis throughout Rolling Thunder on LOC interdiction in Route Packages I and II reflected the second area of dispute between the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. The JCS plan and its 94-target list recognized the necessity for attack of all parts of the interdicted target. This was not revolutionary thinking but the application of long-established air power doctrine. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Hugh Trenchard commented in a memorandum of 2 May 1928:

> . . . air attacks will be directed against any objective which will contribute effectively towards the destruction of the enemy's means of resistance and the lowering of his determination to

fight. . . . By attacking the sources from which [the] armed forces are maintained infinitely more effect is obtained. In the course of a day's attack upon the aerodromes of the enemy perhaps 50 aeroplanes could be destroyed; whereas a modern industrial state will produce 100 in a day — and production will far more than replace any destruction we can hope to do in the forward zone. On the other hand, by attacking the enemy's factories, then output is reduced by a much greater proportion.

> In the same way, instead of attacking the rifle and the machinegun in the trench where they can exact the highest price from us for the smallest gain we shall attack direct the factory where these are made. We shall attack the vital centres of transportation and seriously impede these arms and munitions reaching the battlefield and, therefore, more successfully assist the Army in its direct attack on the enemy's Army.[6]

Secretary McNamara did not accept this line of thinking, stating that "Physically, it makes no difference whether a rifle is interdicted on its way into North Vietnam, on its way out of North Vietnam, in Laos or in South Vietnam."[7] There was not a consensus within the Johnson administration on Secretary McNamara's approach to interdiction. Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, for example, argued with McNamara:

> It can be argued that because the flow into South Vietnam is a larger fraction of what passed through Route Packages I-III than it is of what passes through Route Packages IV-VI, an amount of material destroyed in the former area has more effect than the same amount destroyed in the latter. This is true, but to argue that sorties in the northern region are therefore less important overlooks the fact that this very gradient is established largely by the attrition throughout the LOC. In analogous transport or diffusion problems of this sort in the physical world (e.g., the diffusion of heat) it is demonstrable that interferences close to the source have a greater effect, not a lesser effect, than the same interferences close to the output. If the attacks on the LOCs north of 20° stopped, the flow of goods past 20° could easily be raised by far more than 20% and the 20% increase of attack south of 20° would nowhere compensate for this.[8]

The arguments of Secretary Brown and the JCS were only partially successful over the course of the campaign. Rather, the civilian leadership embarked on a long-term campaign emphasizing armed reconnaissance of lines of communication in the lower Route Packages, expecting more from these limited efforts than the history of aerial interdiction in protracted campaigns promised.[9] The costs were high. For example, in 1966, of 106,000 sorties over North Vietnam, only 1000 were against the 22 fixed targets authorized for attack by the White House; the balance were devoted to the armed reconnaissance interdiction campaign, with two-thirds of the strikes occurring in Route Packages I and II. This highly uneconomical misuse of expensive, high-performance aircraft to seek out and destroy individual trucks prompted this response by one Air Force pilot to Senator (and former Secretary of the Air Force) W. Stuart Symington:

> I am a regular. Nobody drafted me, and I expect to risk my life for my country. But I'll be darned if I like to do it in a multimillion dollar airplane a couple of times a week bombing an empty barracks or a bus.[10]

Additional restraints were imposed on strike forces by the White House. Notwithstanding repeated justification of Rolling Thunder as a campaign for denial of sanctuaries to North Vietnam,[11] the White House established a series of political, military, and geographic sanctuaries throughout North Vietnam in which attacks of otherwise legitimate targets were prohibited. Attacks on targets within populated areas were to be avoided, a restriction that was quickly changed into a prohibition by subordinate commanders fearful of the repercussions of any incident (real or fabricated by the North Vietnamese). Restricted areas of 30 and 10 miles were established around Hanoi and Haiphong, respectively. Targets within these areas could not be attacked without specific White House approval; once authorized, there was limited restrike authority. Prohibited areas of 10 and 4 miles were placed within the restricted areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. Attack of targets within those areas also required White House authorization, which was less likely than for targets within the restricted areas. There was no restrike authority for targets within prohibited areas.

A buffer zone extended south from the Chinese border for 30 miles from the Laos-North Vietnam border to 106° longitude; 25 miles from 106° east to the Gulf of Tonkin. The 106° longitude line also marked the western boundary of Route Package VI, the geographic area containing the most valuable interdiction targets. In addition to the geographic sanctuaries surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong and within the buffer zone, strike forces were restricted in their attack of targets of opportunity within Route Package VI. When the first U.S. aircraft was lost to a surface-to-air missile (SAM) on 24 July 1965, a 10-mile prohibited strike area was placed around Phuc Yen airfield, the principal North Vietnamese military jet air base. Despite repeated JCS requests, Phuc Yen was not authorized for attack until 24 October 1967.[12] There were other restrictions. Fishing boats, dikes and levees, locks and dams, and hydroelectric plants were not authorized targets. Bridges, including bridges on LOCs, were considered fixed targets requiring White House strike authorization. The White House also discouraged the preparation of a comprehensive plan for attainment of Rolling Thunder objectives by approving target packages a week at a time in the initial phases of the campaign, and subsequently in monthly increments.

IN April 1965, SAMs and SAM sites were first detected. Although requested by the JCS, attack on them was not immediately authorized.[13] When the first aircraft was lost to a SAM, President Johnson authorized strikes against those SAM sites south of 20° north, which actually were firing at U.S. aircraft. The SAM threat was permitted to expand without significant interference through early

1966. During that time, SAM sites were developed as ambush positions along the anticipated flight paths of strike forces — a tactic forced upon the North Vietnamese by the limited availability of SAMs but facilitated by the White House decision to select weekly target packages. By the end of 1965, more than sixty sites had been identified around the vital Hanoi-Haiphong military-industrial-transportation complex. Authorization for their attack was limited. Sites were authorized for attack only after photographic evidence had established that they were occupied, an impractical criterion during the 1965-66 period of SAM mobility. As SAMs increased, the threat to U.S aircraft similarly increased. Altitudes for ingress decreased from the preferred 25,000-30,000 feet to 12,000-15,000 feet, which required more fuel and placed strike aircraft within range of North Vietnamese antiaircraft. Strike forces had to adopt echeloned operations by small groups. Strike forces per se were reduced significantly as aircraft were diverted for MiG Combat Air Patrol (MIGCAP) and SAM suppression missions. Restrictions on attack of SAM sites remained, however, particularly with regard to those sites in and about Hanoi and Haiphong. SAMs within the prohibited areas of those cities could not be attacked. With their range of seventeen nautical miles, the SAMs were able to offer protection to the key portions of the North Vietnamese military transportation and supply system while themselves immune from attack. SAMs within the restricted areas (but beyond the prohibited areas) could be attacked if they were preparing to fire upon U.S. forces and if they were not located in populated areas. The North Vietnamese became aware of this last restriction and offset the U.S. SAM suppression threat by placing their SAM and antiaircraft (AA) sites adjacent to or within populated areas whenever possible. Screening their SAM and AA positions from counterattack, rather than locating them immediately adjacent to high-value targets, appeared to be the prevailing

Repeated strikes at extended supply lines exposed U.S. airmen to sophisticated Soviet defensive systems. The above photograph, taken near Hanoi in late 1966, shows the launch smoke of two SA-2 missiles; arrow "C" conceals the characteristic pattern of a six-launcher site (enlargement "C"). Missile "A" unsuccessfully tracks the USAF RF-101 that brought the photo back. The other has misfired—note the erratic smoke trail—and is about to detonate in a populated area, "B."

criterion for North Vietnamese positioning of their SAM and AA defenses. SAMs located in populated areas could be attacked only if they actually were firing at U.S. forces. Despite repeated requests by the JCS, the White House refused to relax restrictions on the attack of SAM sites. Authorization to attack the entire SAM system was never granted during the course of Rolling Thunder.

The North Vietnamese were not reluctant to take advantage of the restrictions imposed on U.S. forces. Gradualism permitted them time to organize, coordinate, and refine their defenses; sanctuaries and restrictions on attack of the defenses enabled them to undertake optimum utilization of SAMs, MiGs, and AA. The greatest concentration of their defenses was in the Red River Valley area extending southeast from Yen Bai to the Gulf of Tonkin, with a substantial portion in a 60-mile by 36-mile wide ring with Hanoi as its hub. Like their MiG defenses, SAMs frequently were used to force strike aircraft to jettison their ordnance during the course of evasive maneuvers. Alternatively, they forced aircraft taking evasive action into the fire of the more than 5000 antiaircraft

Rolling Thunder's gradual escalation enabled the North Vietnamese regime, with Chinese and Soviet assistance, to stockpile and husband their air defense assets. The late 1966 photographs below show a soccer field containing more than 130 missile canisters with no attempt at concealment (left) and MiG-17 interceptors on a North Vietnamese airfield (right).

weapons that ringed the area. While electronic countermeasures (ECMs) substantially degraded the North Vietnamese SAM and radar-controlled AA capability, the excellent AA optical gunsights and massed AA fire were capable of offsetting the ECM efforts of the United States. Throughout this area, civilians by the thousands had been issued small arms ranging from .22 to .50 caliber with instructions to fire directly into the air or at individual aircraft whenever they were present. The North Vietnamese advantage was further enhanced by the White House requirement for visual identification of targets; if attacking pilots had to eyeball their targets, it assured them that they were capable of being eyeballed by their less-than-congenial hosts.

The North Vietnamese were quick to seize upon other weaknesses in the manner in which the campaign was waged by the United States. None was more controversial than the issue of the dikes. The Red River delta, the most populated area of North Vietnam, is little more than a marshland and rice paddies broken up by dams and dikes to permit controlled irrigation and prevent flooding. The earthwork dikes require continuous maintenance. As the North Vietnamese called on the local population to maintain the military lines of communication, labor was drawn away from dike maintenance. The problem was exacerbated by the placement of air defense equipment (AA and GCI) on the dikes and the resulting deterioration caused by the vibration of the guns. North Vietnamese SAMs that missed their mark often fell back to earth before exploding, causing additional damage to the dikes. Given the North Vietnamese tactic of forcing U.S. aircraft to jettison their bombloads and abort their missions, the dikes undoubtedly were their point of impact on occasion, as well they may have been for some downed U.S. aircraft. As the dikes deteriorated, however, the North Vietnamese sought a way to continue to fight the war and maintain the dikes. In order to extract a greater effort from their population, they turned the

issue into one that would rally the people, alleging that the United States was bombing the dikes intentionally in order to flood the entire delta. Foreign visitors were provided tours of damaged dikes — photographic coverage indicates that most visitors were taken to the same "damaged" dike over a period of several years — to exploit the issue in the foreign press.

In some circumstances, dikes can be legitimate targets from either a military or law of war standpoint, as evidenced by the successful campaign by the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the USAAF Eighth Air Force against key points in the Dortmund-Ems and Mittleland canals as part of the attack on German lines of communication in late 1944.[14] Throughout the course of the Vietnam War, however, both in Rolling Thunder and the subsequent Linebacker I and II campaigns, breach of the Red River delta dams and dikes with the intention of flooding North Vietnam was never seriously raised by either the military or its civilian leaders. The North Vietnamese allegations were vigorously denied by the White House. Continued strong emphasis by the Johnson administration of the point that U.S. forces would not bomb the dikes was met by their increased use by the North Vietnamese for military purposes. In addition to increasing the number of AA positions, petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) drums were stored along their length. Little was done to counter the North Vietnamese actions until Linebacker I commenced in April 1972, when AA and GCI sites were attacked with antipersonnel munitions (napalm, cluster bomb units, and strafing) that were effective in neutralization of the personnel and military equipment while avoiding structural damage to the dikes.

The greatest restraints were exercised through the targeting process, which was closely controlled by the White House. Targeting was subject to the concept of graduated pressure. Although interdiction (in the limited sense defined by Secretary McNamara) was the prin-

cipal criterion for target *selection*, it was the intent of the White House to execute an interdiction campaign that would minimize international and domestic political repercussions in the methods used. As a result, minimization of civilian casualties became the principal criterion for target *approval*.

Target recommendations were initiated by TF-77 and Seventh Air Force, where they were coordinated by the Rolling Thunder Coordinating Committee prior to their submission (via PACFLT and PACAF) to CINCPAC. CINCPAC conducted a separate review before each list was forwarded to the JCS. The JCS undertook its own review based on the guidance previously provided by the Secretary of Defense or the President.[15] The political ramifications of attack were weighed, targets were justified from the standpoint of military value, and priority established in their attack. Targets that the JCS realized were not likely to be approved often were not included in order to give greater emphasis to targets that were equally important.[16] The recommended target list was submitted by the JCS to Secretary McNamara, who turned it over to his civilian staff in ASD/ISA. The list underwent substantial metamorphosis at that point. Whereas the TF-77/Seventh Air Force, CINCPAC, and JCS recommendations of a target were based on general targeting principles, such as the value of that target as a part of an overall target system, or the lack of cushion with regard to a critical supply component, ASD/ISA would evaluate each target on an individual basis, mirror-imaged against U.S. production capabilities. Thus a North Vietnamese tire plant, which produced 11,000 tires per year for the 15,000 trucks used on the lines of communication, was recommended for attack because it was an essential cog in the North Vietnamese transportation system. There was little depth of supply and minimal ability to absorb the loss of its production capacity. The ASD/ISA revaluation downplayed its importance as an *individual* target (rather than being part of a sys-

tem), noting that it produced only thirty tires per day or substantially less than any U.S. tire manufacturer.[17] Likewise, military estimates of probable civilian casualties and U.S. aircraft losses were revised *upward* without consultation with military targeting experts and without an opportunity for reclama by the JCS.[18] Finally, strike restrictions were recommended in the event the target was authorized by the White House for attack. Once approved by the Secretary of Defense, the revised target list was forwarded to the Department of State, where it went through yet another review process to ensure that it did not interfere with pending peace initiatives and for consistency with the President's desire to induce, rather than force, a satisfactory settlement to the conflict. After discussion between the Secretaries of Defense and State, the proposed list was sent to the White House.

Target lists were reviewed at the White House in the informal atmosphere of the Tuesday lunch, attended principally by President Johnson, his press secretary, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the President's special assistant for national security affairs. (Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is by law the senior military adviser to the President and General Earle G. Wheeler was one of the few military men Johnson liked, Wheeler attended an average of three Tuesday luncheons per quarter during the course of Rolling Thunder.) After dining, the target list for the coming week was discussed. Each proposed target had been reduced to a single sheet of paper and categorized on four bases (as revised by ASD/ISA): the military advantage for striking the target; the risk to U.S. aircraft and pilots; estimated civilian casualties; and danger to third-country nationals.[19] Each luncheon attendee individually graded each target on the basis of his appraisal of the four standards. Their grades were then combined and averaged. President Johnson reviewed the averaged grades, then personally selected the targets for attack. Parameters of attack were deter-

mined. These included the number of aircraft authorized for strike of the target, date/time of attack, routes of ingress or egress, weapons authorized or prohibited, and restrike authority. For example, when the Hanoi and Haiphong POL storage facilities were authorized for attack in June 1966, the following conditions were specified by the White House:

- execute strikes only under optimum weather conditions, with good visibility and no cloud cover;
- make maximum use of experienced Rolling Thunder pilots;
- stress the need to avoid civilian casualties in detailed briefing of pilots;
- select a single axis of attack that would avoid populated areas;
- make maximum use of ECM to hamper SAM and AA fire control, in order to limit

pilot distraction and improve bombing accuracy;

- make maximum use of high-precision delivery munitions consistent with mission objectives;
- ensure minimum risk to third-country nationals and shipping; and
- limit SAM/AA suppression to sites outside populated areas.[20]

Given the myriad criteria for target authorization and attack, it is appropriate to ask: to what degree did the White House base its decisions on the law of war? The answer: very little, and then more by coincidence than choice. Except for the prohibition against attack of coastal fishing boats, the cited White House criteria and prohibitions/restrictions have little basis in the law of war. With the exception of the General Counsel's approval of the JCS

Targeting authorization procedures in Rolling Thunder

The systematic Communist approach to keeping critical LOCs open and the key importance of the small North Vietnamese steel industry are illustrated by this January 1967 photograph of the Thai Nguyen barge construction area (above). In addition to some 25 barges, many loaded on flat cars, numerous bridge sections and petroleum storage tanks are shown.

The North Vietnamese were fully aware of our restrictions against attacking irrigation dikes and military targets in populated areas and took full advantage of them. The 1968 photo at left shows petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) drums stocked in a fishing village near Haiphong; the 1972 photo below shows POL drums stacked along a dike.

L DRUMS

DIKE

SLUICE GATE

POL D

94-target list, the record is rather clear that Secretary McNamara and the White House never sought advice with regard to U.S. responsibilities *and rights* under the law of war with respect to the conduct of Rolling Thunder. Had they done so and heeded that advice, Rolling Thunder undoubtedly would have concluded in a manner favorable to the United States and at a substantially lower cost.

The law of war constitutes a balancing of national security interests, expressed in legal terms as *military necessity*, against the desire of the United States and other members of the international community to limit to the extent practically possible the effects of war to those individuals and objects having a direct effect on the hostilities, which is expressed as the avoidance of *unnecessary suffering* by those not taking part in the conflict. The Air Force manual on the law of war defines military necessity as justifying "measures of regulated force not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the enemy, with the least possible expenditures of economic and human resources."[21] The compatibility of military necessity with the principle of war of *economy of force* is readily apparent in the Air Force's definition of the latter: ". . . no more — or less — effort should be devoted to a task than is necessary to achieve the objective. . . . This phrase implies the correct selection and use of weapon systems, maximum productivity from available flying effort, and careful balance in the allocation of tasks."[22] In contrast, unnecessary suffering has been defined to mean that "all such kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for the overpowering of the opponent should not be permitted to the belligerent."[23] The concepts of military necessity and unnecessary suffering are weighed both in the target value analysis and target validation process of a prospective target, as well as in force application once a target has been validated for attack.

WHAT, then, are lawful targets? In practice, any object which by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes a contribution to a nation's war effort and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would offer a military advantage to the attacker, is a lawful target. In a less legalistic way, Air Marshal Trenchard defined military targets as "objectives which will contribute effectively towards the destruction of the enemy's means of resistance and the lowering of his determination to fight."[24] Lawful targets are not limited to military facilities and equipment but may include economic targets, geographic targets, transportation, power, and communications systems, and political targets. The inherent nature of an object is not controlling; its value to the enemy or the perceived value of its destruction is the determinant. A comparison of the target systems recommended for attack in the JCS 94-target list with those target categories recognized by the law of war as permissible targets will illustrate their consistency:

JCS	Law of War
1. Power	1. Economic
2. War-related industry	a. Power
3. Transportation	b. Industry (war supporting
4. Military equipment, supplies	/import/export)
5. POL	c. Communications
6. Air defense	d. Transportation
	(equipment/LOCs/POL)
	2. Military
	a. Complexes
	(bases/airfields)
	b. Equipment and supplies
	c. Air defenses
	3. Political
	4. Geographic
	5. Personnel
	a. Military
	personnel
	b. Others taking part in the
	conflict

The JCS eschewed the attack of political targets, although their attack would have been lawful. Under White House direction, the orig-

inal 94-target list did not include targets in population centers. The latter restriction was not a law of war requirement; a legitimate target may be attacked wherever it is located.[25]

The law of war recognizes the inevitability of collateral civilian casualties; what it prohibits is the intentional attack of the civilian population per se or individual civilians not taking part in the conflict, or the employment of weapons or tactics that result in *excessive* collateral civilian casualties. Historically, this standard has enjoyed a high threshold—requiring collateral civilian casualties that shock the conscience of the world because of their vast number — condemning only acts so blatant as to be tantamount to a total disregard for the safety of the civilian population, or to amount to the indiscriminate use of means and methods of warfare. Such latitude has been provided in recognition of the fluidity of civilians on the battlefield and the necessity for decision-making by military commanders in the fog of war — including "fog" created by the enemy in the way of lawful ruses and deceptions. Naturally, this latitude or benefit of the doubt is qualified by the expectation that military commanders will make a good faith effort to minimize collateral civilian casualties, consistent with the security of their own forces.

It was on this point that the Johnson administration made one of the more egregious errors of Rolling Thunder. It selected the hortatory admonishment to minimize civilian casualties as the campaign standard, rather than the law of war prohibition of *excessive collateral* civilian casualties. Although other reasons were cited on occasion, the buffer zones around Hanoi and Haiphong were placed there primarily to reduce to an absolute minimum civilian casualties among the enemy population. In practice, the criterion for White House selection of targets slipped farther from approving only those targets that would *minimize* civilian casualties to one of authorizing attacks against only such targets as would result in a *minimum* of civilian casualties. This criter-

ion was incorrect for several reasons. Whereas the question of whether a nation has utilized illegal means and methods of warfare generally is measured against an overall campaign or war, the Johnson administration elected to apply it against each individual fixed target; it chose to slide the standard to an increasingly stringent level, i.e.,

excessive → minimize → minimum,

to the extent that it became the basis for *target denial*; and when a target was approved for attack, minimization of civilian casualties remained the paramount criterion, to the substantial disregard of the security of the attacking forces and the accomplishment of the mission in as efficient a manner as possible. While such humanitarianism is laudable, it ignored not only the law of war but fundamental concepts of warfare. As Euripides wrote in *Heracles*, "... in war the greatest skill, independent of chance, [is] to harm the enemy while sparing oneself."

The standard was not applied without criticism. The JCS, in responding to a 14 October 1966 McNamara memorandum on Rolling Thunder, argued that if it were to be effective, "the air campaign should be conducted with only those minimum constraints to avoid *indiscriminate* killing of population," which would have been consistent with the law of war.[26] President Johnson, in a response of 18 December 1967, to an October 1967 memorandum by Secretary McNamara on the course of the war, stated that "with respect to bombing North Vietnam, I would wish for us to authorize and strike those remaining targets which, after study, we judge to have significant military content but which would not involve *excessive* civilian casualties."[27] In the ensuing delay brought about by the Christmas 1967 bombing halt, the January-February 1968 northeast monsoon season, and the 1968 Tet offensive, the point was raised once more. On 4 March 1968, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown wrote to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, proposing that "the present restrictions on bombing North Vietnam . . . be lifted

CONFIRMED 122MM CD GUNS ON DIKE

The North Vietnamese dikes hosted a wide variety of military hardware, ranging from 122 mm coastal defense guns south of Haiphong (above) to a SIDE NET height finder ground-controlled intercept radar (right) with generator van near Hanoi.

so far as to permit bombing of military targets without the present scrupulous concern for collateral civilian damage and casualties,"[28] and for completion of the program recommended by the JCS in 1965. The series of events that followed in the next week, including Johnson's marginal victory over challenger Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire Primary on 12 March, foreclosed any action on Brown's proposal as President Johnson on 31 March announced the cessation of all bombing north of 19^0 north latitude and announced his decision not to seek reelection. Rolling Thunder drew to a close six months later.

There were other errors with respect to the application of the law of war in Rolling Thunder. The first lay in the failure to distinguish between civilian casualties as such and the law of war prohibition against excessive *collateral* civilian casualties. Casualties among civilians working in a facility that is a legitimate target cannot prevent attack on that facility; their injury or death as a result of the attack of that target is an occupational hazard and the exclusive responsibility of the defender. Moreover, a serious error was made with respect to the determination of who was entitled to protection as a "civilian." The law of war limits protection to individuals not taking a direct part in the hostilities. Individuals supporting the war effort by moving military supplies and personnel down lines of communication into South Vietnam or repairing the roads and bridges making up those LOCs were taking a

North Vietnamese cultural facilities did double duty during Rolling Thunder. Analysis of a March 1968 photograph of a Haiphong open air amphitheater revealed a military truck park and numerous industrial supplies stockpiled nearby.

direct part in the hostilities and therefore were subject to attack. Personnel who manned AA sites, including those individuals trained in the "Hanoi habit" to run into the street with small arms to fire into the air during air raids, were similarly subject to attack while they participated in the conflict. However, the North Vietnamese classified all of these individuals as protected "civilians" and included them in their civilian casualty reports, without challenge by the White House. Rather, casualties among civilians within military targets and among these unprotected civilians erroneously were included in civilian casualty estimates reviewed at the Tuesday lunch.

The law of war is not a one-way street, imposing obligations on the attacker while absolving the defender of any responsibility for collateral civilian casualties. It expects each to act in good faith with respect to the minimization of collateral civilian casualties. To the extent that the defender elects to disregard the law of war, he is responsible for the civilian casualties that flow from his actions. For example, civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects resulting from intentional actions by the defender to screen targets from attack are the responsibility of the defender exclusively. Knowing U.S. restrictions on the attack of targets in population centers, the North Vietnamese sought refuge from attack by parking military convoys in residential areas, dispersing POL along its earthwork dikes and in villages, and siting SAM and AA positions in populated areas. Similarly, MiG aircraft dispersals were placed in villages adjacent to airfields to screen the aircraft from attack. A military target does not change its character by being situated in a populated area. The law of war does not prohibit their attack but places the responsibility on the defender for civilian casualties caused by its deliberate acts.[29]

Similarly, the defender rather than the attacker is accountable for damage or injury accruing from actions taken to thwart the attack of legitimate targets. Passes by MiG aircraft, the firing of air-to-air missiles, or the launching of SAMs to force attacking aircraft to jettison their ordnance may lead to civilian casualties for which the defender alone is accountable. Likewise, antiaircraft traditionally has had two roles: to destroy attacking aircraft, or to force them to higher altitudes and/or to take evasive action during the critical phases of the bomb run, either of which will result in less accurate bombing of the target — but, by corollary, in the likelihood of increased civilian casualties. The North Vietnamese utilized all these actions to screen and protect their military targets from attack, without response from the Johnson administration. The longer the White House neglected to point out the North Vietnamese actions, the more the North Vietnamese exploited their enemy's weakness.

Like limited war, the law of war depends on both parties to a conflict adhering to agreed standards. Whereas the United States considered the Vietnam War to be a limited struggle, to the North Vietnamese the conflict was total. To the extent the United States undertook Rolling Thunder to induce the North Vietnamese to limit the conflict, it was singularly unsuccessful. The United States might have been more successful in enforcing the law of war, for the law of war provides specific sanctions to induce compliance. Again, however, apparent ignorance of the law resulted in inaction when transgressions occurred. In addition to parking military convoys in civilian residential areas and storing military supplies in such places as the Haiphong cultural center, normally a civilian object protected from attack, the North Vietnamese maximized for military purposes their use of objects enjoying special protection under the law of war. Not the least of these was the utilization of hospitals as AA sites. In relating his experience in attacking the rail facilities and associated equipment at Viet Tri, one pilot noted sardonically:

They had one large complex of buildings just north of town that was billed as a hospital, and [it] was naturally off limits. If it was in fact a

hospital, it must have been a hospital for sick flak gunners, because every time we looked at it from a run on the railhead, it was one mass of sputtering, flashing gun barrels.[30]

The 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the protection of the wounded and sick is explicit in providing for discontinuance of protection for hospitals when they are used for "acts harmful to the enemy."[31] Specific steps are provided for discontinuance of protection and subsequent attack of the facility, requiring a warning to the offending party and a reasonable time limit for him to remedy his violation prior to discontinuance of its protected status — subject to the taking of immediate defensive measures such as flak suppression to protect one's own forces. Given the insistence on widespread photographic coverage of air strikes over North Vietnam, U.S. demands could have been made for cessation of the use of hospitals as AA sites, accompanied by the publication of photographs of the sites. Had the North Vietnamese ignored the demands, appropriate action could have followed. Again, however, the North Vietnamese succeeded in placing the United States on the defensive early in the Rolling Thunder campaign by alleging that the United States was bombing hospitals intentionally. Apparently lacking the capacity for sparring with the North Vietnamese in the world public opinion arena, the White House never entertained any thought of availing itself of its legal remedies.[32]

R OLLING Thunder was one of the most constrained military campaigns in history. The restrictions imposed by this nation's civilian leaders were not based on the law of war but on an obvious ignorance of the law — to the detriment of those sent forth to battle. But *ignorantia juris neminem excusat* (ignorance of the law excuses no one). The law of war evolves through one of two processes or a combination thereof. First, it is the product of the widespread practice of nations over an extended period of time and in numerous conflicts. Alternatively, a rule may be drafted and codified in a treaty by virtue of multilateral negotiations. History reflects that these rules have been honored only to the extent that they are practical, capable of universal acceptance, and therefore do not conflict with a nation's national security interests. History also records that where such rules have not accurately codified customary practice or met the preceding requirements, they have been disregarded in the ensuing conflicts. If one accepts these lessons, then recognition should be provided the corollary that while the law of war generally is considered to be the minimum standard of conduct acceptable from a nation at war, those laws relating to the use of force may very well also reflect the *maximum* limitations a nation may accept and still succeed. One may exceed the minimum legal ration for a prisoner of war by feeding him the very best and have no effect on the war except to repatriate a healthy, overweight prisoner of war on the cessation of hostilities. However, to the extent that a nation exceeds those minimum standards through such unreasonable restrictions as those imposed on the Hanoi POL strike forces, it does so to its peril.

In his commencement address at West Point on 27 May 1981, President Reagan wisely cautioned against an overreliance on negotiation of treaties and agreements to the detriment of military strength. Given the performance of our opponents in past conflicts, President Reagan's admonishment should apply not only to arms control agreements but to new law of war treaties as well.[33] Yet the greater error is to ignore those legal *rights* to which a nation is entitled in the conduct of war, to the detriment of those tasked with executing those combat assignments and missions. The latter was the folly of Rolling Thunder.

Alexandria, Virginia

Notes

1. The pilot's perspective is well presented by Colonel Jack Broughton, USAF, in *Thud Ridge* (New York, 1969). The objections of the military leaders are contained in the August 1967 hearings of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, entitled *Air War against North Vietnam* (hereinafter Rolling Thunder Senate hearings [RTSH]).

2. General William W. Momyer, USAF, *Air Power in Three Wars* (Washington, 1978); Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, USN, *Strategy for Defeat* (San Rafael, California, 1978); and J.C. Thompson, *Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). General Momyer commanded the Seventh Air Force during Rolling Thunder, while Admiral Sharp was Commander in Chief, Pacific. Professor Thompson describes himself as a DOD intelligence analyst at the time of Rolling Thunder, but his precise position or association with the campaign, if any, is not made clear. His book is an apologia for McNamara based largely on McNamara's testimony before the RTSH on 25 August 1967.

3. International law may be used to a nation's advantage, as exemplified in U.S. statements following the downing of two Libyan Su-22 Fitter F aircraft by U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft in international airspace on 19 August 1981.

4. Henry F. Graff, *The Tuesday Cabinet* (New York, 1972), p. 142. A reading of the myriad unclassified documents associated with the campaign provides a reasonably clear indication that Johnson's concern for his domestic programs played a greater part in the way he managed Rolling Thunder and the Vietnam War as a whole than did the often publicly stated concern of avoiding a wider war. The latter posed no viable threat after 1965, if it ever did.

5. ASD/ISA was headed initially by Robert McNaughton and subsequently by Paul C. Warnke. Although a lawyer, McNaughton had no international law or law-of-war background. Nonetheless, he declined to consult the law-of-war experts in OSD General Counsel on the basis that a lawyer does not need to talk to other lawyers.

6. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany*, vol. IV (London, 1961), pp. 74-75.

7. *Pentagon Papers* (Gravel Edition), vol. IV (Boston, 1971), p. 28.

8. Ibid., p. 194.

9. Lieutenant Colonel James L. True, USAF, "The Tourniquet and the Hammer," *Air University Review*, July-August 1981, pp. 2-17; Colonel Herman L. Gilster, USAF, "Air Interdiction in Protracted War: An Economic Evaluation," *Air University Review*, May-June 1977, pp. 2-18; and "On War, Time, and the Principle of Substitution," *Air University Review*, September-October 1979, pp. 2-19; G.A. Carter, *Some Historical Notes on Air Interdiction in Korea*, The Rand Corporation, P-3452, September 1966; F.M. Sallagar, *Operation "Strangle" (Italy: Spring 1944): A Case Study of Tactical Air Interdiction*, The Rand Corporation, R-851-PR, February 1972. Ironically, McNamara attached the Carter study to his testimony before the RTSH to defend gradualism and his approach to interdiction. A separate study for ASD/ISA in the course of Rolling Thunder was critical of the administration's approach to the campaign while supporting the JCS point of view. Oleg Hoeffding, *Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic and Political Effects*, The Rand Corporation, RM-5213-ISA, December 1966.

10. RTSH, p. 72. The pilot subsequently was lost on his seventy-seventh mission attacking a single truck. It cost $100,000 to destroy each North Vietnamese truck on the LOCs during Rolling Thunder.

11. Graff, pp. 36-37 (McNamara), p. 56 (Johnson), and p. 107 (White House press secretary Bill Moyers). Letter of 1 March 1967 from President Johnson to Senator Henry Jackson (*Department of State Bulletin*, March 27, 1967, pp. 514-15); and address by President Johnson before a joint session of the Tennessee State Legislature, 15 March 1967 (*Department of State Bulletin*, April 3, 1967), p. 536.

12. Secretary McNamara was somewhat disingenuous in his sworn testimony on 25 August 1967 before the RTSH regarding the rationale for White House denial of authorization to attack Phuc Yen. He stated (RTSH, p. 305):

> ... at various times in betwen 1965 and today, Phuc Yen has not been on the recommended list for the very good reason that the MIGs were completely inactive. For example, in the 9 months from June of 1965 through March of 1966 we didn't lose a single airplane to MIGs. There wasn't any pressure to strike Phuc Yen airfield in that period for the very good reason that we wouldn't have accomplished anything.

The evidence is to the contrary. Four U.S. fighters were lost to MiGs during the time frame cited. R.F. Futrell et al., *Aces and Aerial Victories* (Washington, 1976), p. 26. The period selected by Secretary McNamara was a major standdown/training period for the North Vietnamese Air Force. Phase II of Rolling Thunder (18 May 1965 to 26 December 1965) was limited primarily to targets south of 20° north latitude. It was followed by the 37-day "Christmas" bombing halt (27 December 1965 to 30 January 1966). Phase III of Rolling Thunder (31 January 1966 to 31 March 1966) was limited to no more than 300 sorties per day, primarily south of 20° north latitude. Most sorties were flown against targets within 40 to 60 miles of the demilitarized zone, in part owing to the northeast monsoon season from late January through March.

During the period used by Secretary McNamara, MiG engagements averaged less than one per month but increased to twelve per month in the period that followed (July to December 1966). When MiGs were scrambled, it was to prevent the destruction of vital transportation and other war-supporting industrial facilities in Route Package VI. The MiGs were used primarily to force U.S. strike aircraft to jettison their ordnance and abort their mission or to force the aircraft into AA or SAM threat areas. The greatest losses during Rolling Thunder were to AA. Forcing aircraft to jettison ordnance resulted in civilian casualties; forcing aircraft into SAM or AA threat areas resulted in inaccurate bombing and generated the need for additional sorties, thereby increasing the probability of additional civilian casualties and U.S. aircraft losses. The JCS occasionally did not place Phuc Yen on their weekly list of recommended targets because of its repeated denial by the White House. It was always on the CINCPAC list of recommended targets.

13. General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, during Rolling Thunder, relates this conversation with the ASD/ISA at the time of the discovery of the SAMs:

> ... at a time when my air commander, Joe Moore, and I were trying to get authority to bomb SAM-2 sites under construction in North Vietnam, McNaughton ridiculed the need. "You don't think the North Vietnamese are going to use them!" he scoffed to General Moore. "Putting them in is just a political ploy by the Russians to appease Hanoi."

Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York, 1976), p. 120.

14. Webster and Frankland, vol. III, pp. 244-48.

15. Such guidance was limited. Neither the JCS nor subordinate commanders were provided any rationale for White House denial of authorization of a target.

16. For example, Phuc Yen airfield was deleted from some weekly lists during Phases II and III as it had been repeatedly denied by the White House, and most strikes were within 60 miles of the DMZ. Moreover, the northeast monsoon season precluded its attack during Phase III, particularly given the administration's

demand for optimum weather conditions in the attack of any fixed target. This led to the argument by Secretary McNamara during his RTSH testimony that Phuc Yen apparently lacked military value, as the JCS did not always request its strike. (See footnote 13.)

17. This example is cited by McNamara in his RTSH testimony (p. 301).

18. JCS predictions were of collateral civilian casualties, whereas ASD/ISA would add the civilians working in a target. As will be noted, the latter are not protected by the law of war while within the target.

19. That the North Vietnamese knew of and exploited the fourth criterion is evidenced by their heavy utilization of the areas around foreign embassies and consulates for storage of military supplies and equipment, as noted in John Colvin's "Hanoi in My Time," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1981, p. 150. Colvin served as the British consul general in Hanoi during 1966 and 1967.

20. *Pentagon Papers*, vol. IV, pp. 105-6, and Colonel James H. Kasler, USAF, "The Hanoi POL Strike," *Air University Review*, November-December 1974, pp. 19-28. Many authorizations included stringent time restrictions. Targets not struck within the time frame specified (usually owing to bad weather) could not be recycled but had to be revalidated by the White House.

21. Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, *International Law—The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations*, 1976, paragraph 1-3a(1).

22. Air Force Manual 1-1, *Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, 1979, p. 5-5.

23. H. Lauterpacht, editor, International Law, vol. II, *Disputes, War, and Neutrality* (London, 1952), p. 72.

24. Webster and Frankland, vol. IV, p. 74.

25. M.W. Royse, *Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare* (New York, 1928), pp. 158, 172-73, 241; Royse, in *La Protection des Population Civiles Contre Les Bombardments* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1930), pp. 104, 115; and C.C. Hyde, *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*, vol. III (Boston, 1945), pp. 1825-26. There is little treaty law applicable to aerial warfare and, as may be noted by the dates of the references, a dearth of writing by experts on international law on the subject. The development of the law of war as it relates to bombing is discussed by the author in "Conventional Aerial Bombing and the Law of War" in the forthcoming *Naval Review* (1982).

26. JCSM-672-66 dated October 14, 1966, *Pentagon Papers*, vol. IV, p. 357. (Emphasis added.) At no time did the JCS recommend attack of the civilian population.

27. Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York, 1971), p. 600. (Emphasis supplied.)

28. *Pentagon Papers*, vol. IV, p. 261.

29. North Vietnam was a party to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, which provides (Article 28) that "The Presence of a Protected Person [i.e., civilian] may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations." North Vietnamese use of its civilian population for military purposes and to screen targets from attack led to a warning from the International Committee of Red Cross that such activities might result in the entire civilian population losing its protected status. The warning was ignored.

30. Broughton, p. 223. The infamous Bac Mai hospital on the outskirts of Hanoi was used as an AA site to defend Hanoi RADCOM Station No. 11 South, Hanoi/Bac Mai airfield, and the Hanoi/Bac Mai military storage area.

31. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, Article 21. Both the United States and North Vietnam were parties to this convention throughout U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

32. Likewise, though specific remedies are available under the law of war for a captor's mistreatment of prisoners of war, the Johnson administration elected not to pursue those remedies and to ignore evidence in its hands that U.S. prisoners of war were being tortured by the North Vietnamese.

33. The United States participated in two separate negotiations resulting in new law of war treaties during the past few years. The first, the Protocols to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, was signed by the United States in 1977. The second resulted in the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. It has not been signed by the United States. These treaties are undergoing comprehensive review within the Department of Defense and the military services prior to their submission by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Our national involvement in Southeast Asia became an emotional public controversy and hence a political issue. This new and traumatic experience by our nation should provide lessons for our people, our leadership, the news media, and our soldiers.

General William C. Westmoreland
"A Military War of Attrition" from
The Lessons of Vietnam edited by
W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell
(New York, 1977)

DETERRENCE:
AFTER THE GOLDEN AGE

MAJOR LESLIE J. HAMBLIN

THE Pericles of the golden age of deterrence was Bernard Brodie. Like the Athenian statesman, the American Brodie established a strategic framework for this nation that would guide its policies long after his death. Working for The Rand Corporation in the late 1950s, Brodie began formulating the thinking that would later become the mainstay of the American concept of deterrence. The term *deterrence*, as applied to nuclear war, appeared as early as 1955 in a British defense white paper. But the first definitive expostulation on the principles that would become the backbone of American strategic nuclear policy was published by Brodie in 1959 in *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Most of Brodie's later writing on the subject would incorporate technical advances that solidified this thesis.

The essence of Brodie's thesis was simple. He argued that there was no adequate defense against nuclear weapons and that it was unlikely an adequate defense would ever be developed. Although a small faction once held that nuclear weapons were simply more destructive variants of traditional weapons, the development of thermonuclear devices smothered these arguments. Thermonuclear bombs were as great a leap in destructive power over fission weapons as fission devices had been over conventional explosives. Wide-scale deployment of nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) seemed to prove Brodie's thesis. Consequently, he concluded that our nuclear policy must be to avert a war that would lead to wide-scale employment of nuclear weapons, and this could best be achieved by a secure nuclear force capable of retaliating "in kind" to any sort of attack. His thesis had such an aura of "obvious truth" about it that deterrence became the mainstay of American policy in the nuclear age.

The theories of Pericles had much the same effect on the policies of ancient Athens. Pericles insisted that the Athenians remain secure within their long walls and exploit their superiority at sea. While he was alive, he was able to guide the maritime strategy of his country and gradually attain successful ascendance over its

enemy, Sparta. But after his death, the Athenians insisted on modifying his strategy. They insisted they were retaining the maritime essence unchanged. They glibly argued that all strategy must change with circumstance. Yet Pericles had always insisted on several qualifiers to his basic theory. Among the most important was not to dilute Athenian superiority at sea by engaging in large-scale land conflict. His successors ignored these strictures, and their policies led to the Athenian catastrophe at the siege of Syracuse and the ultimate defeat of Athens that ended its golden age.

Brodie, too, had several qualifiers to his basic concept for our less-than-golden age. He insisted that deterrence was a variable quality, sharply affected by the passions and stresses of crisis. To retain its deterrent effect, a military force must not only survive but be able to fight effectively should deterrence fail. He saw clearly that people do not always react in coldly logical ways, especially under the enormous pressures of war. He even stipulated that our forces must be capable of striking first and over-whelming the enemy retaliatory force. Brodie felt strongly that a war-winning policy

was no longer meaningful, but he also felt that a war-winning capability was essential for deterrence. In time, these qualifiers were rejected and the basic theory revised by Brodie's successors. They still called their policies deterrence, but its foundation would be drastically altered.

DECLINE AND FALL

Ironically, the Cuban missile crisis proved how useful a pronounced nuclear superiority could be, and yet it convinced American policy makers to change the thrust of our nuclear strategy. President John Kennedy's brinkmanship is considered by political scientists as a classic demonstration of the use of nuclear superiority to achieve political goals. Yet the gravity of the situation chilled the participants. The realization that American cities were totally vulnerable to missile attack shifted from an intellectual abstraction to a gut-level fear. The number of Soviet systems capable of threat-

Bernard Brodie

Bernard Brodie published one of the first books on nuclear war, *The Absolute Weapon*, in 1946. In that and succeeding works, Brodie systematically developed the concept of deterrence into a revolutionary military doctrine. From his position on the graduate faculty at Yale, Brodie began publishing persuasive tracts that clearly analyzed the awesome power of nuclear weapons and the revolutionary changes they had wrought in military affairs. The essence of his new doctrine stated: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them." While most of his fame came from his work on nuclear strategy, he also wrote extensively on naval policy. The most noted of these works are *Sea Power and the Machine Age* (1941) and *A Guide to Naval Strategy* (1942), both so well thought of that they went through numerous editions.

In the 1950s Brodie became a senior analyst at The Rand Corporation, one of the earliest and most prestigious of the think tanks. He was a member of the faculty that opened the National War College and remained a sought-after speaker at the service war colleges throughout his career. In the 1970s, he joined the political science faculty at the University of California at Los Angeles and continued to publish works both on strategic topics (*War and Politics*, 1973) and military history (*From Crossbow to H-Bomb*, 1973). Most observers consider his best work to be *Strategy in the Missile Age*, published in 1959. Brodie died in 1978.

L.J.H.

ening American cities was growing while our systems lacked the accuracy and explosive power to destroy a silo; and the problem of intercepting an incoming warhead was, in Kennedy's words, "like shooting a bullet with a bullet."

The problem of deterrence was now viewed from a different perspective. It no longer seemed feasible to attempt massive strikes against Soviet offensive capability. Both nations had apparently solved the problem of industrial infrastructure and could conceivably turn out a limitless supply of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. American strategists favoring attacks on Soviet nuclear forces now faced the dilemma of targeting a growing force with inaccurate systems and without good intelligence to target with. Technically, it was an insoluble problem.

American strategists groped for another answer. The basic dilemma was our inability to protect our population and industry from nuclear attack. The solution was to present the Soviets with the same dilemma. American strategy shifted to a "balance of terror." The United States would prevent a nuclear attack on its territory by exacting a terrible price from any aggressor. And that price would be measured in terms of destruction of the aggressor's population and industry. Although the precise level of destruction was somewhat controversial, then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara set an official level of a quarter of the population and half the industry in his 1969 defense report. McNamara called his policy assured destruction, and the level of destruction this policy stipulated subsequently drove America's force size and structure. Superiority became superfluous under this policy. An equal number of systems held by both sides became the best guarantee of stable equality in the balance of terror.

Brodie's superiority thus bowed to parity as the proper structure for America's nuclear forces. Prime importance was attached to securing a retaliatory force capable of inflicting

McNamara's level of punishment. But there were other results of this policy. The communications connecting these nuclear forces were, and remain, highly vulnerable. After all, they only need to work once. The targeting was strictly preplanned and required months to complete. The targeting process was not time-sensitive and need not be flexible. It only had to optimize the destructive capability of a fixed number of weapons. Should nuclear war begin, a decision-maker would be forced to launch American forces quickly, before enemy missiles destroyed our communications. And the American forces would be aimed at a target set designed not to prosecute a traditional war aim but to exact revenge.

The essence of deterrence evolved to maintaining a state of mutual vulnerability between the United States and the Soviet Union. When, in September of 1969, the Soviets passed the United States in numbers of land-based ICBMs deployed, the future of the emerging American concept of deterrence became closely tied to arms control agreements. President Richard Nixon would introduce the term *sufficiency* to the nuclear vocabulary, and American negotiating tactics were aimed at both limiting future growth and preserving the vulnerability of existing forces. At the conclusion of the first series of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the administration felt it had succeeded on both counts. Although the SALT I interim agreement allowed the Soviets greater numbers of missiles, American forces were still considered "sufficient" for the purposes of deterrence. Moreover, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty ensured that no defenses would impair the mutual vulnerability between the two powers.

But the SALT agreements met sharp opposition in the United States. The sophisticated logic dictating that American security was enhanced by adopting an inferior nuclear posture escaped many observers. Others were suspicious of the argument that SALT slowed the momentum of the growth of Soviet forces.

Ultimately, Congress was to insist that future SALT agreements not limit American force levels below those of the Soviet Union.

Once again, technology crept ahead of our concepts for using it. Guidance systems have improved by several orders of magnitude. It is now possible to place more than one warhead on the tip of a single missile. Reconnaissance systems are better able to locate land-based missiles. And the once invulnerable missile silo is slowly becoming a viable target. Technology has made it possible for a bullet really to hit a bullet. These advances in technology have seriously undermined a strategy based on uncertain intelligence and inaccurate weapons.

There is, however, an even greater threat to modern concepts of deterrence. The entire framework of contemporary deterrence has rested on the premise that the Soviets entertain roughly the same view as we do toward nuclear war. There is a growing body of analysts who feel that perhaps no assessment of enemy intentions has landed so wide of the mark since Neville Chamberlain's estimate of Hitler at Munich. These analysts claim that, rather than embracing Western views of deterrence, the Soviets have sharply rejected them. While admitting the tremendous destructive capacities of nuclear weapons, the Soviets cannot admit that their peculiar brand of socialism can be annihilated by technology. They refuse to acknowledge that an idea can be extinguished by a weapon. While many Americans cannot conceive of a political goal that could be achieved by nuclear weapons, the Soviets cherish the destructive capacity of these weapons as the method to resolve the greatest historical problem of the age, the conflict between social systems. To the Soviets, it is inevitable that nuclear weapons will resolve the problem in favor of Marxism-Leninism as exemplified by the Soviet system.

Instead of rejecting the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviets have integrated these devices into a classically Clausewitzian concept of war. War remains an extension of policy by violent means. On a tactical level, the Red Army is designed, equipped, and indoctrinated for operations in a nuclear environment. The Soviets depend on nuclear weapons to neutralize American interference with the Red Army operating on the Soviet periphery. The Soviets consistently refuse to separate nuclear from conventional operations and stress a totally combined arms approach to war. Indeed, rather than parallel the American view of nuclear war, the Soviet view in many ways directly contradicts it.

This interpretation of the Soviet attitude toward nuclear war is a controversial one. It is drawn primarily from Soviet military doctrine and has been criticized for not accurately representing the viewpoint of the Soviet political leadership. Advocates respond that it requires a particularly naïve view of the Soviet system to propose that the military would be permitted to promulgate a strategic view not shared by the hierarchy of the Soviet political structure. The issue has been clouded by Soviet statements to the Western press that seem to mirror the American view of nuclear war. The statements are criticized on one hand as bald propaganda to ingenuous American observers and supported, on the other hand, as candid observations made beyond the watchful eye of the Soviet censor. In the end, however, there is no officially sanctioned body of literature that contradicts the position outlined in Soviet military doctrine. There exists no other authoritative source for the Soviet view of nuclear strategy. And because of this apparent Soviet view, the credibility of those forms of deterrence characterized by terms like *parity*, *sufficiency*, and *essential equivalence* has declined, and in some circles completely fallen.

INTO THE DARK AGES

As much as these concepts of deterrence had fallen from grace, the real dark ages for

post-Brodian thinkers began when the concept of war fighting emerged. The idea that nuclear weapons were nothing more than a bigger bomb had many followers just after World War II. But the explosion of a thermonuclear device closely followed by Brodie's persuasive writings effectively stifled the early war-fighting movement. The reemergence of this school of thought was based on far more sophisticated logic than that of the postwar thinkers. This new school began with the increasingly persuasive premise that the Soviets deny the American precept that a nuclear war is unwinnable. If the Soviets feel such a war is winnable, they will not be deterred by the oft-stated American view that, in a nuclear war, everyone loses.

The war fighters argue that it makes no real difference if, as some suggest, there is a split in the Soviet leadership on the issue of whether a nuclear war is winnable. We cannot identify the split in the communist hierarchy; and, more important, we cannot identify the adherents of one view or the other. Thus, we cannot predict which side might prevail in some future hypothetical debate. What we can identify is a strong and prolific body of authors who publish volumes of writings in one of the most tightly closed societies in history; and it is a body of writings that loudly and vehemently proclaims a nuclear war is winnable. If two schools do exist, the traditional policy of revenge is probably adequate to deter the first. But revenge is inadequate to deter an ideological mind-set so confident of its destiny that the use of nuclear weapons is not the ultimate catastrophe but a calculable risk. The war-fighting school feels that an effective deterrence strategy must also act on this starkly Clausewitzian view of nuclear war. We must somehow convince this second school that the use of nuclear weapons will not be worth the gain. In so doing, we must not simply add to the destruction we can already muster. We must intelligently apply that destructive capacity to the objects that second school values and cherishes. The determination of those objects, of course, also proves an issue of considerable controversy.

Even among war fighters there is considerable debate on how to employ the nuclear instrument. Early on, one branch called itself "the war winners" and jumped into the literature with what amounted to targeting strategies for prosecuting a "winnable" nuclear war. But this branch also quickly ran into heavy going. For example, one strategy proposed targeting the Soviet state. Another suggested targeting the Soviet war recovery economy. Both strategies were criticized not only for being difficult to implement but also because the outcome would be extremely uncertain even if they proved successful. The example of Germany following World War I is not encouraging. We succeeded in destroying its political leadership and reducing its economy to a shambles. Yet no one would recommend the result that began in 1939. The experience of post-World War II Germany and Japan seems to indicate that the rational method to ensure genuine political reform is to occupy the conquered nation, rebuild its economy, and firmly guide its future political development. Few in contemporary America are prepared to embark on such a process with the Soviet Union.

The underlying problem with the proposals forwarded by the war winners is that they have developed a strategy inconsistent with American national policy. They have proposed total war on the Soviet Union à la World War II with the goal of politically extinguishing Soviet leadership. While that may well be a valid wartime strategy, we are nominally at peace today. Furthermore, there are those who would argue that a strong Soviet Union is crucial to American interests. They point out that the Western world is essentially unified for the first time in its history. At least the nations of the West are no longer shooting at each other. They refer us to that time before World War II when America had to develop

war plans against virtually everyone. Today, the existence of NATO and whatever political and economic spinoffs the alliance generates are largely influenced by the threat of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviets counter potential Chinese hegemony in the Far East. Others also point out that the resurgence of Western influence in the Third World is largely due to heavyhanded Soviet behavior in the area. In the end, many would argue that peacetime American policy should aim at constraining Soviet expansionism and aggression rather than destroying the Soviet Union itself.

The strategy proposed by the mainstream of the war-fighting school is more consistent with this interpretation of American policy. Actually, the mainstream of the war-fighting school hesitates to accept this nickname, for they remain dedicated to deterrence as the mainstay of American nuclear strategy. But they are equally dedicated to the proposition that if the Soviets choose to fight, America must also be prepared to fight with a vengeance. They use a two-part concept of deterrence as a point of departure. The threat of revenge has always been the mainstay of a nuclear strategy of deterrence. But since the Eisenhower days, massive retaliation had been discredited as a response to aggression below the nuclear level. The essence of flexible response was the concept of building conventional forces up to the level where they had a deterrent effect by being capable of preventing the Soviets from achieving their objectives by fighting with conventional military forces. Thus, deterrence at the conventional level was not based on revenge but on forcible denial of Soviet objectives. Given the Soviet view of nuclear war, the war-fighting school argues that denial of objectives must also be included in a deterrence strategy for nuclear weapons.

Denying Soviet objectives requires a different concept of operations from that called for by both the war winners and by the post-Brodian school of deterrence. Both of these demand a brief massive retaliatory strike early in the campaign. To the war fighter who is trying to counter a carefully calculating Clausewitzian mind, this is precisely the wrong method of deterrence. If a Soviet planner is convinced that a nuclear war can be won, then providing him with precise data on the size, composition, and timing of your attack is simply insane. It provides him everything he needs to know and can only encourage him. The war fighters argue that the best way to deter this sort of military mind is to introduce a huge helping of uncertainty into his problem. Planners as historically conservative as the Soviets have been would hardly ignore General Helmuth von Moltke's caution that "no plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the … enemy." The war fighters want to make sure that the Soviets will have to contend with many more than just one nuclear meeting should they decide to attack the United States. The war fighters feel the key to deterring the Soviets is the ability for America to fight a prolonged nuclear war. To the war fighter, fighting a long-term nuclear war includes the best of both worlds. It incorporates all the elements of past policies of revenge by threatening the enemy with massive destruction. But more important, it will deter that peculiar Soviet mind-set that not only considers a nuclear war thinkable but also winnable.

RENAISSANCE

It seems clear that the force structure required to fight a prolonged war should consist of a mix of forces. The concept of the triad provides the variety of capabilities and strengths required. Two legs of the triad already incorporate the capability to fight a prolonged campaign by virtue of the ability to reload the launch platform. The third leg, our land-based missile force, is less capable of fighting a prolonged war. In order to fight a nuclear war over time, the launch system must be

highly survivable. A land-based intercontinental ballistic missile can be made survivable by a number of means, among them high mobility, hardening, or hiding them. And the best method of bolstering the survivability of our land-based forces is currently the focus of intense study. But the forces themselves are only part of the solution. A strategy aimed at frustrating enemy military objectives cannot count on accurately predicting those objectives in peacetime. Once the war starts, we must be able to assess enemy objectives, formulate appropriate military responses, and be capable of executing our responses. Our intelligence resources must be able to collect information on the enemy rapidly and analyze and disseminate it promptly. Our targeting staffs must be capable of timely and flexible reaction. Command posts must be survivable. Communications must be hardened and redundant. Most important of all, our strategy should shift from targets of revenge to those targets that support the enemy's capability to wage prolonged warfare. Once that capability is denied him, the enemy can no longer resist.

Whatever specific system becomes the mainstay of America's nuclear force, it will be the ability to strike our enemies again and again that will deter them. No feasible civil defense system can protect a population against nuclear attacks that last for months. No fixed installation, no matter how hardened, can withstand repeated, methodical assaults by thermonuclear weapons. No war machine, no matter how massive, will ever march in its victory parade if still threatened by a nuclear strike.

America cannot sustain a nuclear attack. Our industry is soft, our population unprotected. A nuclear war would be a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions for this country. Deterring such an attack remains the core of American nuclear policy. But we must not confuse the goal of deterrence with the practices that we once used to pursue it. The policy of revenge no longer seems adequate to deter the Soviet mind – set. Parity and essential equivalence were once means to an end we called deterrence. But they may not be effective means any longer. We cannot ignore the existence of an authoritative body of doctrine that directly counters American concepts of nuclear war and deterrence. We cannot ignore the fact that this doctrine is supported by at least one-third of the ruling Communist Party, the officer corps of the Soviet military. And we cannot ignore the fact that the Soviets have built a massive military machine whose composition and structure support that doctrine. Our policies must be designed to counter that doctrine. To ignore it is to risk our very existence.

BERNARD BRODIE was convinced that a war-winning capability was an essential part of deterrence. But he did not mean winning in the American tradition of total annihilation. Winning in deterrence means denying the enemy his objectives. It means controlling outcomes. We no longer have the strength to mass superior forces. To attempt it would exhaust us. But we do have the strength to deny objectives. Not by adding numbers but by adding the new dimension of time can we finally control outcomes. And, in Brodie's own words, "so long as there is a finite chance of war, we have to be interested in outcomes; and although all outcomes would be bad, some would be very much worse than others." We cannot revive the transient technical advantages of the 1950s that made Brodie's concept of deterrence feasible. But we can design adequate forces; and, by employing them over time, we can meet the criteria he established in his classical concept of deterrence. By being able to fight a prolonged nuclear war, we can generate a renaissance of our own and enjoy the stability of our own golden age of deterrence.

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PATRIOTISM AND THE U.S. ALL-VOLUNTEER MILITARY

DR. MORRIS JANOWITZ

SOCIAL scientists who make use of research findings to explain the limitations and strains found in the contemporary all-volunteer military tend to agree on one central conclusion. In general, they accept the premise that adequate economic incentives are of crucial importance. However, economic incentives are an insufficient basis for adapting the all-volunteer military establishment to a set of reasonable goals for the United States. This is the perspective of a variety of historians, psychologists, political scientists, and sociologists. Only the economists remain unmoved in their persistent conviction that higher pay incentives will solve the recruitment, retention, and performance dilemmas of the military services. In fact, some economists believe that the all-volunteer military, as originally designed

by the Gates Commission, has not been given a fair test from the economic point of view; that is, truly competitive wages have not been tried.

Responses from other disciplines range broadly and encompass a variety of recommendations:

• establishment of a voluntary or mandatory national service;

• organization change, especially the adoption of a modified form of the British regimental organization for the ground combat forces, where the weaknesses of the all-volunteer force are most pronounced and apparent;

• new styles of leadership;

• radical decentralization of selected aspects of operational command;

• new systems of recruitment, especially including educational benefits with priority in the allocation of federal educational benefits to attend post high school institutions for those who have served for two or three years in the military forces;

• extensive modification of the career patterns of regular long-term military personnel; and

• more precise formulation of U.S. foreign policy objectives and clearer enunciation of these goals by the elected political leadership.

A few military professionals with strong interest in manpower problems have recommended a reduction in the size of the all-volunteer force; they claim the result would be greater effectiveness and that the present level of active-duty manpower is not required. Other social scientists are skeptical of the ability of the all-volunteer force to be effective over the next decade, given our contemporary U.S. foreign policy.

From my point of view, it is striking that during the period of the all-volunteer force there has been very little research and even less policy discussion of the actual and potential significance of patriotism (and ideology), while our foreign policy has been oriented toward deterrence in the context of the threat of nuclear weapons. My approach to this problem is to examine the meaning of patriotism in the contemporary period and to press for conceptual and terminological clarification. What are we talking about when we use the term *patriotism*? Can the traditional ideas of patriotism be reconstructed to be relevant for a modern all-volunteer force? I believe that ideas such as patriotism need to be modernized or adapted to contemporary realities rather than neglected and avoided.

Also, this article seeks to explore the implications of patriotism — traditional or reconstructed — for democratic political institutions and civilian control of the military. Civilian control is broadly defined to include the political imperative that the locus of decision-making in military affairs rests in the hands of elected civilian officeholders. It also includes the idea that the agencies of defense management are so organized that military professionalism can be effectively practiced, in particular so that the military may effectively utilize their expertise in rendering advice. A democratic society rests on a value consensus. This hardly means a total or comprehensive consensus, but it does mean at least a limited consensus on fundamental principles. Therefore, I will address both positive and negative implications of patriotism as an element in this value consensus.

The relative lack of research on the role of patriotism and political ideology in the all-volunteer force is not the result of the perspective or findings of research about conscription. Particular military analysts have stressed that the "discovery" of the importance of the primary group by the social scientists diverted their attention from the political elements in military morale. Of course, social scientists, especially during World War II, sought to study the dynamics of primary group affiliation as part of their comprehensive analysis of military organization. Until that time, primary group cohesion in the military had not been studied or explored extensively. But social researchers

did not view the military as a collection of separate and suspended primary groups. In "Cohesion and Disintegration of the Wehrmacht in World War II," the systemic importance of secondary symbols was identified and emphasized.[1] Likewise, secondary symbols, including nationalism and patriotism, were not seen as factors separate and unrelated to the structure of primary group relations. The authors Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz were interested in the articulation—and disarticulation—between primary group structure and patterns of secondary symbols. If these two sets of factors were not mutually supporting, cohesive primary groups could work against military effectiveness. We formulated an explicit proposition about the necessity of such linkages and stated:

> The capacity of the primary group to resist disintegration was dependent on the acceptance of political, ideological, and cultural symbols (all secondary symbols) only to the extent that these secondary symbols became directly associated with primary gratifications.[2]

The linkages between primary groups and the larger institutional structure of the Wehrmacht were various, but especially important was the symbolism of Hitler. Hitler was a remote but highly effective representation to the average German soldier and officer of the importance and legitimacy of sacrifice on the battlefield.

Thus, the state of research on the eve of the introduction of the all-volunteer military should have stimulated research into the role of secondary symbolism — including patriotism and nationalism — in the all-volunteer force. In fact, given the self-selection of military personnel into the armed forces, the importance of patriotism and other secondary symbolism might be stronger than in particular groupings under the general and heterogeneous recruitment patterns of conscription. The failure to study these crucial questions was in part due to two reasons. First, in social science circles, the idea of patriotism has been subject to intense criticism and negativism. It had taken,

with some justification, a beating, especially among the intellectuals. Second, social scientists, and I include myself, do not operate with a carefully worked out research agenda that stresses continuity over time; rather we stumble from project to project, study to study, with the result that crucial data required for trend studies are not effectively and systematically collected and analyzed. But we are still faced with the task of clarifying and reconstructing the meaning and consequences of patriotism, especially the impact it has on the all-volunteer military force.

Patriotism, Ideology, and Civic Consciousness

The sociopolitical conception of military service — conscript or volunteer — is clarified to some extent by examining three related terms at the same time: *patriotism, ideology* or *political ideology,* and *civic consciousness.* Military service in a democracy is related to citizenship. *Citizenship,* as I use the term, has been profoundly influenced by nationalism and by Western nationalist revolutions, particularly the American and French revolutions. The nation-state was offered by the leaders of these revolutions as an appropriate unit for organizing social, economic, and political reform. Therefore, it is not surprising that citizenship has in the past been bound up with patriotism and nationalist ideology. But *nationalism* as a form of political ideology and *patriotism* have become battered ideas under constant intellectual attack. I seek to make use of these terms not only as polemic devices but also as they have been clarified by social scientists. Of course, this is not completely possible.

I shall, therefore, introduce and define a third term, *civic consciousness.* My interest in this term is multiple. I wish to avoid the negative connotations of patriotism and the persistent ambiguities of ideology. I also wish to deal directly and explicitly with the

reconstruction of patriotism into a format relevant for contemporary citizenship and civic education in a highly interdependent world arena.

It is well recognized that patriotism is markedly different from political ideology, although there are various political ideologies which make extensive use of patriotic symbols. By an *ideology* I mean an elaborated and explicitly formulated, complex system of beliefs designed to support a comprehensive program of sociopolitical action. (The term *political* is therefore redundant when one uses the term *ideology*.) Moreover, an ideology requires thoroughgoing affirmation and observance. To hold particular beliefs hardly implies that the person has an ideology; nor is a loose collection of political proposals an ideology. Of course, one can speak of a partial ideology for such political perspectives. The central aspect of an ideology is that it offers its adherents a compelling code of behavior for most or all life situations.

By contrast, patriotism is not based on an elaborated or complex system of ideas and symbols. To the contrary, patriotism is essentially a primordial attachment to a territorial society, a deeply felt and almost primitive sentiment of belonging; a sense of identification similar to religious, racial, or ethnic identifications. Of course, patriotism has been historically associated with the ethos of modern national societies. Patriotism involves an automatic, almost unthinking response and is in this sense analogous to an ideology. However, it offers no detailed code of behavior but rather a generalized orientation to action.

Although both ideology and patriotism as concepts suffer from an overload of polemics and the difficulty of precise meaning, one cannot avoid the issues that these ideas raise. The elaborate and comprehensive character of an ideology has been the source of much criticism. Ideology also implies rigidity, which is viewed with suspicion. Ideology is in this sense at variance with recourse to pragmatic philosophy and practice, to learning by experience that has been so central in the development of citizenship. But there is a powerful attraction in ideology, especially among undergraduate college students. Therefore, the principle-mindedness of an advocate with a developed ideology remains a component of discourse in a pragmatic and democratic polity. The tolerable input from ideological sources might be described as involving a small number of ideological adherents and wide diffusion of their ideas, with no extensive or preponderant commitment or ability that would block collective problem-solving.

Patriotism, precisely because it is an unthinking response, has also been subject to intellectual, analytic, and moral criticism. In a period of scientific and technological development, patriotism becomes strained. Vocal critics have argued that the interdependence of the world community makes nationalism and traditional patriotism outmoded, useless, and even counterproductive. This argument deals with the full range of social, economic, and political forms of interdependence. However, the crucial aspect of this argument rests on the worldwide distribution of instruments of mass destruction, which makes nationalism vestigial at best.

In short, in this view nuclear weapons have ended the relevance of the nation-state. The analogy with the decline of the city-state and the growth of the nation-state is offered. The danger rests not only on the possibility of nuclear holocaust but also on the strain to human society that could result if the nuclear arms race continues unmonitored and uninhibited. Indeed, some form of world government is the alternative if human values are to survive. Therefore, conventional notions of citizenship are obsolete and counterproductive; world allegiance needs to be substituted for national patriotism. While only a tiny minority of the electorate adheres to such a perspective, the impact of this type of thinking has had discernible consequences in weakening traditional

forms of patriotism. The result has been to produce considerable popular uneasiness about patriotism.

I reject this type of global "world citizenship" analysis. To reject such analysis hardly implies an acceptance of the status quo or a lack of recognition of the profound transformation of the world arena in the last half century. Obviously, the world community has become more and more interdependent, and the component parts are not effectively integrated. The existing forms of national and international organization suffer from "cultural lag." Existing values prevent the emergence of more appropriate institutions. However, merely to assert that the nation-state is outmoded and obsolete is to engage in an oversimplified and overdetermined form of societal evolution. Societal change that produces more complex and more interdependent organizations does not eliminate earlier and more self-contained social forms. Instead, the result is a greater degree of internal specialization in these organizations as the construction of new and more comprehensive ones takes place.

This is the case for a wide range of social institutions: the family, the local community, and the nation-state. The growth of urbanization and industrialization did not eliminate the family but narrowed its functions and altered its internal relations. The same is true of the local community. Elimination of the local residential community, anticipated by some social forecasters, has not taken place with increased population concentration and new modes of urban transportation. Again the local community has become more specialized as new and larger units of organization have been superimposed on local institutions.

Transformation of the nation-state continues. The growth of world regional and supranational organizations has been impressive even if the achieved results have failed to meet hoped for expectations. We have created the bare bones of worldwide institutions. But the essential assumption for the student of citizenship in my judgment is that the nation-state remains the essential and basic unit, directly and indirectly, in the search for a more viable world order. The nation-state becomes more important as specific functions and tasks are transferred to more encompassing institutions. This is the case because viable and effective nation-states are and will continue to be the basic and essential component elements of regional and supranational institution building.

The implications for citizenship and the reconstruction of patriotism are clear, although the means for attaining them remain depressingly elusive. Each citizen of a democratic polity has a set of rights and obligations to his nation-state. These are basic and paramount. Likewise, each person has a set of international or rather "supranational" rights and obligations that are at best emerging and which remain diffuse and unclarified. In principle, there is no fundamental or unbridgeable incompatibility between the rights and obligations of national and supranational citizenship or between national and supranational patriotism. In effect, however, particular, specific aspects of national citizenship and nationalistic patriotism have to be adapted to the requirements of a highly interdependent world. But, to repeat, national citizenship is not expected to dissolve but, rather, to remain the central and viable core of a broader sense of citizenship. Regional integration, such as economic institutions in Western Europe, can become of crucial importance, but such developments only serve to specialize the functions of the nation-state and in fact increase its importance in the search for a political base for a stronger world order.

Because of the gross dysfunction of the nuclear arms race, the world arena is better characterized as a "world disorder" than as a "world system." But the basic elements of a rudimentary world community operate. To strengthen it, one must deny in part the Kantian assumption that universal freedom within nations is required. I am prepared to abandon

this requirement since I do not expect the future world community to be without misery and without war. The goal of national and international citizenship and a reconstructed patriotism is a world in which the struggle against human misery is carried on with considerable energy — more than present levels of nationalism have engendered. The goal is a world in which war is limited to conventional weapons and in which even conventional war is subject to persistent international political inhibition. In other words, the deliberate initiative in the use of nuclear weapons or even the expectation of their inevitable use renders my analysis useless. Clearly, realistic enlarged citizenship does not require a world military balance based on the elimination of national and regional systems of nuclear weapons. Instead, it requires reasonable bilateral and multilateral accords of mutual controls, which I believe are feasible among existing political systems and must be augmented by supranational monitoring systems.

If the nation-state remains the basic organizational unit for the social construction of a broader sense of patriotism, national citizens function in the world community in two distinct configurations.

- First and centrally, the individual functions through the official agencies of his political regime. This is obvious but inescapable.
- Second, unclear and most troublesome is the need for the individual citizen to exercise some aspect of his citizen rights and obligations directly in the world community with only limited mediation by his national government.

But I am not immobilized by the fact that democratic polities should and will be judged by a higher standard of performance in this regard than one-party states.

Therefore, it becomes necessary to ponder the definition and redefinition of the content and meaning of nationalism, particularly national ideology and patriotism in the contem-porary period. Is it possible to think of a delicate balance of vigorous national sentiments with ever-strengthened supranational civic aspirations? In sociological analysis, the distinction between "locals" and "cosmopolitans" is too often overdrawn and rigidly applied. The United States is not made up exclusively of nationalists (locals) or internationalists (cosmopolitans). Those who think of themselves as internationalists constitute a tiny minority. The bulk of the population is nationalists of varying intensity. It is crucial that segments of the nationalists have already expanded their sociopolitical space to include in varying degrees a supranational frame of reference. We are not dealing with a zero-sum game; international identifications are not necessarily developed at the expense of more localistic or delimited affiliations.

Nor is patriotism an inherent barrier to the search for world citizenship. Of course, traditional forms of patriotism that developed in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century are far from appropriate. Articulated patriotism, incorporating a clear element of self-conscious awareness, is required for the emergence of supranational citizenship. In fact, there has been an observable modification of patriotism in the United States. To describe the situation in alternative terms, the refashioning of nationalist ideology and traditional patriotism has already proceeded to that point where global international sentiments are not the only alternative to traditional nationalism and conventional patriotism. In elements of the population — a minority though it be — one can find a sense of enlightened self-interested nationalism and patriotism relevant for an expanded scope of citizenship. (It is striking that the massive machinery of academic and commercial public opinion surveys has completely neglected study of attitudes of national and international identification.) But there is no need to struggle with traditional terms and concepts in order to deal with the requirements

of contemporary citizenship and patriotism — national or supranational. Civic education limited to the inculcation of traditional patriotism or conventional nationalist ideology is obviously inadequate for the complexities of an advanced industrial society and a highly interdependent world. In fact, I find the terms *nationalist* and *patriotic* limiting. I offer and make use of the term *civic consciousness*. It refers to positive and meaningful attachments a person develops to the nation-state. It represents strong commitments but not without a self-critical component. Civic consciousness is a relatively self-critical version of patriotism in an advanced industrial society. Civic consciousness is compatible with and required for both national and international responsibilities and obligations. It involves elements of reason and self-criticism as well as personal commitment. In particular, civic consciousness is the process by which national attachments and national obligations are molded into the search for supra-national citizenship. I believe that given the state of military technology and the forms of international conflict, the concept of civic consciousness is highly relevant both for the career military and the short-term personnel of the all-volunteer military. A military concerned with effective national alliances, with arms control and peacekeeping, and with regional political stability cannot hide under old-fashioned patriotism. Its patriotism must be linked to the positive roles it is asked to perform.

Patriotism and nationalist ideology of the reconstructed variety still require a strong emphasis on the inculcation of tradition; which elements of tradition are relevant is a highly debatable matter. In any case, civic consciousness rests on an important component of effective and reasoned education. It is easy to offer formal programs of civic education, especially for military personnel. But such an analysis is beyond the scope of this article. The central and unanswered question is: Will such programs work? Still another question persists: Who shall educate the educators themselves?

Yet, at this point, I am interested in the positive and negative educational effects of military service, be it conscript or volunteer.

Military Service and the "Citizen Soldier"

The strongest test of citizen obligation is performance of military service in defense of the nation-state. Such an assertion is fully compatible with conscientious objection to military service based on religious, ethical, or even political grounds. A democratic polity does not require a tyranny of the majority. To state the issue alternatively, military obligation may be highly distasteful, but it cannot be without pervasive legitimacy if it is to be an expression of democratic citizenship.

Let me press the argument of military service and citizenship even further. Obviously, military institutions even in peacetime, but especially in wartime, rest on authoritarian structures that operate at variance with the procedures of a democratic polity. I offer that observation, although my years of research on military organization highlight for me the growth of managerial authority in the armed forces. War is immensely destructive and traumatic for its participants. Of course, most of the armed forces are not fighters. Nevertheless, participants in military formations are subject in varying degree to the ethos of the "management of violence." My reading of politico-military history and my specific analysis of the experiences the United States has had lead me to the conclusion that military experience, although it may in the generality of world history be destructive of democratic values of citizenship, is hardly universally so. The case of the United States and selected Western democracies in important aspects has been at least a partial but noteworthy exception.

However, the paradox is deep and complex, and I make no claim that I fully understand it. Mass armed forces, with effective discipline

and technologically advanced weapons, developed first in the West. Yet in the West, democratic political institutions were able to emerge and persist despite these military institutions that increased in their organizational weight and potential political power. Patriotism, including its more strident forms, has in the past been stimulated by the military profession.

Nevertheless, military dictatorship was not the outcome. No one would deny the role of the military as a powerful pressure group during the contemporary period in Western democratic states. But Harold D. Lassell's provocative imagery of the "garrison state" has not come into being during the twentieth century in those countries.[3] In fact, in Western nation-states, the emergence of advanced industrialism has been accompanied by a decline in the threat of direct political intervention by the military and an increase in the supremacy of civilian control. But the military as a powerful and traditionally patriotic group presents a range of political dilemmas. Even in the historically troublesome case of Germany, we have at last the emergence of civilian control in the armies of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I am in effect stating that in modern history the military elites of the West have had immense resources and the organizational power to effect greater military intervention into the political process than has actually taken place. By contrast, in other regions weaker armies historically have exerted greater political power. In particular, the very limited military forces of developing nations have, since 1945, revealed the extensive capacity of their military elites to dominate political life in their nation-states. Obviously, we are dealing not only with the relative resources and potential power of the military but with the weakness of civil-political institutions in the Third World.

If we focus on Western parliamentary polities, can one discern the conditions under which military service has operated as a positive and effective form of civic education? It is clear that, for fighters and nonfighters as well, military service is a powerful experience, a deeply moving experience in the fashioning, for better or worse, group sentiments and affiliations.

The historical record does not permit one to offer the hypothesis that conscript armies with widespread participation serve as effective agencies of citizen education. Conscription per se is not the relevant variable. There are too many instances of authoritarian regimes that have perpetuated centralized and arbitrary power by the use of conscription. These regimes have used conscription to create a police system and coercive control over the population that served in the military. With the passage of time, many of these regimes were weakened by the mass mobilization that conscription generated.

It is rather the development and acceptance of the concept of the citizen soldier — as both a political symbol and military reality — which has been an operative factor in civic education contributing to civilian supremacy and viable patriotism. The citizen soldier has a long and interrupted history going back to the Greek city states. But the American and French revolutions have come to serve as the historic moments in the emergence of the modern military and political version of this classic formula. (I would not overlook the equivalent experience of Great Britain, where local militia had important implications for citizen participation in political control of the central armed forces.)

Service for the citizen soldier, of course, takes a variety of forms: service in the local militia (later the national guard); membership in volunteer military units; and, most extensive, participation in conscripted forces with large reserve components. The idea of the citizen soldier is as much a political and ideological formula as it is a system of organizing military manpower. But regardless of the type of service, the central political element is that military service rests on the obligation of the citizen to the nation-state.[4] Of course, cadres of career professionals are required, but the

citizenry supplies the bulk of the personnel.

Moreover, the person who serves as a citizen soldier does not lose his civilian political rights. These rights may be temporarily constricted, but the less the better. In fact, military service demonstrates one's citizenship, and in turn citizenship is enhanced by military service. As a political formula, there is a strong element of symbolic myth in the citizen soldier, but the symbolic content has its political importance along with actual military realities.

CONCRETELY, I suggest the following hypothesis for the United States, which can be adapted to other Western political democracies. From the American Revolution to the end of World War II, military service, expressed in the duties and obligations of the various forms of citizen soldiering (and the associated forms of militarily influenced patriotism), were at least compatible with parliamentary democracy. In fact, experience during the American Revolution and subsequent military involvements served as a form of civic education in support of the democratic polity. This is not to justify the moral worth of any specific military action, to imply that results were uniformly beneficial, or to overlook the hyperpatriotism that agitations by veteran groups have generated. Rather it is to cause us to assess the overall outcome of the citizen-soldier format on patriotism and democratic perspectives in comparison with consequences of service in the all-volunteer force.

My overall hypothesis faces limiting conditions; namely, since the end of conscription in June 1973, there has been a decline in the effectiveness of military service as an agency of civic education. We need to investigate whether the reconstruction of patriotism becomes thwarted, as I believe has been and will even more be the case. It may be that for the majority of the active-duty military their patriotic perspective is more pragmatic and reconstructed than rigid and merely traditional. However, for one segment of the military (and civilian) population, the frustrations and tensions of international relations generate a rigid and defensive patriotism, a form of maladapative xenophobia that hinders creative problem-solving and effective pragmatism. For another segment, indifference to these issues appears to be the defensive response; this is especially true of the recruits with limited education and from socially marginal backgrounds.

Of course, the long-term impact of the all-volunteer military is not predetermined. But with the introduction of nuclear weapons, the old-fashioned cycle of war and peace gives way to a permanent and chronic tension and struggle between superpowers and their client states. How can one expect that under such conditions military service will automatically and as a matter of course enhance a person's understanding of the political environment and broaden and deepen the scope of his patriotism? Unless corrective measures are taken, the reverse is likely to happen. Interestingly enough, decline in the ability of the armed forces to operate as an agency of effective civic education is matched by the decline in the public school system to perform its civic education and civic consciousness functions.

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Notes

1. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Social Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 2 (1948), pp. 280-316.
2. Ibid., p. 281.

3. Harold D. Lassell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1941, vol. 46, pp. 455-68.
4. Morris Janowitz, "The Citizen Soldier and National Service," *Air University Review*, November-December 1979, pp. 2-16.

OF TREES AND LEAVES
a new view of doctrine

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TO THE aspiring student of the military art, doctrine is too frequently an uncharted wilderness. One is confronted by military-journal articles proclaiming the extraordinary importance of doctrine and yet offering disparate definitions of the word. These same journal articles often refer to the derivation of doctrine from lessons learned in bloody combat by the "great captains" while at the same time the basic U.S. Air Force doctrinal manual devotes considerable space to such current and pacific subjects as the "personnel life cycle." It is no wonder that to many, the word *doctrine* conjures up confusion and consternation.

What has caused this disarray? Some confusion probably stems from the origin of the word, which is more closely tied to religion than to military affairs. Much more confusion is rooted in the use and misuse of the word throughout military literature. Most of the confusion, however, occurs because of our lack of historical aware-

ness, particularly within the Air Force. Our penchant to be on the leading edge of technology has often resulted in a general disdain for things past. Airmen loathe to admit that history, especially "pre-air power" history, contains lessons applicable to contemporary thinking.

All of these confusing factors cloud the picture, obscuring our view of doctrine and its importance. We are unable to visualize doctrine as a working entity, unable to determine if these confusing factors fit together in some sort of coherent whole. In this article I will attempt to bring some degree of order to the obvious confusion by defining doctrine in a manner that is both accurate and connotatively expressive; by revealing the sources and functions of military doctrine; by exploring the different types of doctrine and their relationships; and by considering some of the problems with official military doctrine as published today.

What It Is

As suggested, the word *doctrine* has a religious heritage. Application of the term, however, has spread to many disciplines. Thus we find, in addition to religious doctrines, scientific, social, political, and military doctrines. All of these doctrinal forms fit conveniently under the definition of "theory based on carefully worked out principles and taught by its adherents."[1]

Our concern here, of course, is military doctrine. Many have attempted to refine the common definition of doctrine to better fit the peculiarities of the military. For example, military doctrine has been defined as:

> A compilation of principles and policies . . . that represent the best available thought and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice.[2]

or

> Fundamental principles by which the military forces . . . guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.[3]

Each of these "militarized" definitions could suffice, but neither captures in useful terms the essence of military doctrine and its importance.

Perhaps the best definition of military doctrine, one that is accurate, concise, and yet retains the vitality befitting its importance, harks back to doctrine's religious heritage. *Military doctrine is what is officially believed and taught about the best way to conduct military affairs.*[4] Defining *doctrine* in this manner is significant for several reasons. First, using the word "best" connotes military doctrine's importance to the successful conduct of military operations. Second, the term "military affairs" implies that doctrinal concepts are not limited to battlefield engagements with an enemy. A broader concept of military doctrine is particularly important during an era in which the development and deployment of forces rivals the importance of the employment of those forces. Third, the word "taught" suggests an important function of military doctrine, which will be discussed later. Finally, the word "believed" directly suggests the interpretive and thus transmutable nature of military doctrine. This final point leads naturally to the questions of what is interpreted and why doctrine is transmutable. In short, what are the sources of military doctrine?

Sources

The primary source of beliefs about how "best" to conduct military affairs is the experience of how things were conducted in the past. In other words, the primary source of military doctrine is military history. The remaining discussion, then, is limited to *military* doctrine.

History can reveal the repeated success or failure of certain actions. These observations can then be generalized into doctrine. Finally, these beliefs, if tested over time, can be abstracted into general principles — doctrine that is axiomatic. For instance, in the history of aerial combat, attacks from the rear place the

attacker at a great advantage. This can be generalized into a doctrinal statement such as "maneuver to attack enemy aircraft from its six o'clock position." We could further analyze this doctrinal statement and determine that attack from the rear is advantageous because the enemy has difficulty observing his six o'clock position and thus is often unaware that he is about to be attacked. We might also observe many other instances in which unanticipated actions placed opponents in difficulty. Because of this repeated observation over time, further abstraction to the status of a principle might be appropriate. Such an abstract principle might state, "Surprise is an important element in successful offensive and defensive operations."[5] This example is certainly oversimplified, but it illustrates the role of history in formulating doctrine. The process is one of repeated observation that may be followed by generalization and, in some cases, abstraction.

Understanding that military history is the principle source of doctrine is enlightening, but two problems still remain. First, how does one apply the wisdom of experience to beliefs about the present and future? Second, how does one accommodate those "military affairs" for which there is little empirical evidence in the past. Situations change, enemies become friends, friends become enemies, and the steady march of scientific progress changes the tools of war at a rapid pace. Experience by itself cannot possibly provide all the guidance needed to cope with every rapidly changing situation.

Lieutenant General John W. Pauly has pointed out that ". . . experience without theory lacks an adequate frame of reference to accommodate future changes that will surely come."[6] Theory — a notion used to explain phenomena made plausible by reasoning from accepted facts — provides the framework for future application and is the second major source of doctrine. Also, "meaningful Air Force doctrine, suitable for all the complexities and forms of modern aerospace warfare, is the synthesis of theory *and* experience."[7] It was

the development of theory by members of the Air Corps Tactical School that led to the development of strategic bombing plans used in World War II. Currently, we find that much of our doctrine concerning nuclear war is based on theory since no one has ever waged a nuclear war; the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan did not constitute a nuclear war by any stretch of the imagination.

What It Does

Why do we have these beliefs, and why do we teach them? Again, one can find many statements, both official and unofficial, that attempt to describe doctrine's functions.[8] A broad synthesis of these statements reveals three fundamental doctrinal functions. The first, and perhaps most important, is to provide an analysis of experience. The welter of experience must be analyzed in an attempt to distill lessons that can be of value in dealing with present and future circumstances, i.e., beliefs about the best way to conduct military affairs. But the analysis must not be static. Changing circumstances, perhaps best characterized by technological developments, can change what we believe are the important lessons of experience. If present circumstances do not affect the analysis of history's lessons, doctrine will quickly become irrelevant. The French experience after World War I is illustrative of this problem. Based on the demonstrated superiority of the defense when ensconced in strong trench works during the Great War, the French constructed, during the 1930s, the world's most elaborate and sophisticated fortifications along the German border. Unfortunately, the static fortifications of the Maginot Line were irrelevant in the new age of mobile warfare.[9] The French analysis of history's lessons was not tempered by contemporary circumstances, particularly the advent of motorized ground warfare supported by air power.

If doctrine's first function is to provide a tempered analysis of experience and thus a

determination of what we believe, the second function must be to teach these beliefs or lessons to successors. Without the teaching function, analysis has little value. Without passing on the lessons of experience — ours and others' — we are doomed forever to "reinvent the wheel." For example, the American Civil War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) clearly illustrated that entrenchments, breechloading rifled weapons, and machine guns had so strengthened defensive capabilities that frontal assaults could be mounted only at frightening cost and with dubious prospects for success. And yet during World War I, "Both sides took turns in staging variations upon Pickett's Charge, modernized in weaponry and minor tactics but equally futile."[10]

Why did such a tragic circumstance ensue when the lessons were so clear? Part of the problem may have been faulty analysis. Or, as Professor Russell F. Weigley indicates, the Europeans may have been blinded by pride. In effect, what happened to "backward" armies was of no consequence to highly trained and disciplined European armies.[11] Whatever the reason, the lessons were not effectively transmitted, clearly illustrating the importance of doctrine's teaching function and the obstacles that can be encountered.

Doctrine should also provide guidance for actions, particularly important in the heat of combat when direction from superiors may be unavailable. Perhaps Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox put it best in 1915:

> The object of military doctrine is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force, in accordance with the intentions of the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken. More concisely stated, the object is to provide a foundation for mutual understanding between the various commanders during hostile operations.[12]

Some might believe that setting off the guidance function as distinct from the analysis and teaching functions is a frivolous overcomplication. Yet guidance, doctrine's third function, is actually the fruition of the first two. There is, however, value in maintaining the distinction. Superior analysis of experience coupled with efforts to teach has little value if no lasting impact is made on the student. This implies two things: First, what is analyzed and taught must be useful; and second, the student must be convinced of its utility. One would assume that just keeping the guidance function in mind while analyzing and teaching should eventually lead to more useful doctrine.

Redefining Military Doctrine

To this point, all seems simple and clear enough. Why, then, is there confusion and consternation? The answer lies in the nature of official U.S. military doctrine as published today and our lack of awareness that very different types of doctrine have existed throughout modern military history. Each type had its own unique characteristics and functions. Taken together, however, they form an integrated whole. Unfortunately, doctrine as published in the United States today is only a small part of that integrated whole. The result is confusion and consternation.

There seems to me to be three meaningfully distinct types of doctrine: fundamental, environmental, and organizational, and I think a brief survey of these doctrinal types will be helpful in resolving the confusion.

fundamental doctrine

Fundamental doctrine, as the name implies, forms the foundation for all other types of doctrine. Its scope is broad and its concepts relatively abstract. Essentially, fundamental doctrine consists of beliefs about the purposes of the military, the nature of war, the relationship of military force to other power instruments, and similar subject matter on which less abstract beliefs are founded. A few samples of doctrinal statements that fit into the

fundamental category will clarify the issue. We might believe, for example, that:

- War is policy carried on by other means.
- War is the failure of policy.
- The object of war is to overcome an enemy's hostile will.
- The object of war is the destruction of enemy military forces.
- The object of war is a better state of peace.

Any of these statements, if officially believed, would fit the definition of fundamental military doctrine. They would seem applicable in democratic or authoritarian states and would seem cogent whether discussing Napoleon's campaigns or recent Arab-Israeli conflicts.

An examination of these statements also reveals two other significant characteristics of fundamental doctrine. The first is its "timeless" nature. It seldom changes because it deals with basic concepts rather than contemporary techniques. The second characteristic, which stems from the first, is that fundamental doctrine is relatively insensitive to political philosophy or technological change.

Other subjects that could be considered a part of fundamental doctrine are the basic principles for the effective employment of military forces. These "principles of war," as they are most commonly called, are fundamental factors that commanders must carefully consider when making force-employment decisions. Professor I. B. Holley has indicated that principles of war are doctrinal beliefs that have become axiomatic.[13] But axioms depend on one's interpretation and analysis of history and the current circumstances that influence both interpretation and analysis. This problem is well illustrated by the different principles of war adopted by armed forces throughout the world.

Although fundamental doctrine is the most basic form of doctrine and thus the foundation for all other forms, one rarely finds officially adopted, pure fundamental doctrine. The great military philosophers (Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and others, for example), who dealt extensively in these most fundamental concepts, wrote unofficially. How, then, do their theories become doctrine? First, their works are studied and taught, particularly in military educational institutions. Second, bits and pieces of their theories are found in official doctrinal publications.

environmental doctrine

As man's technology enabled him to put to sea and take to the air, the proclivity to wage war in these environments quickly followed. Quite naturally, beliefs about how best to use sea power and air power also developed. Thus environmental doctrine (the rubric for the doctrinal sea power, air power, etc.) is a compilation of beliefs about the employment of military forces within a particular operating medium.

Environmental doctrine has several distinctive characteristics. First, it is clearly narrower in scope than fundamental doctrine because it deals with the exercise of military power in a particular medium. Second, environmental doctrine is significantly influenced by factors such as geography and technology. Sea power doctrine, for example, is obviously influenced by geography — there are many places to which you cannot take naval vessels — and by technology, particularly since the advent of naval aviation and submarine warfare. Air power doctrine is less influenced by geography but is totally dependent on technology.

As one would expect, sea power doctrine developed long before air power doctrine. Sea power's most notable modern exponent, Alfred Thayer Mahan, expressed the consistent theme that sea power was supremely important in shaping national destinies. Although much of what Mahan wrote was unofficial, it qualifies as doctrine because it was taught (for example, at the Naval War College, where Mahan was President from 1886 to 1893) and because his ideas about sea power were widely believed. As M.T. Sprout has noted, Mahan "precipi-

tated and guided a . . . revolution in American naval policy, provided a theoretical foundation for Britain's determination to remain the dominant seapower, and gave impetus to German naval development. . . ."[14]

Air power doctrine is a newer example of environmental doctrine. The Italian airman Giulio Douhet and American aviator William "Billy" Mitchell were two of the most articulate exponents of air power, and their writings form the foundation of air power doctrine. Their emphasis was on the decisiveness of air forces in war, theorizing that strategic bombing would destroy a nation's will and ability to wage war. Following this logic, they believed armies and navies were, at best, defensive weapons and that the outcome of war would be decided in the air.[15]

During the 1930s, the Air Corps Tactical School faculty expanded the themes of Douhet and Mitchell. These air power pioneers theorized that if certain elements of an enemy's industrial web could be destroyed, the economy which supported war-making capability would collapse like a house of cards. The key was daylight precision bombing aimed at destroying vital industrial elements. These theories became unofficial doctrine. As the threat of a European war increased, doctrinal beliefs were directly or indirectly converted into detailed action plans, i.e., strategy that specified equipment needed and targeting priorities.[16]

The first official air power doctrine published in the United States was FM 100-20, which appeared in July 1943. It has been called the Magna Charta of U.S. air power, for it contained the first definitive official statement that air power must be centrally controlled by an airman. Additionally, FM 100-20 contained statements indicating the importance and unique capabilities of air power. It indicated, for example, that strategic bombing could defeat an enemy nation, that interdiction could result in battlefield isolation forcing enemy retreat, and that close air support paved the way for the advance of ground forces.

FM 100-20 was, for the most part, air power doctrine, one form of environmental doctrine. By our definition, it contained virtually no fundamental doctrine. It did contain, however, scattered elements of "organizational doctrine."

organizational doctrine

Organizational doctrine is best defined as basic beliefs about the operation of a *particular* military organization or group of closely linked military organizations. It is, in fact, an attempt to bring the abstractions of fundamental and environmental doctrine into sharper focus by leavening them with current political realities, capabilities, and cultural values. Typically, organizational doctrine will discuss roles and missions assigned to an organization, current objectives, administrative organization, force-employment principles as influenced by the current situation, and, in some instances, tactics.

Organizational doctrine has several salient characteristics when compared with fundamental or environmental doctrine. First, organizational doctrine is *very* narrow in scope. While fundamental doctrine concerns the basic notions of military force and environmental doctrine concerns the use of force within a certain operating medium, organizational doctrine concerns the use of particular forces (e.g., U.S. forces or Soviet forces) in a particular environment (e.g., U.S. Air Forces or Soviet Air Forces) at a particular time — today. The second characteristic of organizational doctrine stems from the first. Organizational doctrine is current and thus tends to change relatively frequently in order to remain "current." This contrasts sharply with the almost timeless qualities of fundamental doctrine. Environmental doctrine would also seem to have considerable staying power.

The U.S. Army's FM 100-5 is an excellent recent example of organizational doctrine, exhibiting all of the characteristics described

above. FM 100-5, although bearing the title *Operations*, is concerned primarily with the European battlefield and operations against the Warsaw Pact. A large portion of the manual describes current trends in weapon lethality, force organization, as well as current concepts for fighting offensive, defensive, and other specific types of operations.

Air Force Manual 1-1, *Functions and Basic Doctrine*, is another example of organizational doctrine. It is the successor to FM 100-20 mentioned earlier. The evolution from the environmental air *power* doctrine of FM 100-20 to the organizational U.S. Air Force doctrine of AFM 1-1 (1979) was very gradual. The first successor manual appeared in 1953, followed by revisions in 1954, 1955, 1959, 1964, 1971, 1975, and 1979. The 1953 edition was primarily air *power* (i.e., environmental) doctrine flavored with just a bit of the then current political situation. Each succeeding revision saw the inclusion of more and more of the attributes of organizational doctrine and less environmental emphasis. The end result is U.S. Air Force doctrine, not air power doctrine. Air power environmental doctrine is no longer officially published.

Organizational doctrine can itself be categorized. In addition to capstone publications such as AFM 1-1 and the Army's FM 100-5, we also have operational doctrine that is even narrower in scope. AFM, 2-1, *Tactical Air Operations*, and the Army's FM 17-50, *Attack Helicopter Operations*, are two examples of operational organizational doctrine. Finally, the United States has joint/combined doctrine, such as JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action of Armed Forces*, which is another form of organizational doctrine. Obviously, as these publications become more and more narrow in scope, they take on the characteristics of regulations or standard operating procedures. Where one draws the line between beliefs about how to do things and directives about how to do things is a matter of conjecture.

ORGANIZATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

FUNDAMENTAL

HISTORY

The Doctrine Tree

How do these complex puzzle pieces fit together? Clearly, fundamental doctrine is the basis for all other doctrine types while environmental doctrine is at least part of the basis for organizational doctrine. With these relationships in mind, I constructed the doctrine tree as the most useful way to visualize the whole of doctrine.

The trunk of the tree is fundamental doctrine, the basis for all other doctrine types. The trunk, of course, has its roots in the ground, which represents history or experience, the primary source for doctrine. The tree branches represent environmental doctrine — each springing from the trunk, each individual and yet all related. The leaves represent organizational doctrine — dependent on both the trunk and the branches, changing from season to season.

Let's carry the tree analogy even further. What happens if we cannot accurately interpret the lessons of history? This is analogous to cutting the tree's roots, which could kill the tree (i.e., lead to defeat). What happens if we do not have valid fundamental or environmental doctrine? This is analogous to a diseased trunk or branch, which could kill the tree including the leaves (i.e., lead to defeat). The doctrine tree analogy illustrates that doctrine must be a coherent whole to be valuable. The tree illustrates the dependencies involved and the often ignored importance of fundamental and environmental doctrine.

Where does this leave doctrine today? As noted, the only officially published doctrine, at least in the Air Force, is organizational doctrine. AFMs 1-1, 2-1, etc., fit our definition of organizational doctrine although they do contain some references to fundamental doctrine (the "principles of war" in AFM 1-1, for example) and to environmental doctrine (characteristics and capabilities of aerospace forces, also in AFM 1-1). However, even these concessions to more basic doctrinal types are modified by current circumstances. If organizational doctrine is all that is published today, the central question becomes one of sufficiency. Is organizational doctrine enough? We can begin to examine this question by looking at the three types of doctrine in comparison with the three purposes of functions of doctrine.

Fundamental and environmental doctrine fulfills the analysis and teaching functions. The broad abstract concepts of fundamental doctrine are generally the results of considerable historical analysis. The point is notable in the two great military philosophers previously mentioned: Clausewitz was an interpreter of Napoleon while Liddell Hart based nearly all of his fundamental concepts on historical research and interpretation. Environmental doctrine is also often based on historical analysis and "lessons learned" as they relate to the relevant operational environment. Mahan, for example, won his initial acclaim as a historian.

Of particular note, however, is environmental doctrine's teaching function. Clearly it has functioned so as to transmit basic lessons concerning the environment in question. However, it often functions as a selling tool by teaching the uninitiated about the opportunities and benefits of exploiting that environment. Thus environmental doctrine can act as a weapon in the bureaucratic struggles over roles, missions, and associated budget allocations. Mahan developed sea power doctrine and extolled its virtues in part to promote a large

Navy and Merchant Marine. Mitchell promoted an independent Air Force through air power doctrine. Thus, environmental doctrine has had a unique dual-teaching function.

Organizational doctrine presents a different picture. Even a cursory examination of Air Force Manual 1-1 reveals that it does not fulfill doctrine's analytical function. Historical references are more gratuitous than instructive. Concepts are presented as facts without reference to derivation. It is also clear that without the analysis function, Air Force organizational doctrine, typified by AFM 1-1, cannot accomplish the teaching function defined earlier. Quite clearly, the purpose of U.S. Air Force doctrine is almost exclusively one of current guidance.

The fact that organizational doctrine cannot fulfill the three purposes or functions of doctrine does not totally address the issue of sufficiency. But the shortcomings of organizational doctrine lead to other important issues that call sufficiency into question. One must first wonder how experience will be analyzed and the lessons taught if we publish only organizational doctrine. Do we not need a solid grounding in the art of war itself before we attempt to fulfill the current guidance for U.S. forces in today's environment? Is not a military leader without knowledge of the fundamentals of the military art analogous to a brain surgeon without knowledge of basic medicine?

One might also wonder how many of the difficult issues facing the military can be logically addressed without the context provided by fundamental and environmental doctrine. Have nuclear weapons changed the basic nature and purposes of war? What is the impact of unconventional forms of war, such as Mao's People's Revolutionary War? Given both experience and new technology, what are the practical capabilities and limitations of military power in general and air power in particular? Will not the answers to such fundamental questions shape the future U.S. military establishment?

Finally, one must wonder what happens to

organizational doctrine that does not rest on the foundation of more basic doctrinal forms. If there is no logic "audit trail" from fundamental concepts to current application, how does one judge the validity of organizational doctrine? It would appear that organizational doctrine without a firm foundation runs the risk of becoming little more than dogma.

Organizational doctrine, no matter how well structured, cannot adequately fulfill all three doctrinal functions. Organizational doctrine, by definition, cannot provide the context needed to logically address many of the difficult issues facing the military. The most serious problem, however, may be that if we do not develop more historical awareness, organizational doctrine can lose its basis. If the entire doctrine tree is not healthy, the leaves of organizational doctrine can blow unfettered in the winds of change, providing confusion rather than guidance.

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Notes

1. *Webster's New World Dictionary* (New York, 1978).
2. R. F. Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1964* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1971), p. 3.
3. JCS Pub. 1, as quoted in Lieutenant General J.W. Pauly, "The Thread of Doctrine," *Air University Review*, May-June 1976, p.3.
4. The author owes the idea for this most useful definition to Professor I. B. Holley, Jr., of Duke University. In addition to presentations of this concept by Professor Holley at Air University, he presented a similar concept in the 1974 Harmon Memorial Lecture at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
5. See Doctrine Information Publication #2 published by Assistant Deputy Director for Strategy, Doctrine and Long-Range Planning, Hq USAF, 5 October 1978.
6. Pauly, p.3.
7. Ibid.
8. For a few examples see Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine*, particularly Chapters 1 and 15; Pauly, op. cit.; Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Hutchinson, "A New Look at an Old Problem," *Air University Review*, January-February 1979, pp. 69-73; and Major Robert C. Ehrhart, "Some Thoughts on Air Force Doctrine," *Air University Review*, March-April 1980, pp. 29-38.
9. There are numerous accounts of the French experience. Two are exceptional: Alistair Horne's *To Lose a Battle, France 1940* (Boston, 1969); and William L. Shirer's *The Collapse of the Third Republic* (New York, 1971).
10. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (New York, 1973), p. 195.
11. Ibid.
12. Lieutenant Commander D.W. Knox, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," originally in *Proceedings*, March-April 1915, as quoted in Weigley, p. 514.
13. Refer to Note 4 concerning lectures at Air University.
14. M.T. Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, New Jersey, 1971), p. 415.
15. See Giulio Douhet's *The Command of the Air* (Rome, 1921, 1958 translation), and Mitchell's *Winged Defense* (New York, 1925). Also see Edward Warner, "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare," found in Earle, pp. 485-503.
16. An excellent discussion of this is found in Major General Haywood S. Hansell, *The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1973). See also Futrell, Chapter 3.

military affairs abroad

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN TURKISH POLITICS

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We, as the loyal and stubborn sons of the Republic you founded and the principles you established, had to take over the country's administration and say "stop" to those who failed to protect the regime and your principles, and who pushed the country into more and more darkness and helplessness.

General Kenan Evren
Chairman, Turkish General Staff
12 September 1980
Honor Book, Atatürk Mausoleum

INVOLVEMENT or intervention of the military in the political affairs of a nation-state has been a recurrent and not altogether unwelcome phenomenon throughout recorded history. Although the most recent example of this can be found in the coup d'état in Turkey in 1980, from Rome through the Middle Ages, in the spread of Christianity and of Islam, to the Renaissance and the modern era since the Congress of Vienna, the historical record is replete with instances of military men taking on the mantle of political leadership.[1] Yet in the contemporary period, involvement of the military in political matters often has been viewed with ambivalence, if not outright hostility. On the other hand, there have been numerous instances, particularly in the Third World or LDCs (lesser developed countries), where the military has intervened in what has been evaluated as a positive manner.

It is my contention that one cannot begin to understand or analyze the implications of the coup d'état by the Turkish General Staff on 12 September 1980 unless one has a firm grounding in the historical — even perhaps traditional — role of the military in Turkish political affairs. Furthermore, if one is equally interested in the evolutionary process of modernization in a traditional society, and if one

were to use Turkey as an example or case study, then the role of the military in this process must be thoroughly scrutinized.[2]

In this article I will examine the involvement of the Turkish military in political affairs within the historical perspective to answer two basic questions. First, how has the Turkish military come to be such an integral and influential actor or interest group in Turkish political affairs during the past two decades?[3] Second, to what degree has the Turkish military molded, guided, and accelerated the process of modernization and the direction of politics in Turkey, since the founding of the republic but particularly during the multiparty era since 1950? An understanding of the historical underpinnings of the Turkish military's political activities coupled with answers to the above questions should provide us with some tentative notions as to the future role that the Turkish military will play in the post-1980 coup period.

Early Reforms under Selim III and Mahmud II

Any rigorous study of the role of the military in the modernization of the nation-state of Turkey and in the contemporary political affairs of Turkey should commence with a brief synoptic recapitulation of historical and political antecedents in the Ottoman Empire.[4] One central theme emerges in this study: the modernization of the Ottoman Empire from the seventeenth century onward was interwoven inextricably with the activity of the Ottoman military. As a prime mover or catalyst or as the conduit for the new ideas (including revolutionary ones), the Turkish military for nearly three centuries has either occupied center stage or could be found waiting in the wings as the veritable *deus ex machina* of Turkish politics.

In 1683 the Ottoman army reached the gates of Vienna, only to be turned back after sweeping through the Balkans and most of Eastern Europe. From that date forward, the defeats which the declining Ottoman Empire suffered

at the hands of the Great Powers in 1699, 1708, 1774, 1792, and 1799 were the initial (and undeniable) impetus for change.[5] The reaction to the loss of integral territories of the empire, beginning with the Treaty of Carlowitz on 26 January 1694 and culminating in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca on 21 July 1774, took the form of ambitious attempts to modernize the Ottoman military system during the reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39).[6]

"Actual measures to introduce something new into military training date from the work of (Comte) de Bonneval (in 1729)."[7] Although Bonneval's efforts produced superficial and at best ephemeral results, these early partial reforms foreshadowed the later, more thoroughgoing measures introduced by Sultan Selim III.[8]

The first conflict between the modernizing reforms of Selim III and the traditional ruling elites or interest groups was evident during this period. The traditional Ottoman ruling elites—the ulama, the Janissaries, the older Ottoman military officers, and the *âyāns* (autonomous feudal overlords) — were collectively opposed to these modernizing reforms and actively resisted them for two reasons. First, France, as the source and model for modernization, was considered to be an infidel nation whose radical ideals and system of government could only lead to a diminution of the Islamic political underpinnings of the empire. Second, a strengthened, forward-looking class of rising young military officers would threaten their vested interests and their positions of political, social, and economic dominance in Ottoman internal and external affairs. Hence, from these earliest attempts at modernization in the Ottoman Empire, there was a fundamental divergence between the modernizing reforms and the traditional elites. This divergence was manifest in continual conflict between the military as a modernizing force and the political elites. This will be a pattern extant through 1980, as will be demonstrated below.

Under Selim III and his successor, Mahmud II, concerted attempts were made under the *Nizam-i Cedid* (New Order) to institute additional modernizing reforms. While Selim initiated this far-reaching plan, it remained for Mahmud to abolish or curb the influence of these traditional interest groups.[9] Once again, the Ottoman rulers turned to the French; however, this time not only were military innovations and reorganization directed by the Sultan but the French were also responsible for modernizing the Ottoman bureaucracy and diplomatic corps.[10] There is some evidence, in fact, that the new military classes and the new bureaucrats were exposed to the ideas of the French Revolution.[11]

The most serious opposition to military reforms came from the traditional privileged military class known as the Janissaries. While they may have proved to be an ineffective military force in defense against encroachments from the Great Powers, the Janissaries were nevertheless firmly entrenched as the Palace Guard in Constantinople at the close of the eighteenth century.[12] However, Mahmud fully realized that he had to take positive steps to eliminate this stumbling block because

> . . . no real progress towards reform would be possible until all power other than that emanating from him had been eliminated, and the Sultan's will made the sole source of authority in the provinces as well as in the capital.[13]

By using the Janissaries to curb the *âyāns*, Mahmud was able to weaken both interest groups. Driving a further wedge into the power of these traditional interest groups, Mahmud then brought the *waqf* (pious foundations) of the ulama under his control. Finally, on 17 June 1826 Mahmud ordered loyalist artillery units of his new army to open fire in the barracks housing the rebellious Janissaries, exterminating in less than five hours an institution that had held power for over four hundred years.[14]

With the destruction of the Janissaries and the backing of his new army, Mahmud was

able to introduce additional administrative reforms. These included the first Ottoman census in modern times and a comprehensive land survey. The immediate objectives of these two measures were ". . . conscription and taxation—men for the new army and money to support it."[15]

These reforms of Mahmud were the first of a lasting nature in the Ottoman Empire's process of modernization. Although initiated as a defensive response to the challenge of the Great Powers, these reforms set the stage for the work of his successors as well as for the activities of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. Yet it should be well noted that the military played a key role throughout this process.

When Mahmud II died in 1839, he was succeeded by his son, Abdul-Mejid II, whose first action was to proclaim the Noble Rescript of the Rose Garden (*Hatt-i Sherif of Gülhane*) on 3 November 1839. This edict initiated the period in Ottoman history known as the *Tanzimāt* or Reorganization. Then, on 18 February 1856, in response to pressure from the Great Powers, the *Hatt-i Hümâyun* or Reform Decree (*Islihat Fermani*) was proclaimed.[16] The central theme of these edicts and of the reforms instituted during the *Tanzimāt* period was the declaration of full equality for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of religious belief or national origin.[17] Emphasis was shifted to programs of improving the educational opportunities throughout the empire for all its citizens. It was in this area that the rise of the Young Ottomans as well as the first stirrings of Arab nationalism and Pan-Turkism received their impetus.[18]

In addition to basic reforms of equality in educational opportunity, with all citizens of the Ottoman Empire now considered equal subjects, the military and civil service were opened up to any individual with the requisite ability and intelligence. The provincial bureaucracy functioned effectively, and the Sultan had virtually absolute control over the entire apparatus of government. It was precisely this absolute control that caused the Young Ottomans to seek new reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The Young Ottomans and the Young Turks

Because only tenuous links are discernible between the Young Ottomans and the new military class, the *Tanzimāt* period may be quickly summarized.[19] The second half of the nineteenth century was characterized by continuing internal decay within the Sublime Porte and by an underlying process of intellectual growth and ferment among the younger men who were rising through the ranks of the modernized civil service and the new military units. In the case of the Young Ottoman movement, the intellectual core was the backbone, with activist agitation against the Sultan, the modus operandi.

It was these junior officers and provincial bureaucrats, building on the activist writings and political organizing of the Young Ottomans a decade earlier, who formed the first secret revolutionary military society in 1889.[20] The name of this group was "Progress and Union"; later it was changed to the "Committee of Union and Progress" or what the world has come to know as the Young Turks. The members, in order to preserve secrecy and hide their identities from the Sultan's secret police, were organized into compartmentalized cells.[21]

Although neither of the two standard works on the Young Turks treats the ideological underpinnings of this movement, there is enough evidence to suggest that it was indeed a military movement.[22] As Andrew Mango contends:

. . . the Young Turkish Revolution of 1908 can be seen as a model for military intervention in politics . . . it was a military operation which seized power, and it was followed by other military operations in 1909 and 1913 until the

plentitude of power was concentrated in one junta.[23]

For years the military schools had been centers of intellectual activism and protest against the autocracy of the Sultan, but these activities were confined to the schools themselves. However, by 1906 military committees were organized secretly among the junior officers of the Ottoman army.[24] These cells were called *Vatan ve Huriyet* (Fatherland and Liberty); one of the earliest members was a little-known General Staff lieutenant stationed with the Ottoman Fifth Army in Damascus, Mustafa Kemal. Kemal in turn organized other cells among the officers stationed in the Arab lands of the empire. The real source of power, however, was among the junior officers who formed the secret military committees in the Third Army Corps in Salonika.[25] At the same time, the intellectual faction continued to agitate from its Paris base, having inherited the mantle of the Young Ottomans.

On the eve of the Revolution of 1908, a loose but powerful confederation of intellectuals, provincial bureaucrats, and junior military officers existed under the banner of the Committee of Union and Progress.[26] They agreed that the Sultan had to be removed and that if violence were necessary to accomplish this, then violence would be employed. A series of military disturbances and outright mutinies broke out throughout the empire during the first several months of 1908, culminating in July in the Young Turk Revolution.[27]

At this juncture it would be useful to reiterate the underlying theme that the stimulus for modernization and political change during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also emanated from the military. While some of the modernizing reforms were imposed on the military as a response to the external threat to the empire from the Great Powers, the military was the focal point and the catalyst for the significant political changes during these two centuries that culminated in the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. In fact, the impact of the

junior officers of the Ottoman army as a modernizing force, both in deposing the Sultan and informing the nucleus for the Republic of Turkey, cannot be overstated.

With the arrival of the German military mission in 1914 and the subsequent entry into World War I by the Ottoman Empire, the military arm of the Committee of Union and Progress achieved total predominance over the political affairs of the empire.[28] At the same time, they presided over the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of the European territories and the Arab lands of the empire. After spectacular initial successes against the British at Gallipoli in 1914-15, the Ottoman forces fell prey to inept senior leadership and to the superiority of British forces in Palestine and of the Bedouins led by Lawrence in Arabia.

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, blessed by various peace treaties following the cessation of hostilities, was the signal for the more nefarious of the Young Turk political leaders to flee. In the resultant struggle for political leadership, the new sultan attempted to return to the pre-*Tanzimāt* era; he dissolved the parliament and ruled by decree. The economic and social reforms that had been instituted so painstakingly were disbanded.[29] Yet at the same time grassroots support was growing for the nationalist movement that was forming in Anatolia under the aegis of Mustafa Kemal.[30] This movement was the catalyst for the Turkish War for Independence.

The Kemalist Era, 1920-1950

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Father of the Turkish nation, quite simply took the remnants of the Fatherland and Liberty cells and used them to form the nucleus of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. This defense association was in turn responsible for organizing, planning, and executing the revolution for Turkish independence. The national struggle was designed initially to prevent Allied dismemberment of the

Turkish heartland of the Ottoman Empire, but its ultimate achievement was the proclamation of the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923.[31]

Atatürk was able to revitalize and perpetuate the *Tanzimāt* reforms of the previous century. Moreover, he initiated new, far more consequential modernizing reforms, which not only brought the Republic of Turkey into existence but gave it substance and a solid social and ideological undergirding, bringing Turkey into the twentieth century, phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The six basic tenets of what has come to be called "Kemalism" are familiar to most students of modern politics and have been analyzed thoroughly elsewhere. What should be well noted here, however, is that Atatürk was able to initiate and perpetuate these reforms not solely because of his much-vaunted charisma and his shrewd political machinations but because he had the total support and loyalty of the Turkish military.

There is a direct progression from the Fatherland and Liberty cells to the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia to the founding of the Republican People's Party in 1924. When the first Grand National Assembly convened on 23 April 1920, the military constituted 15 percent of the elected deputies, a total of 56 seats, by far the largest single occupational or interest group. From the Second through the Seventh Assemblies, a period of some thirty years, the military consistently held 20 percent of the seats.[32] Moreover,

> . . . from the Second up to the Seventh Assembly the military group was the most favored. In most instances it was the largest occupational contingent at the *top* leadership level, and it was more overrepresented at that level than any comparable group.[33]

These former military officers, products of the modernized Ottoman military education system, had followed Atatürk's rising star throughout the war and had astutely recognized that his reform program was the only hope for a resolution of the social, economic, and political chaos which the nascent Republic of Turkey faced in the 1920s.

When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died in 1938, he was succeeded by his Prime Minister Ismet Inönü.[34] Renowned for his skill as a negotiator on the Lausanne Treaty and revered as the military hero of the Revolution for Independence, Inönü was the antithesis in both leadership style and personal appearance of his mentor and closest friend, Atatürk. Yet Inönü continued to lead Turkey along the basic course that Atatürk had set, while at the same time—here reflecting his more liberal *Weltanschauung*—gradually allowing the controlled growth of opposition political parties, at which Atatürk had made only a token attempt.

Although the military remained quiescent during the Inönü years, particularly as Turkey maintained a strict policy of neutrality during World War II, this was not the result of some traditional policy of an apolitical Turkish military class. True, in the Kemalist era, the military had stayed out of politics because it was well represented in the Grand National Assembly by the Republican People's Party, which had a disproportionate number of retired senior officers who held the most influential leadership posts in the government.

Nevertheless, the military viewed the gradual relaxation of the one-party rule with ambivalent concern. Although this has been cited as "the probably unique case of a dictatorship's voluntary self-transformation into what comes near to a democracy or at least, a more-than-one-party system,"[35] there is no question that in the rise of the multiparty system, the military "lost both its large general representation and its top-level contingent."[36] When the Democratic Party emerged victorious in the elections held in 1950, the pendulum swung away from the underlying military influence of the Kemalist era.[37] This development would have lasting repercussions for the future political direction of Turkey.

Intervention of the Military in the Multiparty Era, 1950-1980

Perhaps it was inevitable that the multiparty system instituted by Inönü would devolve into the factional polarization and bitter conflict which have characterized Turkish politics between right- and left-wing extremists during the past two decades.[38] But more important was that the Democratic Party, following its victory in 1950, "began to tamper with the cherished programs supported and even, to a large extent, inaugurated by the army ... and, in the eyes of many officers, began to sabotage some of those programs."[39] Hence, there was a latent but growing feeling of betrayal among these military officers which was "gradually grouped under a commonly agreed slogan of 'a return to Atatürkism' or 'Neo-Kemalism'."[40] Not only had the pendulum swung away from Kemalism, but the very supporters who had provided the most cohesive element in Turkish politics for thirty years were now on the fringes, a potentially powerful force, the veritable *deus ex machina* of Turkish politics for the next twenty years. This feeling of betrayal, coupled with President Adnan Menderes's indiscriminate use of the military to enforce martial law edicts to prop up his unpopular regime, resulted in the politicization of the military in the late 1950s. The impact of this was felt on three occasions between 1960 and 1980.

The Menderes Coup

Although politicization of the military officers was a direct result of the failure of the social and economic policies of the Menderes regime, there were a number of underlying factors that led to the coup on 27 May 1960 which are worthy of analysis.[41]

> Regimes in Turkey have been challenged by a variety of leftist and rightist groups, either because (the regime) supposedly retards modernization and does not achieve social justice, or because the economic developments and social change undermine the basic values and the established order in the society.[42]

This factionalization and polarization led to a general breakdown in internal security within the republic. In response, Menderes pushed a series of restrictive measures aimed at curbing dissent in the urban areas and restricting active opposition by other parties and interest groups; the Grand National Assembly rubber stamped these regulations and enacted them between 1954 and 1957. Not only was strict censorship placed on the newspapers and radio stations, thus inhibiting free discussion of the political and social issues, but opposition parties were barred from access to the state radio, the only way the masses could be reached during the election campaign of 1957.[43]

How did these repressive measures affect the military officers? Menderes was not unmindful of the need for support from the military; in fact, he actively courted it, promoting officers freely, "but he chose officers for the top commands on the grounds not of merit but of fidelity to the prime minister."[44] It did not take the remaining senior officers, loyal to their Kemalist legacy, very long to realize that the military was fast becoming a tool of the Menderes regime. Instead of the close links with the Republican People's Party enjoyed during the Atatürk and Inönü years, the military was called on in the spring of 1960 to suppress meetings of the political opposition and quell student protest demonstrations. In short, Menderes attempted to employ the army as a police force to destroy the opposition party.

In a real sense, then, the military was virtually forced to overthrow Menderes. His politicization of the military in this martial law role undermined two of the traditional heroes of the military: the Republican People's Party, the party of Atatürk to which the military owed special and long-standing allegiance, and Ismet Inönü, who actively and passionately opposed the Menderes regime and whom Menderes ordered silenced, barred from public political activity. It was almost a classic political confrontation, with the Republican People's Party backed by the military on the one side, and the

Democratic Party of Menderes on the other. With no "democratic alternative (means) to gain power or even to air their views, . . . violent upheaval seemed the only immediately available option for sweeping change."[45]

The actual coup was most probably the inevitable historical and political consequence of the continued internal deterioration in Turkey. While the details are relatively unimportant, it should be noted that the group which seized power in a bloodless coup was known as the Committee of National Unity. It was led by General Cemal Gürsel and consisted of thirty-eight officers, ranging in rank from general to captain and in age from 65 to 27.[46] Its stated purpose was to return the Turkish Republic to the democratic reforms of Atatürk. The immediate or proximate *casus belli* was an order from Menderes to the military to arrest Ismet Inönü. But in fact this revolution

> . . . was organized and planned by students and faculty of the War College and the Faculty of Political Science . . . as many of the same social forces that had achieved the Young Turk Revolution of a half-century earlier.[47]

Shortly after the National Unity Committee assumed power, it declared that the revolution "was not against any individual or any group . . . Every citizen regardless of his identity and party affiliation shall be treated in accordance with principles of justice."[48] Of the original 38 members of the National Unity Committee, 14 differed in their interpretation of these principles of justice from the majority of the officers. These 14 believed that the military should continue to hold power indefinitely to protect the nation from the leftist extremists.[49] General Gürsel exiled these fourteen officers to distant embassies as military attachés on 13 November 1960. Among them was Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, about whom we shall hear more later.

One of the first acts of the National Unity Committee, ruling through its executive agent, the civilian Council of Ministers, was to abrogate the Constitution of 1924 and commission a special task force to write a new constitution. This task force would be made up of civilian bureaucrats, leading members of academia, and a token number of military officers; it was charged with producing a constitution that reflected the contemporary social, political, and economic realities of Turkey but which was also grounded in the spirit, if not the letter, of Kemalism. At the same time, the National Unity Committee instituted a wide range of social reforms that reflected a definite military flavor. A perusal of these programs and regulations leaves one with the feeling that the military leaders not only sought a return to Kemalism but believed that the means to the end lay in tighter state control over social, economic, and educational institutions.

On 9 July 1961 the new constitution was the subject of a national referendum and was ratified by a 61 percent plurality. National elections were held on 15 October 1961 and were carried out with no civilian or military interference, signaling that the democratic experiment in Turkey was still alive, not in spite of military's intervention but, in my view, because of it. Turkey now entered a new phase of its political life, the era of coalition government. No party had won an absolute majority of the seats in the Grand National Assembly, and the National Unity Committee was very much concerned that without one party firmly in control, a return to the pre-1960 social and political chaos might happen. However, when Ismet Inönü agreed to serve as Prime Minister and General Gürsel retired and was elected by the Grand National Assembly as President of the Republic, the military willingly handed over the reigns of government.

One result of the 1960 experience was that a new major political party was formed. The Justice Party, led by retired Army General and former Chief of the General Staff Ragip Gümüşpala, became the party of the center. At the same time, several minor political parties, often little more than splinter groups, were formed on the polarized fringes. In the

coming years these parties would contribute to (and at times cause) the internal chaos and terrorism rampant in Turkey in the late 1970s.[50]

The intervention of the military in Turkish politics in 1960 was, in retrospect, imperative if Turkey were to survive the paralysis and chaos found under the Menderes-led Democratic Party government. Based on private conversations with several Turkish officers, it appears that the military sincerely believed that this action was their only alternative. Yet they never gave any indication that their action was anything more than a temporary measure. On the other hand, while they willingly returned control to the civilian leaders, they also served notice that they would never again allow the situation to deteriorate to that point. Hence, while there may be genuine historical and ideological similarities between the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress and the 1960 Committee of National Unity, the real political linkage of the military's intervention in politics had its watershed in the Menderes Coup in 1960.

The major reason for the seemingly quick return to normalcy was that the military was supported by the bureaucratic and intellectual elites, all of whom desired a return to the center, or at least slightly to the right of center, following the disastrous flirtation with the leftists politics of Menderes's Democratic Party.[51] In summation, then, of this first instance in contemporary times of the military's involvement in Turkish politics, it should be evident that there was not a tradition of nonintervention in politics. The military would continue to remain in the wings, again acting as the *deus ex machina* when called on.

The 1971 Coup by Communiqué

One cannot overstate the fact that the original leaders of the National Unity Committee considered themselves merely temporary custodians of authority in 1960-61. However, as events in Turkey during the late 1960s were to prove, "the subsequent record of politics (and social chaos) in Turkey emphasizes that the military have by no means been able to extricate themselves completely."[52] In a large measure this was due to the increasing activism of the splinter political parties on the polarized fringes and the inability of any one major party to rule in a majority fashion. Politics by coalition soon degenerated into politics by deadlock, which in the case of Turkey, in its still nascent democratic experience, could only result in internal chaos. Having served notice in 1961 that it would not tolerate a similar situation in the future, the military was once again forced to intervene to prevent further deterioration.

A quick synopsis of events is necessary to serve as the backdrop for this intervention. As had been feared by the National Unity Committee, even Ismet İnönü was forced to rule through three successive coalitions (1961-64). During this period several of the small splinter factions on the left and right fringes banded together under respective larger, umbrella-type groups. One of these, an ultraconservative, pro-Kemalist coalition, was the Republican Peasant National Party, headed by retired Colonel Alparslan Türkeş. This coalition became increasingly activist and radicalized and picked up support throughout the rural areas of the country during the late 1960s.[53] There were other parties and coalitions active as well, but what is important here is that an atmosphere was fostered (or at least tolerated) in which all of these various parties and interest groups "became more and more adamant in criticizing the government . . . manifesting their opposition in street demonstrations and even more violent activity."[54]

As was the case with the counterculture opposition's violent activism in the United States during the Vietnam era, the largest percentage of rank and file in these groups were youths and college students who tended to support the leftist parties, "each looking to its own admired prophet—Marx, Lenin, Mao, Marcus —and (adopting) a platform composed of the

teachings of two or more of these thinkers."[55] Not only did these groups adopt Marxian ideologies but they also used Stalinist tactics, participating in a wave of violence and guerrilla warfare with which Suleyman Demirel, the Justice Party Prime Minister, was unable to cope. Of course, the continued refusal of the Republican People's Party to participate in a coalition government and its vitriolic criticism of the Justice Party's failures further encouraged the extremist groups to increase their terror tactics.

It should be noted that many of these polarized fringe radical elements attempted to penetrate the military with their revolutionary propaganda; some cells were organized among junior officers. This hardly pleased the senior military officers, especially when these groups made blatant moves aimed at "recruitment of Kurdish youths and talk about a Kurdish people, which smacked of inciting the Kurds in Eastern Turkey to secede."[56]

The actual "coup by communiqué" is a rather curious affair. It was evident that the military high command—the Chief of Staff and the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—was becoming increasingly apprehensive about internal security and disenchanted with the Demirel government's seeming inability to maintain some semblance of order in the cities and in the countryside. Corrective action was not only imperative but was most probably inevitable.

On 12 March 1971 the military chiefs issued "a stern warning which *threatened* military intervention *if* a strong and credible government capable of passing reform measures could not deal with the severe domestic instability and strife."[57] Specific demands were made for bipartisan leadership and cooperation, coupled with a crackdown on urban terrorists. This memorandum or coup by communiqué was delivered to Demirel by the President, Cevdat Sunay, and resulted in the ouster of the Justice Party. Hence, it might justifiably be argued that this memorandum was more of an ultima-

tum than an advisory communiqué because by this time the military's fund of patience with Demirel and his Justice Party had been exhausted.

A new coalition government was appointed under Professor Nihat Erim, and martial law was declared in Ankara and Istanbul and in the 11 major provinces of the country.[58] Remaining in effect for 31 months, this period of martial law, in retrospect, did little to change the long-term trend of violence because it attacked only one part of the problem, and then only the symptoms and not the roots. Over 40,000 leftists were arrested and tried by military courts.[59] However, according to Article 138 of the Turkish Constitution of 1961, civilians can be tried only for strictly military offenses even in periods of martial law.[60] According to an official government white paper issued during April of 1972, only 687 people were tried by military courts during the first year of martial law.[61] What is likely is that many of the leftists were arrested and detained without trial. At the same time there were clear links between the extreme leftists and radical elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The new Minister of the Interior, Ismail Aren, declared that there were several areas of danger but that the extreme leftists were the most critical and would receive highest priority.[62] The key point is that the rightist groups appear to have been left relatively untouched. While this may be a reflection of the right wing coalitions that ruled Turkey during the early 1970s, it is also a portent for the undoing of what little order martial law was able to bring.

Free elections were held in October of 1973, and martial law was lifted. Nye contends that

... the 1973 election demonstrates that the military would attempt to influence the election if true danger to the system were perceived, but by doing nothing, by not forcibly intervening, the military enhanced the viability of the system and increased civilian respect for itself.[63]

When the election results failed to bring in a

majority vote for any party, the military was forced to pressure the Republican People's Party into a coalition rule with the National Salvation Party.[64]

Turkey throughout the rest of the 1970s was a boiling cauldron of internal violence in both urban and rural areas, a country beset with economic woes, which were exacerbated by total dependency on OPEC for oil. In an allegorical sense, Turkey resembled a runaway express train careening toward an unfathomable abyss without an experienced engineer at the helm. The only chance at stopping the train, at averting national disaster, would seem to be renewed intervention by the military.

It is increasingly apparent from 1961 onward that, as internal social, economic, and political stability became more and more elusive, the armed forces have had to exercise closer vigilance over political developments in what seems to be an expansion or redefinition of their perceived role as guardians of the nation of Turkey. On the other hand, although martial law brought some respite in the violent terrorism, it might also be argued that martial law increased the strident militancy and determination of the extremist factions, many of which had gone underground because the pressure of military rule gave them no other alternative. Once conditions returned to normal, the widespread violence resumed, only this time on a much more intensive scale. Rightists and leftists and splinter groups in between took to the streets and countryside and engaged in a bloodletting unparalleled in the history of modern Turkey. "How perilous the situation had become is reflected in the proclamation of martial law in the last days of 1978 . . . Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's argument was that . . . the army might step in (otherwise)."[65]

Not long before his death, Ismet Inönü attempted to justify or at least to explain the special role of the military in Turkish politics when he wrote on 28 February 1973 that

> . . . the military sincerely respects the political parties as increasing elements of our democratic

life, and all our political parties comprehend the responsibility which the military carries in our country's life. The strength and vigor of our democracy arises from the existence of such a balance.[66]

If there is one factor or term that most clearly describes Turkish politics between 1960 and 1980, it is disequilibrium. The one agent of stability and continuity throughout this period has, in fact, been the military. For this reason the most recent instance of intervention can only be regarded as a continuum of its role as well as predictable reaction to the chaos in the country. As one author stated

> The ambiguous Kemalist legacy and the 1960 precedent, in short, together with contemporary conditions of economic underdevelopment, political stalemate, extremism and military alertness, are the kind of combination which makes direct intervention anywhere by the armed forces highly probable and in Turkey a distinct possibility.[67]

The September 1980 Coup

It should be well noted that the jury is still out on the outcome of this specific instance of direct military intervention in Turkish politics. There is no question but that the military was motivated to take strong action by many of the same social, economic, and political conditions that have gnawed away at the Kemalist foundations since the late 1950s. What is perhaps somewhat different this time, however, is the significant influence of the rightists, the ultraconservatives, particularly the Grey Wolves, the terrorist arm of the Nationalist Action Party (formerly the Republican Peasants' National Party), led by retired Colonel Alparslan Türkeş. No longer was the Turkish government able to focus on the leftists. Violence had become endemic, with terrorist groups of every political persuasion engaged in total violence throughout the country. The estimates vary, but something between several thousand and 15,000 people were killed in the last year before the September coup.

On the morning of 12 September 1980, Gen-

eral Kenan Evren, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, led a coup d'état against the government of Suleyman Demirel. On 20 September General Evren announced that retired Admiral Bülent Ulusu, Turkish Ambassador to Italy, would serve as interim Prime Minister.[68] It appears from the media accounts of these events that the military leaders want to return power to a tough civilian government that would bring the economic chaos and endemic violence of the terrorists to an end. To achieve this goal, in the first four months since the coup, 32,537 terrorists were detained, and authorities confiscated more than 168,000 firearms, including 757 automatic weapons, over 900,000 rounds of ammunition, 951 sticks of dynamite, 2100 kilos of gunpowder, and 632 explosive devices.[69] At the same time, the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, Coskun Kirca, called for a constitutional amendment that would scrap the present system of proportionate representation in the Grand National Assembly, substituting instead a "winner take all seats" system. Furthermore, only two parties would be allowed, and the president would be granted special powers in times of national peril.[70]

In any event, it is clear that new, more radical solutions are needed if the Turkish political system is to survive. The military simply cannot rule for only a brief period as it has in the past, turning over control to the civilians only to have the system deteriorate into chaos again. One is reminded of the ancient saying that "three times is a charm." This is the third time that the military has intervened in Turkish politics since 1960, and while they "might be viewed as a cohesive, progressive political force upholding the tenets of Kemalism,"[71] there is a traditional superstition in Turkey about the evil eye. If the Turkish military is, in its role as the *deus ex machina* of Turkish politics, the veritable talisman against the evil eye of political chaos, then long-term, enduring measures must be instituted.

In a real sense, the Turkish military is uniquely well qualified for the task at hand, both as planners and executors. The Kemalist model, after all, is a rather sound paradigm for reform and stability. A precedent for martial administration has been established. It appears that a tough but scrupulously evenhanded administration by a benevolent yet totalitarian regime will be required. Some of its features could include total censorship of the media, at least partial suspension of civil and political rights, and detention without warrants for a minimum period of ninety days. Such measures are indeed repugnant to a Western liberal democrat, but the situation in Turkey is so grave that it appears that only dictatorial methods will ameliorate it. It will be a difficult time for the people of Turkey. There will be innocents who suffer, but if the country is to survive, then there seems to be no other course of action. To use a popular aphorism, the ball is now in their (the military's) court. It is up to them to set the goals, determine the strategy, and guide the new course for Turkey . . . and then use whatever force is necessary to achieve it.

By now it should be clear that not only was the Turkish military active in politics during the Ottoman era, but since Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey, there has been this continuum of military activism or influence which has guided Turkish politics for the past sixty years. While I have used the analogy of the classical dramatic device of the *deus ex machina*, another more familiar analogy might be that of the 11th Cavalry coming to the rescue. Yet it is my contention that there is a finite limit to the efficacy of these last-minute measures on two counts. First, the Turkish military is justifiably (and understandably) tired of acting in this role; equally justifiably, the military will be less willing to hand over the reins of government to a new civilian regime, its placating statements notwithstanding. Second, the system itself has been so beset with interminable chaos under a series of ineffec-

tive, deadlocked coalition governments that the military may not be able to cause the pendulum to swing back. In other words, without a total and open-ended commitment to enduring reforms, regardless of the severity of the measures to be invoked, there is a good chance that military intervention will do little more than exacerbate the internal strife.

There is one vital area that has not been covered here because it is somewhat tangential and is generally ignored by most authors as a factor in this analysis of military intervention in politics. Throughout the modern period, 1960-80, Turkey has been engaged in a serious conflict with Greece over the future of Cyprus.[72] This bitter dispute erupted into open warfare during July 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus. This was triggered because the Greek junta's coup against Makarios had established de facto *enosis* (union) of the island with Greece. There are direct linkages between the Turkish military's desire to achieve a final solution to the Cyprus issue and the civilian politicians' inability or unwillingness to reach a political or diplomatic solution. Hence any final and complete analysis of the role of the Turkish military as a politicized element must take the Cyprus problem into account, for it is the sine qua non of Turkish politics.

At the outset of this article two basic questions were asked. First, how has the Turkish military come to be such an integral and influential actor or interest group in Turkish political affairs during the past two decades? Second, to what degree has the Turkish military molded, guided, and accelerated the process of modernization and the direction of politics in Turkey, since the founding of the republic but particularly during the multiparty era since 1950? By this point it should be quite clear that the answers to these two questions are virtually inseparable and are grounded in the historical and political events that took place in Turkey during this period. The military since Ottoman times has served alternately as an agent of stability and as an agent of change. Yet it has been a constant factor in Turkish politics and could always be counted on to save the republic from internal politicide. In a large measure, without the political intervention by the military, one could expect the Turkish political system to degenerate into total anarchy. At best it might resemble the contemporary state of affairs in Italy; at worst it could lead to a revolution instigated by a coalition of ultra-conservatives and Islamic fundamentalists, perhaps somewhat similar to the Iranian experience of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Hence, in my view, the military must continue to play an active role in Turkish politics. However, it must transcend its traditional role of simple guardians of the republic. Instead, it must commit itself to a new and stable Turkey and to the long-term stern measures that will be necessary to achieve this goal. The price will be high, but there are no easy options if Turkey is to survive.

Charlottesville, Virginia

Notes

1. S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York, 1962) is probably the seminal work in this field in the modern era.

2. Kemal H. Karpat, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey* (Leiden, 1973), p. 824. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York, 1968) is the classical case study of modern Turkey.

3. Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, editors, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 33-38. Cf., Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review*, March 1958, pp. 270-82.

4. Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (hereafter *Volume I*) (Cambridge University Press, 1976) and Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (hereafter *Volume II*) (Cambridge University Press, 1977) are the basic source works for the study of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey and are invaluable aids in research of any type in this field.

5. Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire*

under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 (Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 4-8.

6. For the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca's text, see M. S. Anderson, editor, *The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923* (London, 1970), pp. 9-14; and J. C. Hurewitz, editor, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 1535-1914* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), pp. 54-61.

7. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (McGill University Press, 1964), p. 47; Harold Bowen, "Ahmad Pasha Bonneval," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition, pp. 291-92.

8. Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 21.

9. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, July 1972, pp. 251-52.

10. Carter Findlay, "The Foundations of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: The Beginnings of Bureaucratic Reform under Selim III and Mahmud II," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, October 1972, pp. 395-98. Cf., Thomas Naff, "Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 83 (1963), p. 303.

11. Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey: Some Notes on the Transmission of Ideas," *Cahiers d'Historie Mondiale*, January 1953, pp. 116-35. Recently, new light has been shed on France's financial ties to the empire during this period. See Michelle Raccagni, "The French Economic Interests in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, May 1980, pp. 339-76.

12. Howard A. Reed, "The Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in June 1926," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1951); Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, pp. 15-28.

13. Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 78; Avigdor Levy, "The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 1808-1839," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1968).

14. Reed, "Destruction of the Janissaries," pp. 193-251 provides a fascinating narrative of these events; Avigdor Levy, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-1839," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, January 1971, pp. 21-39.

15. Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 90; cf., Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1839-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, August 1978, pp. 325-38, which uses the original census documents from the Ottoman Archives.

16. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, pp. 113-16 and 149-53, contains translations of these edicts.

17. Haluk N. Göze, "Modernism and Traditionalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1790-1922," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1964), p. 98. For a discussion of the conflict between traditional Islamic jurisprudence and the reforms of this edict, see Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 92-93.

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19. Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton University Press, 1962) is the sole work on this rather anomalous group of intellectuals, activists, and radicalized journalists, all of whom had been forcibly exiled to Paris. In a real sense, they typify the less desirable result of the Westernized (and here, especially, the French-inspired) educational reforms.

20. Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks—Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 14.

21. Ahmad Bedevi Kuran, *Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler* (Our History of the Revolution and the Young Turks) (Istanbul, 1945),

p. 47. This is a semiofficial account by one of the younger members of the Committee of Union and Progress, written in retrospect.

22. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*, and Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford, 1969).

23. Andrew Mango, "The Young Turks," *Middle Eastern Studies*, January 1972, p. 116, refutes Ahmad's contention on p. 163 that the Young Turk Revolution became a military operation only after 1909, when the civilian leaders failed to stabilize the internal disorder.

24. Kerim Key, "Ottoman Intellectuals and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University), p. 128.

25. Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 205. Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, p. 265, point out that Salonika, the capital of Macedonia, is a traditional center for revolutionary activity because it was far removed from the capital of Constantinople.

26. This coalition was the direct result of the upward mobility that created the forward thinking, modernized classes of civil servants and military officers. Ibid., p. 265.

27. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks*, p. 132. The best eyewitness account of these events in English is by an eminent British author who arrived in Turkey on the eve of the revolution, Sir William M. Ramsay, *The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey* (London, 1919).

28. General Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, translated by Carl Reichmann (Annapolis, 1927) is a self-serving but nevertheless valuable account of the Turkish Army's performance during the war.

29. Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, pp. 332-33.

30. Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal* (New York, 1965) is the standard biography on Atatürk, but because it includes some unfavorable "facts," the book is banned in Turkey.

31. Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 211; Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, pp. 340-50.

32. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965), p. 181, provides the exact percentage breakdown of military deputies for each assembly period.

33. Ibid., p. 261.

34. Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, pp. 396-405, account for the Inönü presidency, but no biography of Inönü exists in English.

35. John H. Herz, "The Problem of Succession in Dictatorial Regimes: A Study in Comparative Law and Constitutions," *Journal of Politics*, 14 (1952), p. 23.

36. Frey, p. 261.

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38. Roger P. Nye, "Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Election," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, April 1977, pp. 209-12.

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40. Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Parties in Modern Turkey* (Leiden, 1974), p. 7.

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42. Kemal H. Karpat, "Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70," *Middle Eastern Studies*, October 1972, p. 349.

43. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly*, June 1961, pp. 43-59; Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, p. 411.

44. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics*, pp. 214-15.

45. Landau, p. 4.

46. Weiker, pp. 118-27, provides a thumbnail biography of the National Unity Committee (NUC) and its members.

47. Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, p. 414.

48. Weiker, pp. 20-21, quotes a 27 May 1960 broadcast from the NUC.

49. Ibid., pp. 126-27.

50. Ergun Özbüdün, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 56-59. Cf., Landau, *Radical Politics*, pp. 14-44.

51. Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*, Winter 1973, pp. 169-90; Özbüdün, *Social Change*, pp. 52-53.

52. Aaron S. Klieman, "Confined to Barracks: Emergencies and the Military in Developing Societies," *Comparative Politics*, January 1980, p. 147.

53. Frank Tachau, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments, and Elections," *Comparative Politics*, July 1973, pp. 557-73; Özbüdün, *Social Change*, p. 125.

54. Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, p. 416.

55. Landau, p. 36.

56. Ibid., p. 44.

57. Nye, p. 213.

58. Klieman, p. 148.

59. Ibid.

60. Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, p. 418 contains these articles.

61. Landau, p. 45.

62. Robert W. Olson, "Al-Fatah in Turkey: Its Influence in the March 12 Coup," *Middle Eastern Studies*, May 1973, pp. 197-205.

63. Nye, p. 228.

64. Shaw and Shaw, *Volume II*, p. 419. Cf., Jacob M. Landau, "National Salvation Party in Turkey," *Asian and African Studies*, 3 (1976), pp. 1-51 for a detailed analysis of the influence of this splinter party in recent Turkish politics.

65. Klieman, p. 149.

66. Quoted in Nye, p. 209.

67. Klieman, p. 149.

68. "Retired Admiral Named Interim Premier in Turkey," *New York Times*, September 21, 1980, p. 12.

69. "32,537 'Terrorists' detained in Turkey," *Milliyet*, 7 January 1981, p. 1.

70. "Retired Admiral Named Interim Premier in Turkey," *New York Times*, September 21, 1980, p. 13.

71. John Kifner, "The Turks Have a Word for It—Kemalism," *New York Times*, September 21, 1980, p. 4-E.

72. Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus, 1958-1967* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974—International Crises and the Role of Law) is the best study on Cyprus but needs updating in view of the 1974 invasion by Turkey.

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THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY ELITE COHESION IN EASTERN EUROPE

the case of Czechoslovakia

DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

THE armed forces of communist states have been examined on a variety of dimensions. There are numerous analyses of the technical capabilities of these armed forces and of the probable performance of the forces in conflict. Other students of communist armed forces have chosen to concentrate on civil-military questions. In communist systems, the civil-military relationship is dominated by the interaction between the hegemonic communist party and the professional military. Concentrating on the tensions that party control policies have

brought to the relationship between these institutions, these analysts detail the activities of the party control apparatus, the Main Political Administration. Moreover, the problems that communist states have encountered in developing a professional officer corps, which is both politically indoctrinated (red) and technically proficient (expert), are discussed in depth. Generally, then, the focus has been on the interaction between the party and military with little attention to the relationship between members of the military elite. This is curious because the question of intramilitary politics affects the cohesion of the elite and ultimately, the ability of the elite to effectively manage military affairs.

The armed forces of Eastern Europe are generally understudied, and very little has been written about intramilitary politics in the satellite Warsaw Pact states. Key issues of the ability of the elite to undertake concerted political action and the cohesion of the elite in times of crisis have been afforded virtually no attention. Nevertheless, there is no lack of speculation about how the armed forces and their elites would behave in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. Additionally, the constant conflict between the Soviet Union and her allies, which produced "fraternal" invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, has led concerned analysts to wonder about the loyalty of the East European forces.

It is not too difficult to imagine, for example, circumstances under which the Soviet Union might be faced with armed resistance from elements of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations.

In Romania, it is very possible that the military might resist as a discreet unit. Although it is difficult to predict how well East Europeans would fight in an East-West confrontation, it is almost impossible to say how an East European commander ordered to resist (or not to resist) a Soviet invasion might behave. Even the behavior of the most elite officers, the Minister of Defense or the Chief of the General Staff, is questionable under the circumstances. Would the military elite, professional officer corps, and the rank and file behave as a cohesive group? What role would nationalism play if a national military were ordered not to resist an invading force? These are questions that come to mind more readily in the East European frame of reference than in most others. These concerns reflect the special historical and continuing circumstances of East European political and military development.

The communist regimes that now constitute the Warsaw Pact came to power primarily by force of the Soviet Red Army. Unlike the revolutionary roads to power that established the Soviet and Chinese communist parties, the East European rulers were installed by the Soviet leadership. The Czechoslovak case is somewhat

different. After World War II, Czechoslovakia was ruled by a true coalition government with strong communist representation, and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia actually enjoyed considerable popular support. The onset of the Cold War and the polarization of Europe led to circumstances in which Czechoslovakia's democratic course was no longer tolerable in Eastern Europe, however. In February 1948, the Communist Party provoked a governmental crisis and seized power. Thus, in 1948, Czechoslovakia joined already communized Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Poland and became a member of the Soviet alliance; the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was created in 1949.

The postwar armed forces of Eastern Europe were created much like the governments that they served. The institutions were reconstituted to lend legitimacy to the new states of the region, but they were created with insufficient power to threaten the fledgling regimes. The problem of creating loyal military elites was particularly difficult. It was no small matter to find experienced officers in the former Axis satellites (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania) or in anti-Soviet Poland. The problem was slightly less acute in Czechoslovakia, but most of the best trained officers were strongly pro-Western. The armed forces were thus created with primary consideration of loyalty and only secondary attention to efficiency. The armed forces of the region were weak, Soviet-styled establishments, which actually bore little responsibility for the defense of Eastern Europe. As a result of this inauspicious beginning, domestic legitimacy and prestige have always been problematic for the armed forces of the region.

As time passed, some of these problems have been alleviated, but the loyalty and legitimacy of the armed forces continue to concern party leaders. The officers are now a generation removed from the inglorious alliances with the Axis, and many of them were trained exclusively under communist rule. Presumably these are thoroughly indoctrinated officer corps. But the creation of an officer corps that is red and expert has not removed one critical problem which must be taken into consideration when examining the loyalty, cohesion, and effectiveness of these armed forces and their elites. The armed forces continue to suffer an identity crisis. The major culprit, in this regard, is the client-state nature of military affairs in this region. The members of the elites of East Europe are satellite commanders, subjected to the efforts of both the indigenous party and the Soviet sponsor to control and influence them and to command their loyalty. Presumably this dual control pattern always causes tensions within the military elite, but when there is an overt split between the party and the sponsor, the tensions are more acute and become very pronounced. The dual control and influence pattern is by no means a passive phenomenon. Both the sponsor and the indigenous party have direct and indirect institutional and informal instruments of influence at their disposal, and they do wield them in an attempt to elicit certain behavior.

The Soviet Union controls many of the key interests of the military, most important the level of defense spending and the modernization and technological capability of the fighting forces. Soviet policy toward the East European elites is aimed at forging strong identification with the Soviet Union. Political education not only emphasizes the importance of Marxism-Leninism but paints the Soviet Union as the best example of socialism and fraternal defender of Eastern Europe. There are even appeals to pan-Slavism and in some cases identification with the old Russian empire. Classes in the Russian language, history, and culture attempt to encourage a greater appreciation among the satellite elites of the Soviet Union. Working class heritage, an important requirement for communist officers, is no longer the primary requirement for mobility through the officer ranks. Study in the Soviet Union's military or military-political academies is also an important factor. Moreover, numerous

awards, citations, and special projects are intended to ensure that East European officers remember to whom they owe their prestige and level of advancement.

The party cannot compete for the loyalty of the military elite on these terms. The institutional links between party and military have been disrupted by long years of Soviet domination. No longer completely dependent on Moscow to hold them in power, and bidding for popular support, the communist regimes of Eastern Europe find this severance of links with national institutions problematic. But bearing only minimal responsibility for matters that traditionally interest the military, the members of the party elite must wield other instruments. Wages and benefits, social mobility, and citations are often used, but these are all too constrained by slavish organizational mimicry of the Soviet system. The party is unable to relinquish any modicum of control in exchange for military allegiance, for the Soviet Union insists on uniform party control apparatus throughout the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the party resorts to the one lever of influence that the Soviet Union cannot and appeals to nationalist sentiment. In the sensitive military sphere, the party is often hesitant to appeal outright for military loyalty, but in the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises, and in Romania, nationalism and the right to a voice in military decision-making did become issues. The artificial separation of internal military nationalization and the external role of national forces is simply too difficult to maintain.

The military elite, then, is capable of influencing its resource allocation only through contact with the Soviet establishment. Confrontations with the party over defense spending and modernization, so prevalent in other societies, simply do not come to the fore. The lack of tension and conflict between these powerless parties and the powerless armed forces has served to undermine the cohesiveness of the military elite.[1] Indeed, there are few causes to which the military can rally and few external "threats" to bring them together. Thus, the inability to participate in the political process contributes to this lack of cohesion. The decisions that the military might be capable of influencing are simply never decided in the domestic political context. They are decided by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact command.

Certain members of the military elite are attracted by the possibility of once again bearing primary responsibility for the defense of the homeland and of minimizing Soviet control within the institutions. These men respond favorably to appeals to national tradition and heritage. For example, the Romanian military has supported the drive for independence on just such grounds.[2] Presumably, other members of the elite see nationalism as a threat to the prestige and technological might that association with the Soviet Union can offer and are skeptical of offers of military independence. Permanent splintering of the elite into Muscovite and nationalist factions thereby occurs. The factionalism is indiscernible until crisis periods, but when forced to make a choice between two masters, the factions rapidly surface.

One barrier to the examination of intramilitary relations is the united front with which the communist military confronts the outside world. This veneer of monolithic unity makes it impossible to monitor the deliberations of key members of the elite on even the most superficial issues. But one aspect of elite interaction that can be addressed is the question of cohesion in crisis situations, for here divisions are more apparent. This is an instructive exercise, for it impacts on issues ranging from military reliability in conflict to the ability of the elite to act as a cohesive political force and influence the political process. The Czechoslovak political crisis of 1968 provides an excellent opportunity to study the question at hand. It is acknowledged that there are varying degrees of cohesion throughout Eastern Europe, but the Czechoslovak case affords an opportunity

to examine the military under a prolonged period of strain and under the invasion of "fraternal" armies.

THIS study suggests that the ability of the military elite[3] to act as a cohesive body is more impaired in the satellite states of Eastern Europe than in other communist states. This is not to suggest that intramilitary factions do not exist in all communist societies. Indeed, interservice rivalry and personal and ideological factionalism plague all military elites. But in a society in which the elite has been tailored to fit a very specific mold, in which there is virtually no variation in the backgrounds of the elite officers, and where only conformists rise to the top, it is interesting to note that in times of crisis elite cohesion is a serious problem. Further, this lack of cohesion is a major factor in the reliability problem and in the inability of these elites to influence political policy. In sum, then, it is no accident that the East European military elites are the least cohesive, that the institutions are of questionable reliability, and that their military leaders are often politically isolated.

Before turning to the examination of elite cohesion, we must first ask, "What is a cohesive elite?" It is obviously not an elite without differences and divisions. Similarity of background and ideological predilection is often characteristic of cohesive elites, but a homogeneous elite is not necessarily cohesive. Rather, a cohesive elite is one that in spite of differences is capable of confronting another actor in a united fashion, sticking tightly together in order to win certain shared goals. It is an elite that in times of crisis is capable of concerted effort. Presumably, it is also an elite that is able single-mindedly to follow a given set of commands from national political authorities.

The military elites of Eastern Europe are, of course, by design remarkably homogeneous. Men who rise to the top share several important characteristics. First, they are all members of the Communist Party, and in Czechoslovakia all but one were party members before becoming military officers. Second, all of the men in the sample studied in Soviet academies early in their careers, and all but three returned for advanced study after achieving the rank of lieutenant colonel or higher. All members of this elite with two exceptions served in World War II, the Slovak members having been defectors or repatriated prisoners of war. Finally, all officers claimed working class heritage and were in an age range varying only thirteen years. Yet this extremely homogeneous group fell into serious infighting during the 1968 crisis. Splintering along intramilitary/intraparty lines and eventually along Muscovite/nationalist lines, this group was never able to enjoy the enhanced political prestige the military could have had during the crisis.

The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Military Elite

Prior to 1967, the Czechoslovak military were inactive both in political affairs and in the defense of the state, for the Czechoslovak forces had inherited a posture of passivity. It should be remembered that in 1938, when German forces occupied Czechoslovak territory, the military offered no resistance, in spite of the fact that most observers believe that the very fine Czechoslovak military could have offered effective resistance against the then relatively weak German forces. Again in 1948, the Czechoslovak Army, at the behest of President Eduard Beneš, was confined to barracks during the political crisis that overthrew the democratic coalition government. In fact, at that time, the armed forces were very weak, heavily infiltrated by communist officers, and in such general disarray that they were not trusted by either the communists or the social democrats. Particularly suspect was the military elite, a heterogeneous group consisting of Western and Soviet sympathizers and a few Slovak collaborators. There is circumstantial evidence, however, indi-

cating that elements within the military planned to overthrow the new communist regime. The coup was supposedly betrayed by an insider.[4] Whatever the case, the incident was an excellent pretext for the thorough purge of any remaining pro-Western officers.

A professional communist military elite was developed to replace those officers of questionable loyalty. In time, the technical efficiency of the Czechoslovak People's Army (CPA) increased in concert with the development of the loyal officer corps. By the mid-1960s, the Czechoslovak armed forces were considered the best in Eastern Europe and were enjoying tremendous prestige as the Soviet Union's junior partner in the extension of socialist resources into the Third World. The Czechoslovaks were so trusted, it is reported, that they participated in on-site training of Third World officers and invited many of them to study in Prague, despite the fact that there were no Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil and fewer advisers in Czechoslovakia than in East Germany or Poland. Still, the military played almost no domestic political role. Large numbers of military men were purged in the great terror between 1949 and 1953, but there is no evidence of professional military involvement in the subsequent review of these cases. The military press did not even comment on political affairs and confined its reporting to recantations of promotions and rewards, articles on problems of military logistics, and tales of fraternity and assistance among Warsaw Pact nations.

Then, in 1967, Czechoslovak politics collapsed into a state of turmoil. Antonin Novotný, one of the few arch-Stalinists to survive the bloc crises of 1956, finally encountered serious opposition within his own communist party. Initially charged with serious errors in economic policy, Novotný was soon accused of cult of personality and abuses of the presidency and party secretaryship. In January 1968, Novotný was stripped of party leadership and a few months later of the presidency. This crisis is very important in the history of Czechoslovak military development because it represents one of the first times that the military leadership became politically involved.

Much evidence suggests, both Western and Czech, that the military, under Major General Jan Sejna, Party Chief of Military Security, was planning to intervene on behalf of Novotný. The notorious Sejna affair is a curious episode in Czech military history. Briefly, it is believed that Sejna and General Vladmir Janko, Deputy Minister of Defense, both political officers, intended to use the military to prop Novotný. The plan was apparently supervised by Miroslav Mamula, Chief of the Eighth Department of the Central Committee of the Party. The evidence, though somewhat patchy, is nonetheless convincing.

In December 1967 and January 1968, the Czechoslovak armed forces held unscheduled and rare winter maneuvers in which military units circled Prague. In the meantime, a letter was delivered to the Central Committee from the Presidium of the Party of the Armed Forces, urging that the positions of Party Secretary and President remain joined. In essence this position supported Novotný. The letter arrived too late, however. The vote had been taken, and Novotný fell. Two months later, General Sejna was accused of embezzling funds, and it was announced that he had fled the country. He applied for and received asylum in the United States. The next day, General Janko committed suicide. Press accusations flourished, and the affair reached a fever pitch when the Army General Staff published an open letter alleging that a coup had been attempted and implicating Novotný and Mamula. Reports surfaced about the unusual military maneuvers, and the Soviet Union was accused of arranging for Sejna's safe passage to the United States; however, the Soviets offered vehement denials of activity in the Sejna affair, and Soviet involvement remains unsubstantiated.[5]

That there was an attempted coup has been freely admitted by liberal forces in Czechoslovakia, however. General Egyd Pepich, Chief

of the Main Political Administration in 1968, admitted there were deep divisions in the military and revealed that the "army had tried to influence the deliberations of the Party Central Committee in January, 1968."[6] The situation was so serious that Defense Minister Bohumir Lomsky appeared on Czechoslovak television in March 1968, attempting to acquit himself of charges of complicity in the Sejna affair.[7] In fact, Lomsky denied that the army could be so used, but added, "If somebody else tried to give an order for the abuse of the armed forces behind my back and if it were proved, he must take full responsibility."[8] Lomsky continued claiming that he held no responsibility for Sejna because Mamula was in charge of the Eighth Department. By most accounts, the coup was canceled, perhaps by Novotný himself, when Major General Vaclav Prchlik, Chief of the Main Political Administration and a Dubcek supporter, learned of the coup and alerted liberal forces. Nonetheless, the coup caused tremendous outrage and contributed to the fall of Novotný.

Within the military there were serious repercussions. The military elite, which was already dividing into conservative and liberal factions, splintered further. Those officers who identified with the liberal cause moved to discredit and dismiss the conservatives, even though many conservative officers knew nothing of the coup. It is important to note that the liberal wing had begun to form long before the 1968 crisis. Documents published in 1968 show that as early as 1966 liberals were warning that democratization of the armed forces must be carried out and that party abuses in the armed forces could not be tolerated. Likewise, there was a conservative wing that warned against democratizing the army too rapidly. By the admission of several officers of both persuasions, this bickering plagued the military elite for some time, at least from the 1966 flare up until the 1968 crisis.

Interestingly, it appears that one cause of internal division was the friction between the liberal political-military leadership under General Vaclav Prchlik and the conservative General Staff under Otakar Rytir. Rytir's group enjoyed considerable support with the Novotný leadership of the party and with the party organization in the armed forces under General Sejna. The Ministry of Defense was unable to mitigate the friction between these groups, and the minister admitted that this made the army incapable of acting as a unified force.[9] During the crisis, these divisions worsened, and the officer corps began to polarize completely. Hardliners Otakar Rytir, Chief of the General Staff, and Frantisek Bedrich clashed often and furiously with the Main Political Administration leadership under Pepich and Prchlik. But during the latter months of the crisis, the liberals seemed to be winning the battle for control of the armed forces. Matters pertaining to the role of the party in the army and the need for democratization were gradually replaced by discussion of a national military doctrine and the need for the national military to assume responsibility for the defense of the state. Such dialogue was heresy in the Soviet camp, but the liberals were obviously in control of the military press, and discussion of this kind was the rule rather than the exception. These arguments were followed by the suggestion that Czechoslovakia give primary consideration to its geopolitical and social circumstances and secondary consideration to the alliance. This suggestion enjoyed some support within the Ministry of Defense. These were often remarkable statements in the military press. An *A-Revue* commentator proclaimed, "The army and the party do not serve one class, they serve a nation, a nation of two peoples."[10] For the first time the Czech press cited past abuses in the armed forces and placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet leadership, not on nameless reactionaries or demagogues. Throughout June, the liberal discourse within the armed forces continued with the highest members of the elite granting interviews to the radical military press.

The conservative wing of the armed forces was incapable of stemming the liberal tide, and many conservative generals lost their positions of power. Rytir, Lomsky, and Bedrich were all isolated or demoted. In spite of their pro-Sovietism and Moscow's concern over the course of Czech military affairs, the conservatives were unable to mount any resistance. One explanation lies in the events of January 1968, for though many conservatives knew nothing of the coup episode, the liberals were able to discredit them publicly and within the moderate officer corps ranks. Another seems to have been Soviet underestimation, indeed miscalculation of the depth of liberalism. The Soviets believe in the interchangeability of client commanders and tend to depersonalize relations with client personnel. This time they may have erred in the assessment of liberal sympathies within the military. Pepich lamented the division of the officer corps but claimed that the majority of officers favored liberal ideals.[11] Conservative accounts corroborate the admittance of divisions but of course claim that the conservative position was more popular. General Frantisek Bedrich, the postinvasion Chief of the Main Political Administration, stated, "Due to a lack of partisan discipline, there were fissures in the army."[12] Earlier, General Otakar Rytir admitted that he was effectively excluded from party activity in the army after 1968.[13]

During the crisis, more moderate liberals in the party and in the military struggled to keep the focus on democratization and to take attention away from the debates concerning the Warsaw Pact. The tide of liberalism often outstripped the call for moderation, however. A national military doctrine did become an issue. The debate is codified in two sets of documents: the draft Action Programme of the Ministry of Defense and the memoranda of the Klement Gottwald Political-Military Academy. The ideas were startling. Now it was publicly stated that geopolitical rather than class analysis should govern Czechoslovak military doctrine. The authors of the memoranda actually stated that the West German-NATO threat might be exaggerated.[14] Soviet and conservative attacks began after the publication of the memoranda, but they were paled by the furor caused by the nationwide press conference of General Vaclav Prchlik, the Chief of the Eighth Department of the Central Committee in 1968. Prchlik stated that the Warsaw Pact was not governed as democratically as it should be and that joint command should quickly become a reality so that all members could contribute fully. He also implied that an abridgement of Czechoslovak sovereignty should be resisted. Defense Minister Martin Dzur failed to disavow the statement immediately, saying only that the press conference had been favorable in substance but that some of what the general said was incorrect.[15] The Soviets were furious and began to question openly the loyalty of the military elite, the reliability of the Czechoslovak forces, and the preparedness of the CPA in general. Later, the Eighth Department which Prchlik headed was abolished, a move already planned by the liberal wing. Additionally, concessions were made to the Soviets in the composition of the military-political leadership. The liberal General Pepich was removed and replaced by the arch conservative Frantisek Bedrich even before the invasion took place. As a concession to Moscow, Prchlik was not given a new position of comparable military responsibility (although he was nominated for the Central Committee), but in a victory for the liberal forces, he was granted immunity from prosecution. This immunity was lifted one year after the invasion.

This outright confrontation with the Soviet Union dampened the enthusiasm and vigor of the liberal military movement. The upper echelons of the military elite were relatively quiet after the Prchlik affair, however. Shaken by this flirtation with Soviet wrath, the moderate liberals, in particular General Dzur, apparently silenced the more radical wing and moved toward closer cooperation with the Soviet

Warsaw Pact Command. That the elite never solidified is evidenced, however, by the continuing attacks of conservative generals upon counterrevolutionary forces in the military. Dzur, a Slovak, is an extremely interesting case during this period. He has sometimes been accused of duplicity in publicly praising the liberalization and privately denigrating the effectiveness of the Czechoslovak military. It is possible, however, that Dzur actually favored some of the reforms but refused to challenge the Soviet Union directly. Whatever the case, he survived the invasion and remains Minister of Defense today.

The conservatives were not yet done. After the invasion, they reasserted control until late 1969, when Gustav Husak and Dzur purged the most conservative elements in an attempt to bring the military back to center. It is reported that the military was once again contemplating political action, this time at the behest of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, it is believed, were impatient with Husak's slow normalization and threatened to encourage military rule if the process were not accelerated. Generals Rytir and Bedrich were to lead the coup.[16] Husak was able to allay Soviet fears, however, and a military solution was deemed unnecessary. Though these reports have never been definitively proved, the scenario offers one plausible explanation for the subsequent purge of the military's radical right, in particular Rytir and Bedrich. Perhaps these two and others were unwilling to disavow the need for military solutions. Following the purge of the radical right, the military returned to a position of neutrality.

In the postinvasion period, the military is once again nonpolitical. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the crisis left a greater mark on the military than on any other institution. Over 57 percent of the officers under thirty left the military voluntarily after the 1968 crisis.[17] It is believed that as many as 11,000 officers were purged.[18] The shortages of personnel were truly critical in the 1970s and have not yet been alleviated completely. Military morale and recruitment are acknowledged problems. It is also undeniable that the failure of the Czechoslovak forces to resist has completely undermined the prestige of the military. This image of a useless, reactionary, and expensive military plagues the Czechoslovak establishment and points out the costs for East European forces that do not defend the homeland from fraternal assistance. Obviously the pressures to take the nationalistic road are great. The pressures are equally great to remain neutral and not become embroiled in a conflict with the Soviet sponsor.

In Czechoslovakia, the costs of nonresistance are especially ironic, for the Czechoslovak military elite was following presidential orders. This has not helped to soften the criticism of the military for their failure to defend Czechoslovak national sovereignty, however. In spite of the difficulties of the postinvasion period, Czechoslovak military affairs are calm. On the surface *Obrana Lidu* and *A-Revue* have returned to the coverage of rear service problems and praise of the 1944 Soviet effort on Dukla Pass. General Dzur annually thanks the Soviet Union for its fraternal assistance during the time of crisis, and extensive coverage is afforded the visits of Soviet officers to Czechoslovakia.

Between 1971 and 1975, the purge of higher ranking officers was completed, and the thirty or so officers at the top have remained relatively constant (with some genuine retirements) since 1975. The military elite once again appears as a monolith, but given the eruption of factionalism in 1968, first of liberal and conservative groups and then Muscovite and nationalist, it is difficult to believe that all is as calm as it seems. Since 1969, Czechoslovakia has concentrated on being the model satellite, and her military is a thoroughly sovietized institution. This is due in part to the coercive effect of five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia and the reinstitution of networks of Soviet advisers within the military elite.

In the post-1968 period, every Czechoslovak officer of general rank was asked to write a new biography, presumably to answer the question, "What were you doing in the crisis of 1968?" Not surprisingly, not one of the top officers who survived the purge admitted to any political activity during the eight-month period, preferring to concentrate on how they continued to discharge their duties even in the face of difficult circumstances.

THE 1968 crisis and the behavior of the military elite is instructive, and its lessons cannot be obliterated by the veneer of unity and calm that surrounds intraelite relations. The fact is that the very highest echelons of the Czechoslovak military elite fell to serious infighting and factionalism at the first hint of crisis. This was not factionalism among junior officers. This was splintering at the highest elite levels. But while we have been concerned primarily with elite incohesiveness, it is clear that in the Czechoslovak case the divisions ran deeper below the elite levels. Reported incidents of violence by soldiers against their commanders and tensions among commanders[19] suggest that dual loyalty was a very real problem throughout the Czechoslovak military establishment.

It is difficult to say how much of the Czechoslovak experience is applicable for an understanding of the elite cohesion problem in the remainder of East Europe. Czechoslovak antimilitarism and passivism are not common to other Warsaw Pact states. Surely, Polish nationalism and anti-Sovietism make that case unique, and the reverse is probably true in Bulgaria; but the strains of dual control are common in all states except Romania. The inability to influence political decisions of interest to them and the lack of unifying confrontations with the local party plague the military elites of the five satellite states. Also plaguing to them is the probability of conflict between the party and the Soviet sponsor, which raises the possibility that the members of the elite and ultimately members of the military might again be forced to choose sides. The debate may, as it did in Czechoslovakia, begin as a liberal versus conservative debate, but it soon could evolve into a dispute about the relationship of a national military to its sponsor. At this point, Muscovite and nationalist factions emerge. Just how serious and pervasive these divisions are in the rest of East Europe is difficult to gauge, for without prolonged, monumental crises, one wonders for how long the armed forces can keep the facade of monolithic unity.

The most serious consequence of elite incohesion, emanating from the dual control factor, is that the military cannot be completely trusted by the sponsor or the party in a conflict between them. One must be careful, of course, in extrapolating from intra–alliance conflict to other situations. The Czechoslovak crisis produced the interesting combination of a reformist party and an increasingly reformist military facing internal conservative opposition and a sponsor willing to risk invasion to reverse the reform. Under this circumstance it is noteworthy that the military elite splintered so badly. It is not possible to say what this episode portends for other kinds of conflict. In the case of Warsaw Pact-NATO engagement, factors like the nature and length of the conflict will be of foremost importance. And in situations in which the Soviet Union and the domestic communist party are united against common internal dissension, the problem of dual loyalty and control is presumably less important. Nevertheless, the tension between national loyalty and the control of the Soviet Union to which these elites are often subjected casts doubt on their ability to perform well under strain. This circumstance, unfortunately, only succeeds in clouding the already murky picture of the reliability and cohesion of the Warsaw Pact forces.

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Notes

1. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1980. Herspring and Volgyes identify the lack of conflict with the party as one contributing factor to the incohesiveness of these military elites.

2. Alex Alexiev has identified this rapprochement between the Romanian military and party in which the party has returned considerable autonomy to the military in exchange for military support of the independence drive from the Soviet Union. Alex Alexiev, *Party-Military Relations in Romania* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1977).

3. In this essay, the term *military elite* refers to the very highest echelons of the officer corps. While the political importance of other officers is acknowledged, they are generally less visible than their higher-ranking counterparts and presumably have less access to the higher levels of the policymaking apparatus and less responsibility in crises. Further, it is expected that the incohesiveness at these high levels is symptomatic of an even greater lack of cohesion at lower levels.

4. The so-called "Kultvasr coup" is shrouded in mystery. Though Kultvasr was later rehabilitated by the Czechoslovak government, U.S. intelligence at the time maintained the authenticity of the coup. Supposedly, the military action was to take place in conjunction with popular uprisings around Prague. Files of the U.S. Department of State, telegrams and memoranda (declassified), April-July 1949.

5. *Pravda*, June 11, 1968.

6. Major General Egyd Pepich, "The Army Serves the People," *Pravda* (Bratislava), March 25, 1968. The Minister of Defense, Martin Dzur, also admitted that the armed forces were about to be misused. *A-Revue*, July 12, 1968.

7. Radio Free Europe Situation Report, March 13, 1968.

8. Ibid.

9. Martin Dzur in *A-Revue*, op. cit.

10. *A-Revue*, no. 6, June 1968.

11. Pepich, *Pravda* (Bratislava), op. cit.

12. Radio Free Europe Background Report, April 4, 1970.

13. "As General Otakar Rytir Sees It," in *A-Revue*, no. 10, 1969.

14. "How Czechoslovak State Interests in the Military Are to Be Formulated," *Lidova Armada*, July 2, 1968.

15. *Rude Pravo*, August 7, 1981.

16. "The Coup That Never Was," Radio Free Europe Background Report/Czechoslovakia, June 6, 1969.

17. Robert W. Dean, "The Political Consolidation of the Czechoslovak People's Army," Radio Free Europe Research/Czechoslovakia, April 29, 1971.

18. A.Ross Johnson, Alex Alexiev, and Robert Dean, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1980).

19. Jaroslav Krejci, "We Have Had Our Cross to Bear," *Tribuna*, August 20, 1969.

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Mark Meyer, *Time*

WOMEN AND THE SOVIET MILITARY

MARY LOUISE O'BRIEN

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRIS JEFFERIES

EXAMINATION of Soviet military manpower utilization leads to the conclusion that there is little information available about the role, status, and employment of women in the Soviet armed forces. This conclusion raises important questions, however. Is information about women in the Soviet military lacking because it is closely controlled by the Soviets, or does it reflect the general lack of participation by women in their armed forces? Evidence suggests that the scarcity of information stems more from the latter reason. Women are not in the mainstream of the Soviet military. This is an important contrast to the role of women in Soviet society where they provide more than 50 percent of the labor force and almost 75 percent of the professional positions.[1] With increasing global interest in the women's movements and indications that women play only a minor role in the armed forces of the Soviet Union, it seems appropriate to try to determine the reasons for such low participation.

Women in the Soviet Armed Forces

The common historical perception of the woman in the Soviet Army is that of a heroic, highly motivated, well-disciplined, tenacious soldier fighting in defense of the Motherland. Growing out of the Soviet experience of World War II, in which more than 8 percent of the Soviet Union's mobilized troops were women,[2] the image may reflect more the propaganda efforts of the Soviets than reality.[3] Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is one of the first contemporary societies to employ women extensively in its armed forces. Women served as "women soldiers" in World War I,[4] fought in the Revolution, and even provided combat units during World War II, when three women's air regiments flew combat aircraft and 23 of their fliers were named Heroes of the Soviet Union.[5]

Women also served with ground combat units as snipers, machine gunners, and tank crew members.[6] While 40 percent of the medical officers at the front were women, the greatest percentage of women served in rear areas to release men for combat duty.[7]

From the wartime strength of approximately one million women in uniform, the number of women in the Soviet armed forces of today has fallen to an estimated strength of 10,000 to 20,000, or less than one-third of one percent.[8] Women are included in the Soviet draft law, but they are to be drafted only in time of war. In peacetime, however, women who have medical or other specialized training are listed on military rosters and occasionally called to active duty for training and indoctrination.[9] To attract the required numbers of women to fill their active force quotas, the Soviets rely on unmarried, childless volunteers from the ages of 19 through 25 years.[10]

In the active force, women serve in traditional, well-defined and controlled occupations carefully separated from operational activities. They generally work in clerical positions, the communications field, in administration, as repair technicians, and particularly in the health and medical services. Indeed, these occupations mirror those usually filled by women in the civilian sector where they are actively recruited.[11]

While theoretically women can hold any rank in the armed forces, the limited number and types of positions available to them restrict their advancement into higher ranks since the position itself, not the individual's rank, determines the rank the occupant will hold. Thus, with fewer numbers of positions available for women, fewer opportunities exist for promotion.[12]

Women rarely achieve officer rank in the Soviet military since they are not allowed to attend the military colleges, the source of regular commissioning in the Soviet Union. Women do participate in mandatory reserve officer training programs while attending educational

institutions of higher learning, but few are called to active duty.[13]

The greatest value of women to the Soviet military, however, seems to be their potential for large-scale wartime mobilization. Indeed, the Universal Military Duty Law of 1967 specifies the drafting of women in wartime, and the Soviets have established several programs and procedures to prepare women for mobilization. These include mandatory participation in military-oriented youth programs, draft-board registration of women with special skills, participation of discharged servicewomen in reserve status until age 40, and reservist status for all women who complete mandatory reserve officer training at university level.[14] In summary, the present utilization of women in the active Soviet military, beyond their potential as a large reservoir of manpower in time of war, is restricted to carefully and deliberately controlled positions.

Of greater interest and relevance than the fact of low-participation rates by women in the Soviet military, however, may be the issue of "why." With Marxist-Leninist ideology stressing the equality of the sexes, and with a tradition of high participation by women in Soviet society generally, it appears paradoxical that so few women serve in their armed forces. Indeed, in an interesting analysis of women in combat, an American scholar argues that women are most likely to be employed extensively in the military by societies in which manpower is considered insufficient to meet a perceived military threat — as in Israel — or in societies where "social consciousness" is prevalent — as in the United States with its concern for equal opportunity.[15] One can argue that the Soviet Union fits into both categories: in a world perceived as "threatening," labor shortages claiming military-aged youth are chronic and increasingly critical; and since the Revolution, women have been encouraged ideologically and even required to participate generally beyond their domestic roles in society. Nevertheless, the fact of very low participation by women in the Soviet military yet remains. A brief review of the experience of women in the broader Soviet society helps to explain these apparent paradoxes.

Women and Soviet Society

The Soviet Union offers an impressive record of providing job opportunities for women. Fifty percent of the labor force is now female, compared with only 41 percent in the United States.[16] One of the main tenets of the Bolshevik Revolution was the liberation of women from economic bondage resulting from the "yokes of capitalism and the patriarchal system."[17] The idea of equality for women originated in demands made by the nineteenth-century radical Russian intelligentsia.[18] But it was with the social and economic upheaval of the Revolution and the subsequent restructuring of the nation that women's liberation was codified into the revolutionary system. The revolutionaries rejected the patriarchal notion that required females to be economically dependent on the male "provider-exploiter."[19] It was therefore vital that women find employment outside the home. The bonds of traditional family structure would thus be weakened, leading society to a new level in Marxian history in which *all* mankind would have the potential for achieving true freedom.[20] That was to be the plan. One should also note the pragmatism of the early Bolsheviks who projected the beneficial effect of such an influx of manpower on the preindustrialized, war-torn economy of the 1920s.

Marxist-Leninists quickly established in their constitution a legal basis for female equality. Article 35 states that

> Women and men have equal rights in the USSR. Exercise of these rights is ensured by according women equal access with men to education and vocational and professional training, equal opportunities in employment, remuneration, and promotion, and in social and political and cultural activity, and by special labor and health protective measures for women, by providing conditions enabling mothers to work . . . .[21]

Subsequently, various labor regulations were enacted that were intended to prevent discrimination and exploitation in employment; they were rules designed to prohibit excessively heavy labor and dangerous work (although in practice not always enforced) and reflected a traditionally chauvinist perception.

However, the ideologically inspired and pragmatically applied concept of women's equality in the work force has not been without costs. As a result of a contradiction in Soviet policy that urges women to be both productive workers and housewives, a "double burden" has been created by emancipation — raising children and managing a household on one hand and holding full-time, often technical jobs in industry on the other.

This double burden has been largely responsible for a significant trend that is causing alarm to Soviet sociologists and demographers: the decision of the overburdened working mother, particularly in urban, ethnic Russian families, to limit family size to one or at most two children. As a result, ethnic white Russian birthrates are declining, while the Asiatic Russian minority birthrates are rising. Their concern is not ill-founded. Statistics indicate that between 1959 and 1970, the percentage of ethnic Russians in the U.S.S.R. dropped from 55 to 53 percent of the total population.[22]

Soviet economists and planners are also concerned with the declining ethnic Russian birthrate because it is producing manpower shortages exacerbating the already serious loss of much of the male population during the Second World War. This loss now produces a numerically smaller generation in twenty-year cycles, a decline which can be illustrated by a statistical snapshot comparison of the number of persons reaching the age of sixteen in representative years between 1955 and 1965:[23]

Year	Number of Youth
1955	4,803,000
1960	1,537,000
1965	4,028,000

The pattern that the three data points suggest gives a picture of the overall population trend. By the mid-1960s, the generation that had been sixteen in 1960 had reached adulthood and was entering the labor force and rearing families. Significantly, because their numbers were fewer, they likewise produced a smaller generation of children, perpetuating the twenty-year cycle of sharp decline in the population. As the work force of the mid-1980s, the lower number of children from the generation of the 1960s, coupled with overall declining birthrates among ethnic Russians, is creating manpower shortages during the 1980 decade.

During periods of similar manpower shortages, the traditional solution has been to expand the labor force by using women. If that solution is used again, however, birthrates may be reduced even more, exacerbating again an already acute labor shortage.

Just as in other societies, the *theory* of non-discrimination has not measured up to the *practice*, even though in the Soviet Union the theory has its origins in Marxist-Leninist ideology. Women are concentrated in the lower-status, less-remunerative work, principally the health professions, education, and retail trade. Although the Soviet traditional professions include far more women than is the case in the United States (75 percent are physicians and 38 percent are lawyers, compared to 11 percent and 13 percent respectively in the U.S.),[24] it is significant that these professions are accorded less status in Soviet society than in any other. Doctors are poorly paid and expected to work, as one woman physician states, "for the love of the profession and mankind."[25] Furthermore, opportunities for entering the more prestigious professions (military, agriculture, industry) in the Soviet Union are limited by discriminatory admissions policies in the higher schools of learning. A Soviet study concluded that even with equal entrance scores, women had more difficulty in gaining admittance to advanced schools.[26] Nor are women admitted to the military academies. Another

1943: the commander of a
night-bomber regiment
briefs her crews before
a mission.

In World War II many Soviet
women pilots and navigators
were assigned to all-female
night-bomber units flying
antiquated biplanes such as
this Po-2, a dangerous and
demanding mission.

A more traditional view
of the relationship between
women and warriors: a
collective farm worker greets
Soviet soldiers on maneuvers

The Soviet military tends to staff many medical specialties with women.

In keeping with Soviet emphasis on the importance of stable family life for the military man, a soldier and his bride are married in official ceremony.

Entitled "Home on short leave," this 1979 photograph suggests the tenacity of traditional attitudes in the Soviet Union.

A female cosmonaut trainee stands before a barely visible MiG jet trainer.

study found far fewer females in industrial/ agricultural institutes than men, even though females greatly outnumber males in the secondary schools.[27]

Finally, just as there does not seem to be complete freedom in career selection for women in the Soviet Union, neither does there seem to be a sharing of authority in the work force. In the medical profession, for example, men represent only 15 percent of the number of physicians, yet at the same time comprise 50 percent of the chief physicians and executives of the medical institutions.[28] Thirty-nine percent of those in scientific occupations are women, yet these women hold only 10 percent of all professorships and memberships in the prestigious U.S.S.R. Academy of Science.[29] In industry, women constitute half of the labor force but are supervisors and shift chiefs one-sixth to one-seventh less often than their male coworkers.[30] Of the politically sensitive positions, women represent only 12.3 percent of Soviet writers, and for every 573 radio, press, and TASS commentators, only 8 are female.[31] Exact figures are unavailable for the number of women in the officer corps of the armed forces, but estimates are generally quite low. The total strength of women is estimated to be no more than 30,000 in a total military force of four million.[32]

It is within the political power structure that women are most underrepresented in the Soviet Union. In the Communist Party, fewer than one-quarter are women. More important, only 3.3 percent of the Central Committee are women.[33] In addition, only one woman, Ekaterina Furtseva, has served in the Politburo, the highest policymaking body in the U.S.S.R.[34] Within the lower levels of government, however, women won one-half the seats in the local 1975 elections.[35] Yet the roles women play in these local bodies are limited to traditional feminine concerns. Additionally, an analysis of the debates occurring in the Supreme Soviet from 1966 to 1973 demonstrated that female deputies addressed themselves mainly to issues of health policy, marriage and family law, labor legislation, and education. Their role in the power politics of foreign, defense, and budgetary policy was nearly nonexistent.[36]

THE foregoing survey of the current status of women in the U.S.S.R. illustrates that despite ideology and law, true equality between the sexes is still an elusive goal. To provide clues to this apparent failure of the Soviet system and to provide the basis for our analysis of women in the military, we suggest four interrelated factors that reinforce conventional and traditional Soviet sex-role attitudes within Soviet society.

First, efforts to remedy the woman question following the Revolution were focused on restructuring the female's role in the economy. The psychosociological origins of why women were historically subordinated to men went unrecognized.[37] Although women had been given the same rights as men to participate in the labor force, little was done to modify *traditional* attitudes toward male and female sex roles. Thus, the Bolshevik Revolution brought a new but partial consciousness-raising to the society, yet it did not profoundly alter the overall perception of the woman's place in it. This fact is of major significance in the role women play in the military.

Second, the ideological legacy of the "New Soviet Person" — the example of the model citizen — reinforces conventional and, again, traditional sex-role attitudes. This "New Soviet Person" for the most part exhibits traits culturally approved as masculine: he is a "soldier of the Revolution" who sublimates personal needs to those of country; "he" is a flexible, highly mobile party activist who will go where the party feels there is need.[38] Notably absent is any traditionally defined female characteristic such as nurturance and domesticity.

Third, of the institutions that have most hampered women's progress, the political system has provided the greatest hurdle. Since

women's influence has been limited both by inadequate numbers in official party and elected positions and by their traditionally confined interests, women have not been able to broaden the ideological base of equality established by the Revolution. Statistics illustrate that the degree of party participation for men is four to five times as great as for women.[39] As a consequence of their professional and occupational backgrounds, the specialized political concerns of men and women alluded to earlier determine the roles they play in the political power structure; defense and foreign matters take precedence over health and education, the "appropriate" women issues.

Fourth, no outside pressure group, such as the women's movement in the United States, exists to demand change. Indeed, in the political sphere, the problem has long been considered resolved by ideological and legal measures; hence it no longer really exists. Additionally, and perhaps largely because of the absence of a women's movement, there are few role models for women to imitate. Little girls see that women are chiefly doctors, teachers, and mothers; eventually, they enter the same fields and in so doing perpetuate those roles in society.

In summary, then, there are several major factors in the broader Soviet society which affect the role of women in the Soviet military service: the declining ethnic Russian birthrates; a projected, severe labor shortage in the mid-1980s; the double burden of home and work; and the pattern of discrimination and under-representation caused by reinforced, traditional views of the role of women.

Women and the Military

Given the traditional perception of the role of women in the broader society, there is justification for assuming that service in the armed forces, beyond certain limited and specified occupations, is but another profession generally considered unsuitable or inappropriate for women. Indeed, the harshness, deprivation, isolation, and generally demoralizing existence attendant to the profession are not well thought of by many of the *male* youth facing the prospects of being drafted into military service.[40] While Soviet military training and service conditions are somewhat ameliorated for the women who do serve,[41] society still perceives military service as being harsh and difficult. The rigors, which are deliberately introduced into military service to harden the soldier, are usually those from which Soviet women in civilian occupations are traditionally excluded: that is, hard manual labor, long hours, isolation from social amenities, and strict regimentation.

There are other reasons for excluding women from the military, evident in the following characteristics of Soviet society: ethnic Russians may soon be a ruling minority (if they are not so already) due to decreasing birthrates among ethnic Russians and dramatically increasing birthrates among the Russian Asian minorities; the Soviets are experiencing chronic labor shortages that will peak in the mid-1980s when the number of 16- to 20-year-old males will again reach a significant low.[42] These characteristics are of great concern to Soviet leaders and are thus likely to limit the utilization of women in their armed forces in greater numbers for the following reasons.

First, fertility rates among ethnic Russian women are highest in the age group of 20 to 29 years.[43] Recruiting efforts to attract the numbers of women needed to fill the quotas of specialized skills identified for women are directed toward this very group: women from ages 19 through 25, single, without children, and physically fit.[44] Service in the Soviet military for these women thus essentially prevents their having children since pregnant women soldiers are discharged.[45] More extensive use of women in the armed forces would therefore conflict directly with societal efforts to increase birthrates among ethnic Russians.

Second, if the Soviets hope to maintain an

armed force at its present size through the 1980s, when declining birthrates will result in a major shortage of 16- to 20-year-old males, the labor and military sectors will be competing for the same male youths.[46] Among alternatives available to the Soviets to compensate for this shortage is, of course, greater use of women in the military — the pattern typical of other societies facing manpower shortages and perceiving a military threat.[47] Doing so, however, will present a serious dilemma to Soviet planners. Recruiting more women to serve in the military to compensate for manpower shortages, as already noted, will run the risk in the long run of further reducing birthrates. Equally important, it will run the risk in the short run of creating a shortage of women in the professional and technical skills of the civilian industrial sector which, by tradition, are provided by women:[48] greater recruitment of women for the military limits their utilization in the civilian labor force; greater use in the civilian labor force limits their use in the military.[49] Further, while there appear to be links between the number of women employed in industry and declining birthrates — working women seem to have fewer children — there are unquestioned links to military service by women and declining birthrates. Of the two alternatives for employing women, greater numbers in the military appears to be less desirable. Indeed, the Soviets are more likely to turn to more traditional solutions to compensate for the shortage in the 1980s of draft-age males, such as returning the service obligation to three years and eliminating or reducing the numbers of construction and support workers under direct military control.[50] A major change in the use of women in the armed forces is thus unlikely.

Third, a greater military use of women is likely to have an adverse effect on the already serious ethnic problems within the Soviet Union.[51] If women were to be used more extensively in the military, preference would likely be toward ethnic Russian women rather than women of any of the growing ethnic minority groups.[52] Ethnic Russians are more likely to have the needed technical and educational background and are also more likely to be considered more reliable — that is, patriotic and loyal. Yet recruiting women from only one ethnic group is also more likely to have both political and ethnic liabilities for Soviet officials. Present Soviet emphasis on "Russian" nationalism (as opposed to "Soviet") in general appears to intensify the historic frictions between ethnic Russians and other nationalities. Excluding large numbers of women minority groups from serving in the military would thus not only emphasize the ethnic distinction between Russians and the minorities but would also contrast significantly with political efforts, consistent with Marxist-Leninist ideology, to minimize minority nationalism. And again, greater use of ethnic Russian women by the military would aggravate the growing ethnic imbalance in favor of the non-Russian groups by further reducing births. Parenthetically, greater use of *non*ethnic Russian minority women could become a means of curtailing their increasing birthrates; mandatory military service for these women might be an effective birth control measure.

THIS article has attempted to summarize the limited information available about women in the Soviet armed forces and to analyze their minimal participation. It appears that low utilization of women in the military, in contrast to the popular image of the Soviet female soldier of World War II, is a direct reflection of sociological and demographic factors of Soviet society. Whereas other societies perceiving external military threats typically turn to greater use of women in periods of manpower shortages, doing so does not appear a likely course of action by the Soviets.

Norfolk, Virginia
and
Brussels, Belgium

Notes

1. Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry, *Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1978), pp. 180-81.

2. Jim Rogers, "Soviet Women," *Soldiers*, March 1978, p. 13.

3. Edd D. Wheeler, "Women in Combat: A Demurrer," *Air University Review*, November-December 1978, p. 66. The author describes their combat role as "an exercise in public relations, designed to impress the outside world with the underdog position of [Russia]."

4. The combat role of women in the Revolution is addressed by Vera Broido, *Apostles into Terrorists: Women and the Revolutionary Movement in the Russia of Alexander II* (New York, 1977). Their combat role in World War I is addressed in "Russia's Women Soldiers," *Literary Digest*, 25 August 1917.

5. Ray Wagner, editor, *The Soviet Air Force in World War II* (New York, 1973), p. 136N.

6. Rogers, p. 13.

7. *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces* (Washington: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976), p. 1.

8. A precise figure is yet to be substantiated. The range of figures comes from several sources: *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. iv; Wheeler, op. cit.; Rogers, op. cit.

9. The information comes from Chapter II, Article 16, *USSR Bill on Universal Military Duty*, 12 October 1967, translated by U.S. Air Force, Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Soviet Awareness Division.

10. *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, pp. 6-7.

11. For example, 75 percent of the civilian physicians and 85 percent of the workers in other health-related fields are women. Murray Feshback and Stephen Rapawy, "Soviet Population and Manpower Trends and Policies," *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, October 14, 1976), p. 145. Specific descriptions of the positions filled are generally unavailable. Indeed, much of the information on the positions they do fill is derived from Soviet propaganda photographs.

12. *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. 8.

13. *Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces* (Washington: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 1978), pp. 5-7. See also *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika*, February 1977, pp. 26-27, translated by U.S. Air Force Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Soviet Awareness Division; and *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. 11.

14. Ibid., pp. 10-11. See also Robert D. Heinl, "The Soviet Military Machine," *Sea Power*, May 1976, pp. 31-34.

15. Wheeler, op. cit.

16. Department of Labor Statistics, 1979.

17. C. D. Kernig, *Marxism, Communism, and Western Society*, vol. 8 (New York, 1973), p. 343.

18. Dorothy Atkinson, Alexander Dallin, and Gail Warshofsky, editors, *Women in Russia* (Stanford, California, 1977), p. 118.

19. Mark G. Field, "Workers (and Mothers): Soviet Women Today," in *Women in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1968), p. 10.

20. Ibid.

21. Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, *Constitution*, Article 35.

22. Barry and Barner-Barry, pp. 180, 181, and 239.

23. Field, p. 29.

24. Department of Labor Statistics, 1979.

25. Robert G. Kaiser, *Russia: The People and the Power* (New York, 1976), p. 52.

26. Lotta Lennon, "Woman in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1971, p. 52.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 50.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 51.

31. Ibid., p. 50.

32. *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. 5.

33. Barry and Barner-Barry, p. 105.

34. Ibid., p. 122.

35. *Pravda*, 21 June 1975, p. 3.

36. Gail W. Lapidus, "Political Mobilization, Participation and Leadership: Women in Soviet Politics," *Comparative Politics*, October 1976, p. 99.

37. Ibid., p. 115.

38. Lennon, p. 48.

39. Lapidus, p. 104.

40. David M. Gist, "The Militarization of Soviet Youth," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, p. 127; and Leon Goure, *The Military Indoctrination of Soviet Youth* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1973), p. 73.

41. *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, pp. 7-10.

42. Field, pp. 13-29. The dramatic drop in births during and after World War II (due to heavy male combat losses) appears to be cyclic, repeating every 15 to 20 years. The second generation shortage of 16- to 20-year olds occurred in 1960-62; the next will occur in the early-to-mid-1980s.

43. Nadezhda Tatarinova, *Women in the USSR* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1968), p. 11.

44. *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, pp. 6-7.

45. Ibid., p. 10.

46. David R. Jones, editor, *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*, vol. 2 (Gulf Breeze, Florida, 1978), pp. 40-41.

47. Feshback and Rapawy, pp. 149-51.

48. Norton T. Dodge, *Women in the Soviet Economy: Their Role in Economic, Scientific, and Technical Development* (Westport, Connecticut, 1966), p. 199.

49. Robert S. Buemer, "The Soviet Draft: Cornerstone of USSR Nuclear Strategy," *Military Intelligence*, October-December 1979.

50. *Women in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. 149.

51. Many sources (such as Barry and Barner-Barry) address ethnic problems in Soviet society, and several address the problem in the military. The most useful is Herbert Goldhamer's *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York, 1975), p. 187.

52. For a listing of the largest and most rapidly growing ethnic groups in the Soviet Union and their growth rates, see Barry and Barner-Barry, pp. 237-42.

OF BEARS,
WEASELS, FERRETS
AND EAGLES

COLONEL HAROLD E. JOHNSON

*In the beginning, God created heaven and earth,
the sea, and all that in them is . . .*

Exodus 20:11

WITH His omnipotent power, God also created man in His own image with the ability to think, to reason, and to learn. But in His human creation, the Good Lord must have included either some of His own shortcomings or purposefully have implanted weaknesses, for man makes many mistakes everyday.

One of the biggest mistakes we in the military make is that either we personally fail to learn from our lessons in combat or we are negligent in passing along those important, often lifesaving observations and discoveries to the following generation. Such a lesson lapse that greatly concerns me relates to the employment problems of the Wild Weasel surface-to-air missile (SAM) killer mission, especially when applied in the potential European theater of operations.

I was a crew member of the F-105F Wild Weasel "3" group that was sent to Southeast Asia in 1966 as a quick-reaction response to the SA-2 SAMs introduced by the communists into North Vietnam. The Wild Weasel project had been created to provide a counterblow against the more sophisticated air defense weapons that threatened our fighter-bombers flying interdiction missions over North Vietnam.

The program was originally named Operation Mongoose, but that was changed when it was discovered a World War II clandestine project had used the Mongoose title. The Weasel portion of the name was then selected because of the mission employment perceived by the original designers. The SAM killer aircraft were supposed to "weasel" their way into enemy territory at low altitude, sniff out electronically the position of the SAM sites, and effectively mark those sites so that accompanying bomb-laden fighter-bombers could visually acquire and destroy them. The *Wild* portion of the name reflected not only the atmosphere of the type mission being flown but also accurately described the personalities and attitudes of the crew members who volunteered to fly such missions. In fact, the term *Bear* originated as a result of the observed aggressive behavior of the electronic warfare officers (EWOs) hand-picked to fly in the back seat of the specially retrofitted F-105F aircraft.

Major Milt Rickman, of the 357th Tactical Fighter Squadron, while attending an F-105 squadron 100-mission party in the USAF officers club at Takhli Air Base, Thailand, in 1966, paid a tongue-in-cheek compliment of recog-

Peeling off—an F-105G, equipped with QRC-380U blisters, carrying AGM-45A Shrike air-to-ground missiles and an AGM-78B Standard ARM missile

nition to these strange green-electron talking, funny-winged additions to the formerly all-single-seat fighter pilot organizations:

Do you remember the shooting gallery section in the arcades of the amusement parks? If so, you undoubtedly remember the electronic rifle apparatus that had a large bear running back and forth at the end. Every time you hit him, the bear would stop running, rear up on his hind legs, and roar before turning about and continuing on. Well, that's what these EWOs flying against the SAMs up North remind me of. Every time the SAMs fire at them, you'll see the EWO put his paws up on the back seat canopy rail and roar

Flying missions over North Vietnam, U.S. aircrews faced intense ground fire. Captured in a flare-illuminated night photograph, tracers arch toward an RF-4C on a night recce mission.

defiantly at the missiles as they whiz by his aircraft. So instead of GIBs (guys in back), as we've always called them, I propose to rename our Wild Weasel EWOs "Bears."

A deafening table-banging and shouting din of approval immediately followed his proposal, and use of the term quickly spread. Thereafter, a Wild Weasel pilot was commonly chided with comments about the antics or whereabouts of his "trained bear."

The wing commanders at the F-105 bases of Takhli and Korat, Thailand, where the first Weasel mission aircraft were introduced, had differing views about how such special mission resources should be organized and implemented. Since they had only general guidelines, the theater commanders were free to ad-lib with their use of the limited Wild Weasel

resources. The originally intended mission employment of trolling for and killing SAM sites was never implemented. Instead, the Wild Weasel aircraft were thrust into the lead flight of all deep-penetrating fighter-bomber force missions to act as what became known as "Iron Hand" SAM suppression flights. The Weasel four-ship flights were always the first in and last out during all fighter-bomber attacks in the high density SAM, AAA, and MiG defended areas of North Vietnam. It was not unusual for newly arrived Weasel crews to find themselves in the lead aircraft of the lead flight supporting a full 24 aircraft fighter-bomber strike against a prime, heavily defended target close to Hanoi on their very first mission. If the average 18- to 24-minute exposure time over the target area was survived, this was true

baptism under fire, but the resulting loss of almost 50 percent of the Weasel aircraft and crews made the stateside training of replacement crews and the retrofitting of replacement aircraft very difficult to keep up with. Those Weasel crews that survived added techniques for further survival and successful attack against the SAMs to their repertoire with each completed mission.

Vital lessons were learned quickly. First, it was discovered that one should never fly against the SAMs either through weather or above a solid cloud layer. The SAM acquisition radar could detect an aircraft clearly and fire at will. Even though the Bear knew what the SAM site was doing, when missiles were fired, the Weasel flight was limited as to what counter actions it could take. It was necessary to see the missiles coming at you as soon as possible to evade them effectively, so flying in or over weather was a definite handicap. Second, it was essential to stay low and fly fast when dueling with a SAM site in the heavy SAM/AAA environment. The aircraft had to be kept moving about rapidly (jinking) to complicate the SAM's intercept; the surrounding terrain had to be utilized appropriately to mask the flight from the SAM radar until the Weasel flight was in a position to kill the SAM site.

Another lesson was learned soon after introduction of the wing-positioned, self-generating jamming pods. When jamming was introduced close to the F-105F Weasel, or emitted by that aircraft itself, the skills of the Bear to monitor and interpret the SAM activity and enemy electronic environment were rendered completely useless. His electronic radiation receivers, radar homing and warning (RHAW) gear and audio receiver (music signals) were all obliterated. Many arguments were offered in defense of

An RF-101 photograph of a North Vietnamese SA-2 streaking upward. SAMs forced our planes to lower altitudes, where they became vulnerable to antiaircraft fire.

"Loaded and cocked" . . . An AGM-78A Standard ARM, which increased SAM suppression capability, hangs beneath the wing of an F-105F. . . . An air-to-ground missile (left) streaks toward a SAM site after launching from an F-105.

jammers in the Weasel flight primarily because it seemed to offer some sort of magical security-blanket-type support. I am of the opposite opinion, however. From my experience in the Weasel hunter-killer role, if the EWO was an effective, confident operator, the attachment of jammers either in the flight or to the lead two-seat aircraft was, and is, so much excess baggage. The Weasel aircraft should be either a SAM killer or a jammer. I am not convinced that it needs to be both.

The weapons used against the SAM sites by the F-105F Weasel aircraft evolved rapidly as new ideas were tried or new systems became available. In the beginning, 2.75-inch rockets coupled with a 20 mm Gatling gun strafe on the same pass were used to mark the SAM site position for the accompanying three F-105Ds, each armed with six 750-pound bombs. Later the Shrike missile and cluster bomb units (CBUs) adding lethality to the attack, replaced the 2.75

rocket pods. Follow-on Shrikes and some Standard Arm missiles were implemented as they were made available.

Introduction of the F-4 as a Wild Weasel aircraft involves a complicated story that deserves full coverage in a separate discussion. Basically, the first attempted conversion of the F-4 as Wild Weasel "4" began in 1966 but was soon abandoned for many reasons, e.g., the incompatibility of electronic gear to the F-4 system and the requirement to use pilots in the back seat instead of EWOs. The F-4G was eventually designed and retrofitted to fulfill the role as the primary USAF Wild Weasel aircraft in 1976. Most of the F-105F or two-seat Wild Weasels have since been transferred to the National Guard.

A low-level reconnaissance photo of an SA-2 site somewhere in North Vietnam

BAMBOO MATTING

The devastating impact of an SA-2 warhead is evident in these photographs taken over the Red River Valley in 1971. From the left, the missile detonates below an RF-4C, igniting the fuel tanks; the Phantom tumbles and disintegrates.

Thus, it is obvious today that Wild Weasel aircraft and crews are a critical, limited resource. Their effective utility in any conflict is an accepted probability. Even standard computerized war games produce a positive probability of success factor for other flight operations when Wild Weasels are simulated to accompany the attacking forces. Therefore, it seems logical that Weasel operations, aircraft, crews, and weapons will be a viable, on-going consideration in future USAF war-fighting plans. Yet I am gravely concerned about the continuing ability of the USAF to employ or support SAM killer missions effectively. There appears to be an increased emphasis on standoff jamming in lieu of the hunter-killer option, but perhaps both alternatives provide balance for opposition to and defeat of the enemy SAM threat.

More Wild Weasel aircraft are needed, but at present the program seems stagnant. I do not intend to discuss classified details, but I perceive that the employment considerations of the F-4G Wild Weasel are reminiscent of our beginning utilization over North Vietnam. In fact, the weapons designated for use on the SAM killer mission appear less flexible now than in those days. I shudder to think of the loss rate that could be experienced by this critical resource in the NATO arena where a five-to-10,000-foot cloud layer plants itself much of the time. The Weasels will have no choice other than to fly their missions in this foul weather. The mortality rate of the Wild Weasel forces escorting interdiction flights across the heavy SAM-ZSU-23/4-infested forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) could be devastating. Unless the Weasels were tasked specific missions to engage and neutralize this standard Soviet/Warsaw Pact FEBA SAM support, they would be free to engage the Weasels and the aircraft being escorted to targets behind enemy lines. The fast-moving Wild Weasels need some help. They need a "ferret"!

LOGIC leads us to believe this help can be provided by specially equipped modifications of existing aircraft such as the two-seat A-10s or the F-15 Strike Eagle. These advanced aircraft coud be used in the FEBA area SAM and ZSU-23/4 killer role. An EWO in the back seat equipped with up-to-date, state-of-the-art electronic receivers and RHAW gear could help to search out and destroy enemy SAMs

and antiaircraft units positioned near and immediately behind the FEBA. As well as adding a positive dimension to the SAM killer force, two-seat A-10s or Strike Eagle F-15s would bring unique qualities to the mission. A-10s, designed to fly and fight at a very low altitude, could play a secondary role in destroying tanks. Imagine the versatility of a "Thunderhog Ferret"! F-15s, with engines and design features suited to higher altitudes, would still retain significant air-to-air as well as interdiction capabilities.

The Wild Weasel contribution to the overall mission has been vital since the hottest and darkest days of the air war against Vietnam. In a future conflict the U.S. Air Force may face an enemy with numerical superiority in the air and enough SAMs to achieve air deniability from the ground. To meet these challenges, the Air Force must be flexible and dynamic in its approach to the SAM suppression mission so that our aviators can continue to say, "Yea though I fly through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no enemy; for thou, Wild Weasel, art with me."

MacDill AFB, Florida

The dissenter is every human being at those moments of his life when he resigns momentarily from the herd and thinks for himself.

Archibald MacLeish
"In Praise of Dissent,"
New York Times
December 16, 1956

MILITARY HOSTAGES: WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW AND DON'T

Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Porter

*If U.S. military personnel are to accept
the obligation to risk their lives in combat
against revolutionary governments,
what are the obligations of the U.S. government
on their behalf?*

GENERAL John Singlaub's question could not be more appropriate.[1] The hostage experience in Iran and the current one in Italy demonstrate that peacetime captivity harbors unique problems for the military hostage. International terrorism, particularly the government-sponsored variety, alters the traditional rules of hostile detention. Peacetime hostile detention, unlike wartime, is not firmly grounded in international law. Instead, it reflects a hopelessly tangled net of international conventions, revolutionary rhetoric, and religious righteousness. Despite its metaphysical qualities, however, it poses very real challenges for its victims.

Military hostages will have to rely to a considerable degree on their own judgment. There is no uniform service policy on how to counter hostile peacetime detentions.[2] The services do not even agree on their obligations to provide such a policy. Positions vary from one's commitment to provide some additional guidance and training to an insistence by another that the Code of Conduct is alone sufficient. By failing to agree on a common policy, the services have placed the burden of surviving hostage situations solely on the shoulders of their people. They have not, however, given up their right to judge their people on how well they carry this burden.

This article is written for those who may face the challenge of honorably surviving a hostile peacetime detention. It will not propose standards of conduct, that is an institutional responsibility. It will, however, attempt to give future hostages an appreciation of the problems they will face. Specific guidance is not appropriate; hostage situations are too complex and diverse. Instead, the best tools are good judgment and a conceptual framework for analyzing hostage situations and determining proper courses of action.

The Code of Conduct provides the moral basis for coping with all military captivity, peacetime or wartime. The result of considerable study and experience, it embodies the most honored traditions and values of the military profession. Its philosophy offers sound direction regardless of the situation.

The code, however, cannot be arbitrarily applied; its six articles must be selectively adapted to each hostage situation. The practitioner must use the code's spirit and intent to determine his best course of action.[3] This difficult task can cause the hostage great anxiety.

While particular articles may not be suited to certain peacetime detentions, they are still used as a standard to judge a hostage's conduct. It is a dilemma the captive cannot avoid. To survive his experience with dignity, he will be forced to apply some of the articles and reject others. He will never be on solid ground; others will second-guess him. To properly interpret and apply the code in peacetime requires some understanding of its origins and suitability for various types of peacetime situations.

The code is the product of our Korean prisoner of war (POW) experience. The enemy politically exploited a number of our prisoners to further their war effort.[4] Some Americans made damaging false confessions. In 1953, 23 of our POWs refused repatriation; a few were eventually prosecuted (11 were convicted) for serious offenses against their comrades.[5] Of the 7000 American servicemen taken prisoner, nearly 40 percent perished in captivity. Many died because they lost their will to resist and survive.[6]

The promulgation of the Code of Conduct responded to this experience. After the war, President Eisenhower appointed a distinguished blue-ribbon commission to study the conduct in the POW camps and recommend an appropriate standard of behavior. The committee's findings were promulgated in 1955 as The Code of Conduct. At the time, the committee was neither aware nor concerned about kidnappings, hijackings, hostage-barricade situations, and other types of peacetime detention. Articles IV and V of the code contained the words, ". . . I become a prisoner of war. . . ." Since the code's moral guidance was suited to

all types of captivity, the services, with little forethought, extended the application of the code to all captivity.

Such an extension of the code follows the premise that peacetime captivity is similar to wartime. Actually, fundamental differences do exist. In peacetime, the captive's conduct can have a much greater influence on his eventual fate. His actions can significantly impact national policy, and he is not supported by the political-legal framework that exists in wartime. These assertions become clearer when we look closer at these differences.

In wartime, a prisoner's conduct seldom impacts on national policy. Diplomatic relations are suspended, and policy is dominated by those political military considerations necessary to prevail in battle. The POW camp is a side show; the prisoner a minor actor. Exploitation of prisoners by the captor certainly occurs, but it seldom becomes a major concern until one of the combatants decides to abandon its military efforts to resolve the conflict.[7] Improper conduct by a POW can severely harm fellow prisoners, but most of what happens in a camp remains speculative to outsiders until the prisoners return home.

In peacetime, the conduct of a hostage can directly influence national policy. Once the media arrive, a hostage situation generally becomes international theater. It is not a side show but the main event. If the hostage is held by a hostile government, he can expect his actions to have considerable political fallout. He is not only a vehicle for propaganda and exploitation but also a source of classified information. By a few careless remarks before a TV camera, he can discredit his government in the eyes of the world or help the captor justify his illegal detention. The death of a hostage, for whatever cause, can pressure his government to take actions of considerable risk and consequence—actions forced by internal public pressures to respond.

Peacetime captivity lacks a recognized political-legal framework. In wartime the Laws of Armed Conflict sanction the capture and holding of prisoners.[8] The duration of captivity is specified and ends when the warring powers achieve an armistice. The Geneva Conventions directly support the captive in two important ways.[9] First, they prescribe internationally recognized standards of treatment. Second, they protect the prisoner from arbitrary trial and conviction by revolutionary tribunals or local courts.

In essence, these laws and conventions establish some rules of the game that are not easily ignored. Their violation often constitutes an international crime for which there is no statute of limitations. While serious transgressions occurred in the past, the violators fate has always weighed heavily in the outcome of the conflict. Those on the winning side may well escape punishment, but those on the losing side face quick retribution or relentless pursuit.

The code is closely tied to these rules of the game and was purposely designed to exploit them. Article III's obligation to the escapee is directly supported by the Geneva Convention's protection of an unsuccessful escapee from arbitrary or harsh punishment.[10] Article V's requirement to give name, rank, serial number, and date of birth is lifted almost verbatim from Article 17 of the conventions.[11] Consequently, the code is well adapted to fit unforeseen wartime detentions because the conditions for such captivity are formally structured by international laws and conventions.

In peacetime, there are no such rules of the game. Captivity may vary from a spontaneous hijacking by a psychopath to the carefully orchestrated takeover of an embassy by a foreign government. Such unstructured and diverse detentions make the code extremely difficult to apply. In most cases the captor is already outside the law; and the hostage's fate and treatment will depend on other deterring factors such as unfavorable publicity, fear of reprisal, or promise of concessions. Consequently, arbitrary application of the articles will often

not serve the best interests of either the hostage or his government. The wisdom of selectively applying them is evident in my examination of the general types of hostile peacetime detention and the articles' suitability to each.

DESPITE its inherently complex and diverse nature, hostile peacetime detention can be divided into three general types: *legal* detention by a hostile government, *illegal* detention by a hostile government, and *illegal* detention by a terrorist. A hostage should know that each presents unique problems and challenges for the code. While these groupings are arbitrary (their boundaries certainly overlap), they provide the hostage a useful framework for analyzing his particular detention situation.

In *legal* detention, the captive is rightfully held by a hostile government for violation of one of its laws and is properly called a detainee rather than a hostage. Here the political implications usually far outweigh the legal. A detainee's actions can significantly affect the conditions and length of his detention. The nature of this captivity is best illustrated by the example of an F-4 pilot who accidentally strays into East Germany and has to eject.

Here, the pilot, regardless of intent or circumstances, has violated East German sovereignty and is subject to legal detention. A state of war does not exist, but the articles of the code provide wartime guidance. Article II forbids the pilot from peacefully surrendering himself to German authorities. Instead, it charges him to evade through hostile territory and cross one of the most heavily guarded borders in the world.

If the pilot is captured rather than killed, his actions have belied the accidental circumstances of his presence. In the process of evading, he has very likely trespassed, stolen food, or broken other East German laws. The code then asks the pilot to complicate his situation further. Article III directs him to break jail and repeat his effort to flee across the border. The failure of this endeavor puts the pilot in greater jeopardy. By religiously following the code, he has unnecessarily endangered his life and severely complicated diplomatic efforts to free him. He has given the East Germans justification to exploit his presence politically and even try him in their courts. In this case, his actions have benefited neither himself nor his country.

In such detentions, the captive must be very careful. His interrogators will often be professionals who are highly skilled in political exploitation. Treatment will reflect both the circumstances of his capture and the state of diplomatic relations between the detaining power and his government. The detainee should make every effort to maintain military courtesy and to secure U.S. counsel. To avoid complicating diplomatic efforts to gain his release, he should not seriously consider escape. He should avoid to the utmost any public statements or written confessions.

In *illegal* detention by a hostile government, the hostage faces a variation of the captivity that was described earlier. These detentions, however, are usually based on a recognized breach of international law. They are an endeavor played for high political stakes before a worldwide audience. The hostage situation in Iran is an example. Here the so-called students were surrogates of the government. On Iran's behalf, they seized the hostages in order to exploit them for propaganda, blackmail, and classified information.[12]

In this captivity, the hostage should heed the code's strong stand against divulging information to the captor. Unlike other types of peacetime detention, the hostage's conduct will seldom, if ever, determine his eventual fate.[13] Some U.S. hostages in Iran believed they would not be released unless they participated in filmed interviews or met with visiting clergy. This rightfully proved to be false. Their eventual freedom was not truly linked to their conduct but to Iran's national policy. If it had served Iran's best interests to execute them, the nation would have done so. In the end, they came

home because Iran determined that the liabilities of their continued detention exceeded the benefits. Such a realization does not make the physical aspects of captivity any easier, but it promises to reduce some of the mental anxiety. It will also encourage a stronger resistance than might otherwise have appeared prudent.

The code's guidance on escape and special favors is generally inappropriate for this type captivity. In Iran, the government fervently sought justification for its widely recognized criminal act of seizing hostages. By attempting an escape, the hostages could have easily played into the hands of their captor, particularly if they employed violence. The prospects for successful escapes are usually small. In Iran the nearest friendly border was half way across the country. An unsuccessful escape could be a godsend for the captor; it could arguably provide him with the very legitimacy for holding the hostage he previously lacked. A hostage should not arbitrarily reject the possibility of escape. If the prospects for success are high and no violence is necessary, the gamble may be appropriate. It is the failure of escape that has such far-reaching consequences for the hostage, his comrades, and his government.

Article III of the code forbids captives from accepting parole or special favors. After two weeks, the Iranians released 13 black and female members of the embassy. Should the military members of this group have refused this special favor? Again their release was predicated on Iranian national interests and not on their conduct or cooperation. The Iranians saw them as oppressed minorities and sought international sympathy in their release. In such situations the acceptance of such an offer generally makes good sense. The returnees provided valuable intelligence, and the Iranians had fewer hostages to exploit. Since the services did not reprimand their returnees, we can assume that violation of this provision of the code is condoned.

In this type of detention, the hostage should stick closely to the code's guidance regarding communication with a captor, but be cautious of its provisions on escape. The greatest danger will most likely come during the capture and initial period of captivity. Therefore, the hostage should avoid combative behavior until tensions subside and a detention routine is established. Since the government will attempt to mask its involvement, the hostage may have difficulty determining its presence. The hostage should, therefore, presume that his captor is a foreign power until he can determine otherwise. Indications of a government's involvement include persistent efforts to acquire classified information, seek political propaganda, and blackmail the United States. Many other indications will emerge as the captivity progresses, but these will be evident from the beginning.

The most difficult captivity to counter will very likely be *illegal* detention by a terrorist, because it is the least predictable and structured. The captivity of Brigadier General James L. Dozier, USA, fits this category. Here the hostage is held by international outlaws; his fate is more in the hands of his jailers than some institutional authority. As international fugitives, genuine terrorists may or may not have to play their hand quickly. In hijackings and other similar hostage barricade situations, terrorists can seldom sustain their criminal act beyond a couple of weeks. Typically most incidents are over in a few days. In kidnappings, however, the terrorist is capable of sustaining the captivity for several months to a year. In either case, terrorists have little sympathy for a hostage who causes problems. Good treatment of a hostage does little to alter the terrorists' fate if they are caught.

The military hostage will find it most difficult to apply the code to these situations. The circumstances of captivity are quite likely to be far removed from the wartime conditions on which the code is based. There are several factors that put the military hostage on his own. First, the code primarily concerns community captivity, but many terrorist victims, such as General Dozier, are isolated in "peo-

ple's prisons." The code tells them to trust in God and their country, but national policy is to make no concessions, political, economic, or otherwise.[14] Such a declaratory policy places greater emphasis on deterring terrorist incidents than on securing the safe release of those already held.

In these situations the military hostage should expect the challenge of surviving with dignity and self-respect to be his very own. Certainly his government will attempt to help him, but the host country is in charge and deals with the terrorists. Therefore, the best hope for the hostage is to convey to his captors a personal dignity. The stronger their respect for him as a person, the harder it may be for them to kill him. One does not earn respect by pandering or praising the terrorist's cause. One earns respect by standing for "something"—God, family, and country. The hostage must become more than an inanimate artifact of Western imperialism. Such an effort may make no difference, but what are the alternatives?

Such a relationship between hostage and terrorists is possible within the spirit and intent of the code but not within the prescriptive guidance of its articles. Article V severely limits communication between captive and captor. While this is sound guidance for other detentions, it works against the military hostage here. Communication on nonsensitive matters is the hostage's only means of establishing the respect that may be crucial to his eventual survival. The hostage must be careful until he is certain the terrorists are not surrogates of a government.

Service reluctance to permit even limited communication with a captor is not justified with respect to terrorists. These are seldom structured detentions manned by professional interrogators. If the terrorists are seeking ransom or freedom for their comrades, they will have little interest in classified information or dishonoring a foreign state. For these groups sufficient publicity generally comes from the seizure of the hostages not from attempts to propagandize them. If the terrorists see a well-known person or political exploitation, they generally seek information to support their propaganda objectives. Links between the terrorists and foreign states are possible, so the hostage may find himself pressured for classified information. For the captives these two types of hostage situations require a slightly different approach. In the first, the hostage should have more flexibility to communicate and influence his eventual fate. In the second, he can expect his interrogation to be much more severe and his task of establishing his personal dignity much more difficult. More important, his fate will be less dependent on his conduct than on other factors.

The military hostage will find the code's obligation to escape too arbitrary for a terrorist situation. In some cases, he will want to make every effort to escape; in others, he will want to sit still. If kidnapped by Central American terrorists, he should consider escape regardless of the risk or the prospect of violence. The track record for such hostages has been grim where their governments believe in no concessions. On the other hand the victim of a hijacking is usually better off to wait out his situation. Statistics show that more than 90 percent of hijacking victims are eventually released unharmed. When dealing with terrorists, the hostage needs more flexibility than in any other type of detention. The dynamics are too great, the conditions too varied, and the retribution too swift to permit a cookbook approach.

A military hostage should never consider the code a handicap to be overcome. It can be a very valuable tool once the hostage understands its original purpose, strengths, and weaknesses. The spirit and intent of the code provide the essential moral foundation necessary for any successful resistance. There are no short cuts to surviving a hostile detention with dignity and self-respect. Experience shows that an iron link exists between resistance and survival. The captive who stands by his country's honor and

his moral convictions to the utmost of his ability will have the best chance of surviving this experience and with least difficulty in readjusting afterward.

In response to General Singlaub's original question, the services have an obligation to educate their people on the complexities of hostile peacetime detention. Because of the fundamental differences between wartime and peacetime captivity and the great diversity of the latter, the services cannot provide the type of specific guidance that the code provides for wartime. Every peacetime captivity will be unique and require its own special response. Since the services expect their people to live up to the goals of the code, they should provide them guidance on how to achieve these goals.

There are several options open to the services:

• To recommend the code as a valuable frame of reference, pointing out its strengths and weaknesses in the three general types of peacetime hostile detention;

• To write a special policy based on the spirit and intent of the code but with separate guidelines for particular types of peacetime captivity; and

• To prescribe the use of the code but provide separate instruction on how to apply its various articles selectively.

The best choice is a combination of the first two options. The first is suitable for the thousands of servicemembers traveling or stationed overseas who (however unlikely) are possible victims of a kidnapping, hijacking, or other hostile detention. While building on the individual's previous knowledge of the code, it provides him a framework with which to evaluate his situation and the flexibility to respond accordingly. The second option is ideal for those military personnel who because of their responsibilities or area of assignment are attractive candidates for hostage situations. For them a specially designed policy is both feasible and economical. It is also easy to support with training that which contributes more to a successful detention than any other factor. The disadvantage of the third option is that its guidance must be narrowly structured to a specific type of detention, which may differ considerably from what the practitioner encounters. Even if the captive situation can be adequately foreseen (as in the second option), implementation puts a tremendous burden on those who must conduct the training.

THE trends of terrorist activity are clearly upward, and U.S. military personnel are increasingly being targeted. For a few states, terrorism has become an accepted and alternate way of doing business. It is time for the services to quit dwelling on their inability to agree on a uniform policy and meet their obligations to provide some guidance on how to cope with a hostile peacetime detention. To date, only the Air Force has moved in this direction. Much more needs to be done.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Major General John K. Singlaub, USA (Ret), "A Perspective on the POW/MIA Issue," *Washington Report,* March 1981, p. 3.
2. This has been a very difficult issue for the services. Two attempts to establish common ground rules (1977 and 1981) have failed because each service views the code in terms of its own unique needs and traditions.
3. DOD Directive 1300.7, which provides for "Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct," purposely divides the code into its spirit and intent that apply at all times and its articles which apply in wartime
4. Colonel Howard J. Dunn, USMC (Ret) and Major W. Hays Parks (USMC), "If I Become a Prisoner of War. . .," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings,* August 1976, p. 18. In fairness, the POWs were the victims of an unprecedented enemy campaign to

exploit them politically. Their condition was severely aggravated by the lack of a coherent policy for resistance and no prior training.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Vietnam fits here. The POWs became a major political issue once the United States decided to withdraw from the war. Securing the release of the prisoners was a necessary precondition of that policy.

8. See Article 23 of Hague Convention No. IV, "Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907," as published in *Selected International Agreements*, AFP 110-20, 27 July 1981.

9. See Articles 12-16 and Articles 82-88 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War as published in *Selected International Agreements*, AFP 110-20, 27 July 1981.

10. Ibid. Articles 89-108.

11. Ibid. Article 17.

12. There is considerable evidence that the takeover of the embassy had professional preparation and Khomeini's blessing. The students were only a means to mask government responsibility.

13. This does not include acts of violence or the commission of crimes by a hostage.

14. U.S. Department of State, *International Terrorism*, policy paper No. 285, 10 June 1981, p. 2.

Airpower Research Institute

On 1 October 1981 the Air University Airpower Research Institute (AU/ARI), a separate organization within the Air War College (AWC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, officially began operation. Its primary purpose is to produce detailed background studies that can serve as a basis for high-level, long-range decision-making.

The ARI is a predominantly blue-suit organization that seeks to bridge the gap between the operational Air Force and thorough academic research. The majority of ARI researchers are one-year military research associates sponsored by a major command, the Air Staff, or other Air Force organizations. In addition, four officers are assigned to the ARI for a full three-year tour, and four civilian research associates come to the ARI to complete one- or two-year research projects of interest to the Air Force.

In addition to completing their research project, military research associates have the opportunity to satisfy a professional military education (PME) requirement. Interested officers may complete a specially tailored program leading to the award of an ARI-designated Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) or AWC diploma.

ARI research efforts are focused in three main areas: (1) past, present, and future air power employment concepts in terms of doctrine, strategy, and technology; (2) technical, politico-economic, and military trends that can contribute to the long-range planning efforts of the USAF and its component elements; and (3) military professionalism and the challenges of military officership in a changing environment. The unifying theme is the search for more effective Air Force war-fighting capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

Those desiring more information about the Airpower Research Institute may call 205-293-5202 (AUTOVON 875-5202) or write to Colonel Kenneth J. Alnwick, AWC/EDY, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112.

PROFESSIONALISM FROM LIEUTENANT TO COLONEL

MAJOR C. ANNE BONEN

IN recent years much has been said about the subject of professionalism. Comments from U.S. Air Force leadership indicate a drifting away from traditional values such as sacrifice, dedication, duty, and unity. Even use of the term *occupationalist*, which infers that self-interest comes first, has become a common and negative word in our military vocabulary. While such comments and words *might be* based on accurate observation, it is important to note that there has never been a baseline by which a level of professionalism could be set for Air Force officers. Even Samuel P. Huntington's classic treatise on professionalism is Army in its orientation and is not based on data collections. Most of what has been said, then, has obviously been based on observation, experience, and assumptions. Only during the last two years have attempts been made to measure professionalism among Air Force line officers.

In 1980, Majors Joseph R. Daskevich and Paul A. Nafziger, while attending Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), created a 75-question survey to assess attitudes on pro-fessionalism among their fellow classmates. In addition to research in available literature and discussions with members of the ACSC faculty and student body, Daskevich and Nafziger used the four indicators of professsionalism developed by Professor Charles C. Moskos, Jr.

Professor Moskos theorized that a high level of corporateness (a sense of unity within the officer corps), a high sense of duty, an institutional outlook (as opposed to an occupational or civilian job outlook), and a specialist (instead of a generalist) orientation were measurements of professionalism. The 1980 ACSC student researchers developed a number of statements by which to measure each of these professional indicators. They developed a 5-point scale to measure the indicators, with scores of 1.0 indicating low corporateness and sense of duty and an occupational and generalist outlook. Scores of 3.0 represented the midpoint. A high feeling of corporateness and sense of duty and an institutional and specialist orientation were indicated by scores of 5.0. These were "relative positions" on the scale since the Air Force did not have a standard.

Daskevich and Nafziger administered the survey to 368 Air Force officers attending the ACSC Class of 1980. The results, reported in ACSC research report, "The Pulse of Professionalism" (0520-AY80), established a standard of professionalism, at least for Air Force majors.

The following year, three more ACSC student researchers using the same survey, collected and analyzed data on professionalism. Captain James R. Slagle collected and analyzed professionalism attitudes of 603 Squadron Officer School (SOS) student officers. He reported on how the junior officer views professionalism in his article "The Junior Officer of the 1980s — The Situational Professional," which was published in the November-December 1981 *Air University Review*. Major Hubert A. Jenneskens analyzed attitudes among 106 Air War College (AWC) officers. I compared the SOS and AWC survey findings with 373 ACSC student responses to determine if a "professionalism gap" existed among the junior-level, mid-career, and senior-level officers. This article, then, reports the results of a professionalism survey among 1082 Air Force line officers attending Air University during 1981.

PROFESSIONALISM is important in the Air Force today — according to at least 94 percent of each officer group of respondents. This opinion is reinforced by frequent comments from the Air Force leadership. When asked to respond to the statement "I consider myself to be a professional military officer," almost all respondents affirmed that they were professional military officers.

Although most officers indicated basic agreement on professional qualities, when asked to select the concept of professionalism that most closely paralleled their own views, approximately half (48 percent) of each Air University student officer group identified with Morris Janowitz's description of the pragmatic professional.

• Janowitz describes the military professional as one who is educated in political as well as military affairs, has managerial and technical skills, and cultivates a broad understanding of domestic and international affairs. It is important to note that Janowitz says a military officer is motivated by professional considerations.

The remaining half of each group was split in their responses between Samuel Huntington's traditional view of professionalism (24 percent) and James R. Golden's moderate concept of a military professional (28 percent).

• Huntington noted that a military profession is characterized by three things: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Comparing this to Janowitz, Huntington's concept is much more traditional and narrow, as it is a military only perspective. He stated that officers are professionals because they have expertise in the management of violence. He also said that officers are responsible to the state for the security of society; they are incorporated into the officer corps, sharing a certain set of values based on that membership.

• Golden views military professionalism as a gradual shift toward Janowitz's pragmatic professionalism and sees a more controlled use of force and a convergence of military and civilian values.

Golden's description of the military profession during wartime is more similar to Huntington's traditional professionalism.

On general concepts of professionalism, then, almost all officers surveyed thought that professionalism was important and considered themselves to be professionals. Although there was a variance in fundamental beliefs as to what denotes a professional, a higher percentage of each officer group endorsed the general concept of the "pragmatic professional." However, it was most interesting to find that although all the officers considered themselves "professionals," there was not even a 50 percent agreement on which one of three very broad concepts described the professional offi-

cer. In other words: "We all say we are what we can't even define!" I believe there is a message here for the leadership and for all officers.

The following are the results of the four primary professional indicators that were used to collect more specific information.

institutionalism versus occupationalism

Seven questions specifically measured attitudes on the first indicator—institutionalism versus occupationalism. One of these was a statement on professional military education (PME) in which at least 63 percent of all respondents agreed that PME was vital in nurturing competent and professional military officers. However, another statement measuring preference for base housing showed a high level of disagreement with at least 64 percent of each officer group stating a preference for off-base housing. It was the percentage of all the statements measuring institutionalism and occupationalism attitudes that led to an overall index of 3.3 for SOS, 3.4 for ACSC, and 3.7 for AWC officers. The student officers were more institutional than occupational in their outlook.

sense of duty

The duty index was measured by six specific statements on the survey. Officers from all three schools tended to agree that personal interests and desires must take second place to operational requirements. It was surprising, however, to find such a significant number of officers at ACSC and AWC who disagreed with that statement (ACSC, 16 percent; AWC, 13 percent; and SOS, 14 percent). Thirteen percent can be considered a significant number of AWC respondents since they represent a very select group of leaders. When officers were asked to respond to the following statement, "Military personnel should perform their duty regardless of personal or family consequences," the sense of agreement was not as strong, especially in ACSC and SOS (SOS, 51 percent; ACSC, 52 percent; AWC, 60 percent).

One curious highlight to this series of questions showed the officers with support Air Force specialty codes (AFSCs) as having a higher sense of duty than officers with operational AFSCs (62 percent versus 48 percent, respectively). The reverse would have been expected to be true since operational AFSCs are "closer to the cutting edge" of the Air Force wartime mission and these officers would, supposedly, feel a greater commitment to duty. Several explanations were postulated for this.

• Support officers, by their very jobs, are "supporting." This nearly subconscious reality may equate to a stronger sense of selflessness and, hence, "duty."

• Operations officers, in contrast to the obvious supporting role of support officers, are at the "receiving end" of the pipeline. To some extent, they may be less able than support officers to see their role in context to the larger Air Force. Many rated officers, at least during the first decade of their service, would probably admit to a narrower Air Force focus compared to their nonrated counterparts.

• Since most officers holding operational AFSCs are rated, the publicity regarding higher pay, need to improve retention, and the long tradition of flight pay may be producing an occupationalist or "marketplace" mentality in a higher percentage of these officers.

These are only postulations, since the research was not designed to clarify this issue — it was not even suspected to exist to the degree that it did. The overall duty index was 3.4 for SOS, 3.6 for ACSC, and 3.9 for AWC. Here, again, sense of duty was ranked above average (a 3.0 on the scale) by all three groups, with AWC students indicating the highest sense of duty.

corporateness (a sense of unity)

According to Huntington, the members of a profession share a sense of unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from non-

professionals. Four questions measured the corporate index. For example, "personally identifying" with the Air Force officer corps (rather than with the officers in their specialty or their immediate work unit) was highest for AWC and lowest for SOS (AWC, 41 percent; ACSC, 32 percent; SOS, 18 percent). This is not surprising, as a greater sense of unity would be expected the longer one is associated with a profession.

As with the sense of duty index, there was a similar variance between support and operational officers, with 20 percent more of the support officers identifying primarily with the Air Force officer corps while officers with operational AFSCs identified more frequently with their career field. Hypothetical reasons for this would be the same as those stated earlier. The overall corporate index was 2.8 for ACSC, 2.9 for SOS, and 3.3 for AWC respondents. This index showed the greatest difference between officer groups, with the AWC officers having a higher sense of corporateness than their SOS and ACSC counterparts.

Although the corporate professional indicator was the lowest of the four, as with the other findings, the responses still clustered around the average.

specialist versus generalist

The fourth professional indicator, specialist versus generalist, was measured specifically by three statements. For example, the officers were asked to respond to the statements: "You cannot be a 'specialist' and also be a 'professional.' " and "A 'professional' must be a specialist in his primary field." When asked to respond to the statement that you cannot be a specialist *and* a professional, the officers emphatically disagreed (SOS, 90 percent; ACSC, 95 percent; and AWC, 96 percent). The specialist-generalist index was the least clear-cut in its meaning. The SOS and ACSC response was identical (3.9), and the AWC response was 3.7. The majority of officers considered themselves to be specialists. As indicated by the AWC response, the longer officers serve in the Air Force, the less likely they would consider themselves to be specialists. However, even at the 05/06 level, 59 percent said they were specialists. Although nearly two-thirds of the SOS, ACSC, and AWC respondents felt that professional Air Force officers should balance specialized and generalized knowledge, in an Air Force composed of over 50 career fields and 400 officer AFSCs, the majority have worked primarily in only one or two AFSCs.

In addition to findings on professionalism in general and the four primary professional indicators, I examined three additional but less significant areas: *influencing factors, integrity issues,* and the *Air Force spouse.*

Several survey statements were designed to determine what things influence career decisions. The respondents were asked to rank in order of importance nine factors influencing them to stay in the Air Force. Job satisfaction was the primary factor influencing career decisions among all officers surveyed. Base pay and job security rounded out the top three, while professional status, retirement, and patriotism occupied the middle three positions. Nonpay benefits, stable family life, and esprit de corps were the least influential of the nine factors. Retirement at 20 years was not seen as unprofessional.

Lack of integrity was another significant issue. Fifty-six percent or more of all respondents from the three PME schools claimed that other officers compromised their integrity sometimes or often. ACSC respondents, for some unexplained reason, identified lack of integrity as a more serious problem than did SOS or AWC respondents. Perhaps the explanation for this is that 04s are in a unique position enabling them to see breaches of integrity and because they are the historical buffer between the dictates of the leadership and the junior officer force.

Another finding was the importance of the Air Force spouse. The spouse was an impor-

tant factor in the career decisions of nearly all respondents. It was surprising to find that, with the exception of SOS, spouse influence was not related to educational level or paid employment over the past five years.

The role of spouses working for pay was of greater importance for SOS students than for ACSC or AWC officers. Since a higher proportion of the younger spouses are working outside the home, there will probably be increasing pressure on officers to acccommodate the "other half" in their career decision.

W HAT, then, was learned from these surveys? The primary and combined objective was to gain a more accurate picture of professionalism in the Air Force, an achievable goal since so little empirical data existed previously. Ultimately, three main conclusions with collateral recommendations were reached.

First, the term *professionalism* is important both for its frequent use in the Air Force and for the attitude that almost all officers have of themselves as professional military officers. That is hardly surprising. Who could disagree, for example, with such terms as dedication to duty and country, identification with the mission, commitment to service, and integrity? They sound great, but what do they mean?

Although the pragmatic approach was favored, no universal definition of professionalism was found. There was less than 50 percent agreement on any of the broad concepts describing professional officers. Although all officers think of themselves as professionals, they have different ideas as to what professionalism means. Even statements made by the Air Force leadership to "improve the level of professionalism" are probably falling on deaf ears. Apparently, discussions of professionalism can be productive only if the participants get down to specific behaviors and reject abstract philosophical concepts. Unless a concept like "self-sacrifice"

is specifically translated into "more remote tours," "work longer hours," "don't expect any pay raise this year," etc., use of the term is meaningless.

Second, previous research has yielded no baseline by which professionalism could be measured. Yet a number of Air Force officers speak and write about the deterioration of professional values. I suggest that the professionalism survey be repeated among PME students at Air University at least every three years. It was also clearly recognized that a need exists to include more survey statements on integrity for its accurate assessment. A thoughtful reassessment should be done by those who believe there is a "professionalism gap" between senior and junior officers. In fact, if one considers the likelihood that the ACSC and AWC respondents were probably biased toward the professional end of the spectrum (due to competitive selection for PME), the responses by SOS students could be considered nearly identical to the AWC counterparts. On nearly every indicator examined, officers of all ranks leaned toward the professionalism end of the spectrum. There are, to be sure, occupationalist tendencies, but they have not become dominant themes.

If this study suggests any gap, it is probably between those who claim there *is* a deterioration and the audience they are addressing. I think these findings should be made available to Air Force leadership because the results indicate that Air Force members are communicating ineffectively about professionalism.

Finally, I recommend that the study of professionalism be continued in the PME curriculum but with one caution: it must go beyond the necessary philosophical foundations and identify specific behaviors that will impact on the Air Force of the 1980s and 1990s. Objective identification of specific behaviors is critical, and no one has really explored this arena.

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THE INDECISIVE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

DR. KENNETH R. WHITING

IN THE preface to his latest book, †Adam Ulam states that he is seeking an answer to the question: "What was it that at decisive moments has frustrated or flawed the libertarian intentions of Russia's revolutionaries and reformers?" In searching for that answer, Ulam surveys the whole revolutionary tradition in Russia from the inept attempt at revolt by some tsarist officers in 1825 down to the present feeble opposition to the Communist regime. Ulam does it with his usual flair for the apt expression, the vivid characterization, and with his rare ability to judge the actors in terms of their own time, not ours. Ulam's theme

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†Adam B. Ulam, *Russia's Failed Revolutions: From the Decembrists to the Dissenters* (New York: Basic Books, 1981, $18.95), 453 pages.

throughout this narration of more than a century and a half of Russian history can be epitomized as the failure of the Russian *intelligentsia*[1] time after time to delineate achievable goals, let alone achieve a workable constitutional government. In their striving for change, they were afraid to afront those to the left and yet stayed in awe of the autocracy when the chips were down. In the one big chance that the liberal intelligentsia had to establish a constitutional government, namely during the period of the Provisional Government (March through October 1917), the intelligentsia of both left and right were outmaneuvered by a hard-nosed leftist, an autocrat in disguise, Vladimir Lenin.

The story begins with the Decembrists, a group of young officers who had seen service in Western Europe against Napoleon and on their return to Russia expected immediate reforms. But Alexander I, although mouthing liberal ideas during the early years of his reign, had relapsed into mysticism and reaction after 1815. When he died, in 1825, there was some confusion as to which of his brothers, Constantine or Nicholas, should succeed. The Decembrists seized upon this confusion, and, on 14 December 1825, the officers of several regiments marched their men out to the square in front of the Winter Palace in an attempt to block the accession of Nicholas. It was not much of a revolution—most of the officers had only the vaguest concept of what they wanted, and their soldiers had been hornswoggled into believing that Nicholas was a usurper. After standing about most of the day, the mutineers surrendered. But as Ulam pointed out in an earlier book, *The Bolsheviks* (1965), although the Decembrists were not, properly speaking, part of the Russian revolutionary tradition, one cannot grasp either the tradition or much of Russian history without understanding this early movement.[2] Few of the Decembrists had thought beyond the actual coup itself: some wanted a constitutional monarchy; others wanted to end the autocracy altogether. One, however, stood out, a bright, young officer named Paul Pestel, who, as Ulam points out, anticipated the mentality of Soviet communism in some ways. He advocated a species of *socialism* before the term came into use, he wanted a powerful secret police, and he even called for a dictatorship for ten years to get the new government under way.

The Decembrists in all probability would deserve only a modest footnote in history as another of the numerous abortive palace coups if Nicholas had not made martyrs of the lot, hanging some and exiling the rest to Siberia. Future revolutionaries almost to a man would hearken back to the glorious heroes of the December 14th Revolution. One of them, Alexander Odoyevsky, wrote a poem in which this line stood out: "Out of this spark will come a conflagration." And in 1900, Lenin and his fellow Marxists named their new revolutionary journal *Iskra* (*The Spark*).

The thirty years between the failure of the Decembrists and the disaster of the Crimean War were relatively free of revolutionary activities. Nicholas I, using his secret police, the Third Department, effectively choked off most libertarian buds long before they could bloom. There were a few exceptions such as Chernyshevski and Belinsky, the former ending up in Siberia and the latter camouflaging his radicalism under the cover of literary criticism. The voice of revolution in the last years of Nicholas's reign and early years of Alexander II's was that of Herzen, who, securely ensconced abroad, was able to have his paper, *The Bell*, smuggled into Russia. Ulam, in keeping with his search for why the libertarian intentions of the revolutionaries failed at decisive moments, concentrates on Chernyshevski, Herzen, and the less famous early "Land and Freedom" movement of the 1860s and gives only a bareboned account of better known *Narodnichestvo* (*Populist*) and "People's Will" movements of the 1870s. There was little "libertarianism" in the latter movements.

Sixty percent of the book is devoted to the

dozen years in which the 1905, February, and October revolutions occurred. It was during that period that Russia had its only chance to shed authoritarian rule and acquire a more democratic government. The events of 1905-06 were, as Trotsky so aptly put it, a dress rehearsal for the later revolutions. The tsar gave in and allowed the creation of the Duma, a "parliament" without power, and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed, a body that was destined to play a disastrous role in the period between the February and October revolutions of 1917. As Ulam points out time and time again, the decade between the election of the first Duma and the fall of the monarchy in 1917 was a golden opportunity for Nicholas II to institute a responsible government. Instead, he insisted on appointing extremely stupid ministers; and he listened dutifully to his silly wife, who in turn was influenced by the likes of Rasputin — it almost looked as if Nicholas and Alexandra were plotting the end of the Romanov dynasty.

When the end came, it was "not with a bang but a whimper," to borrow from T. S. Eliot. No one planned the February Revolution; it began with bread riots in Petrograd and, then, like Topsy, it "just growed." Nobody had any idea of what to do. The Duma leadership formed a government of sorts, the Provisional Government, more by default than design, and the Soviet was reinstituted. In *Russia's Failed Revolutions*, Ulam really berates the Russian liberal who revealed his ". . . fatal weakness, his lack of self-assurance and his sense of guilt about his moderation, which repeatedly made him yield and at the decisive moment rendered him helpless before the left . . . [It] was another manifestation of the original sin of Russian liberalism: its fear of political power." (pp. 156, 244) The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, claiming to represent the "people," refused to rule, although it probably had the power to do so, but neither would it let the Provisional Government rule. For eight months there was a dual government, half of it ruling ineffectively, the other half keeping it from ruling.

In the midst of all this confusion, enter Lenin from Switzerland. He knew what he wanted, had definite plans of how to attain power, and was relentless and audacious in going about getting it. According to Ulam, Lenin's ". . . calculations hinged on subverting the Russian soldier" and "the main thrust of his policies would be to destroy all elements of social, economic, and political stability and to plunge the country into complete anarchy. It was only as heirs to anarchy that his Bolsheviks could come to power." (pp. 334-35) This single-minded devotion to the seizure of power plus Lenin's mastery of the art of vituperation, the ability to pin false labels on his opponents (which, as Ulam comments, has remained a Kremlin art to this day) made Lenin a dangerous competitor of both the Provisional Government and the Soviet.

The Bolsheviks gained followers at the expense of the more moderate socialists, proceeded in their task of undermining military discipline at the front, and carried on their unrelenting vituperation against the Provisional Government and the moderate elements of the Soviet. In early July, however, an abortive coup by the Bolsheviks temporarily united both halves of the dual power against them, and Lenin went into hiding. Ulam rises to new heights of sarcasm in describing how halfheartedly the authorities were in seeking out the scarcely concealed Bolsheviks. Again, how could there really be a "danger from the left"; the right had a monopoly on the threat to the revolution! Ulam claims that some socialists who saw through Lenin's game still would not push for his arrest.

Lenin, from his hiding places in Finland and later in Petrograd, badgered his colleagues unmercifully to make an immediate bid for power. The time was ripe, and, accordng to Ulam's diagnosis of the state of health of the nation in the following striking passage, Lenin was right:

> On its institutional side, Russian politics came to resemble a junkyard: various prerevolutionary

bodies in different states of disrepair lying side by side with brand new pieces of government machinery produced since February 1917, but not functioning properly. (p. 377)

And strike they did on the night of 24 October (6 November New Style); the opposition was just about nonexistent, and on the next day Lenin presented the All-Russian Congress of Soviets with a new government made up of Bolsheviks.

Ulam is very harsh on Lenin. To achieve his goal of world revolution, according to Ulam, Lenin would resort to every chicanery in the political book and some original ones of his own. The great passion of Lenin's life ". . . was his hatred of the intelligentsia. It runs like a thread through his personal and public life, and provides much if not most of the emotional intensity behind the revolutionary strivings. Phrases such as 'the intelligentsia scum,' 'the scoundrelly intellectuals,' 'that riffraff,' run continually through his writings."[3] Ulam also describes Lenin as "a great strategist, but not a tactician of revolution . . . He preached constantly the importance of organization, yet he himself was not a good party manager, having no head for details." (p. 351) Ulam has Trotsky as the designer and field commander of the October seizure of power. It was he who suggested synchronizing the coup with the opening of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets so that the Bolsheviks could claim that the power grab was in the name of the Soviets. He also was able to manipulate the troops in Petrograd through his control of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

No one outside Russia would argue that the role of Trotsky in the October Revolution and in the subsequent Civil War has been reduced to naught, or even made counterproductive, by Soviet historians, while Lenin has been endowed with almost godlike omnipotence. Ulam, however, seems to be overcompensating Trotsky and undervaluing Lenin. The man who thought out and put into practice "demo-cratic centralism" as the organizational basis for his party had every right to preach "the importance of organization." As for the tactics of the October Revolution, there is no doubt that these were left up to Trotsky, but it was Lenin's obduracy, his unrelenting advocacy of *revolution now*, that galvanized his somewhat reluctant comrades into action.

Professor Ulam also has harsh things to say about the Russian intelligentsia's inability to govern when circumstances were propitious in the period between the revolutions in 1917. For example, in describing Kerenski and his fellow ministers, Ulam says sarcastically: "Most revolutionary dramas unfold to the accompaniment of effusive oratory, but the February revolution is the only one which literally talked itself to death." (p. 378) It just may be that the Russian intelligentsia were embarked upon a mission impossible in attempting to create a democratic government in the war-torn, chaotic Russia of 1917. The country had never known anything but authoritarian rule, and Lenin's authoritarian concepts were more in line with the national tradition than the untried parliamentarianism of the intelligentsia. The democratic aims of the latter were not attainable under the prevailing conditions.

In his final chapter, Ulam sums up the fate of the dissenting intelligentsia during the 63 years of Soviet rule, and he does this in fewer than 40 pages or less than 10 percent of his book. He describes how Lenin went beyond mere authoritarianism to the use of terror as a deliberate state policy to ensure the "cult of power," i.e., the Communist state. Stalin in turn increased the use of terror far beyond anything visualized by the Bolsheviks. In the early 1930s he launched "a pogrom of the intelligentsia," and that pogrom spread to all levels of Soviet society in the late thirties. Even the mildest criticism of the Stalinist regime inevitably landed the critic in a *Gulag* in Siberia or immediate execution by the NKVD. The role of the intelligentsia as the voice of society pointing out the excesses of the authoritarian

ruler was liquidated under Stalin, who not only forbade criticism but also insisted on the intelligentsias' praising him. Even conformity did not ensure safety. In an earlier work, Ulam argued that ". . . terror was necessary not only to keep men obedient, but even more to make them believe. Without terror, who would have failed to notice the patent absurdity of Stalin's rule — . . . ?"[4]

During Khrushchev's tenure in power (1954-64), the intelligentsia were allowed some freedom of expression, especially if they directed their fire at the late *vozhd'* (dictator), for Nikita, from 1956 on, was on an anti-Stalin crusade. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and Yevgeny Yevtushenko's poem "Stalin's Heirs" seem to indicate an open season on Stalin. But with the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the dissenting intelligentsia came under fire again—the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime closely resembled Stalinism without the excesses of terrorism. The new leaders used more subtle techniques such as phony trials, incarceration in "psychiatric" clinics, and expulsion from Russia with a concomitant revocation of citizenship. The dissenting intelligentsia were forced to push their ideas in illegal ways such as through *samizdat*, a Russian term meaning "self-publishing." But over the last few years, the number of dissenters has been whittled down drastically. As Ulam suggested several years ago, ". . . in spirit Soviet Russia of today is still much more Stalin's than Lenin's."[5] And he might have added, far less free than under the tsars in the second half of the nineteenth century.

SCHOLARLY, but wearing its erudition lightly, *Russia's Failed Revolutions* is an excellent piece of work. Furthermore, in an age teeming with collections of articles by a dozen or more authors crammed into slim volumes, it is a pleasure to have a volume by a single author, obviously the product of a great deal of research, much thought, and one that reflects some deep insights. It is also a relief to read an author who writes not only smoothly but also interestingly. For anyone with a desire to understand what makes the Russian intellectual tick, this book should go far toward satisfying that curiosity.

Documentary Research Division
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Notes

1. The Russian term *intelligentsia* is a hard one to define. It usually refers to the educated class that had an intellectual interest in social-political problems and wanted either to restrict or even abolish the monarchy.

2. Adam B. Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* (New York, 1965), p. 21.
3. Ibid., p. 210.
4. Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (New York, 1973), pp. 740-41.
5. Ibid., p. 741.

STRATEGY AND THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN THE 1980s

WING COMMANDER NIGEL B. BALDWIN

IN 1979, in his essay "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," British military historian Michael Howard described four elements of strategy: operational, logistical, technological, and social.[1] All were derived from Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" (political objective, operational instruments, and social forces), and Howard maintained that "no successful strategy could be formulated that did not take account of them all . . . ."[2] He argued that since World War II the technological dimension of strategy has become preeminent in the minds of Western strategists. Unlike our opponents, while we have merely neglected operational and logistical aspects, we have ignored the societal dimension altogether. Remembering that this last dimension is, in Howard's words, ". . . the attitude of the people upon whose commitment and readiness for self-denial we depend upon,"[3] let us, in this essay, concentrate on one aspect of it. Within the next decade, advances in communication techniques will enable wars to be broadcast live from anywhere in the world into our living rooms. Such a development may have profound effects on our strategy and on our war-fighting ability. The question thus arises: Will people have the stomach to observe at close and realistic hand what they have asked their armies to do?

"Vietnam was television's first war, a war whose end was hastened by public opinion."[4] That war has been called the living-room war: the jerky, monochromatic newsreels of Korea and World War II, complete with homespun commentary, had changed by the 1960s into aggressive, full-color reporting with extensive interpretation and analysis by members of a new and nontraditional school of journalism. The latter felt and still feel that their responsi-bility is "to discover truth, not merely facts."[5] Reporters, denying their very name, are encouraged to give their own subjective analyses of events. The result has been that "to an unprecedented extent, the media have not just reported events, but have stimulated, sometimes created, and even actively participated in those events."[6]

Critics of U.S. media performance in Southeast Asia—and the Johnson and Nixon administrations contained many—maintained that the press establishment willfully distorted the Vietnam news to enhance the case of the opponents of the war. Peter Braestrup, in his detailed analysis of U.S. press and television reporting and interpretation of the 1968 Tet offensive,[7] suggested that, at least in that case, the extremes of so-called "advocacy journalism" (the use of news media facilities to conspire against and influence national policy) were not, in fact, reached. Despite a lingering and wholesale belief to the contrary, Braestrup concluded that there was no such conspiracy. Instead, he demonstrated that the events at Tet were simply too much for the U.S. media to comprehend accurately at the time and that it was overwhelmed by what happened. There was no deliberate misrepresentation; the events themselves, reported within the peculiar pressures of U.S. television and press time demands, conspired to give the impression that Tet was a disaster for the United States rather than a severe defeat for the North Vietnamese. Braestrup, answering his own question about the unsatisfactory performance of the U.S. media, concluded that

the special circumstances of Tet impacted to a rare degree on modern American journalism's special susceptibilities and limitations. This pecul-

iar conjuncture overwhelmed reporters, commentators, and their superiors alike. And it could happen again.[8]

Was there an ideological antiwar conspiracy by the press? Braestrup is convinced that such ideology played "a relatively minor role . . . the big problems lay elsewhere."[9] This conclusion notwithstanding, reviewers of his study have not been kind to his professional colleagues:

> The American public, disenchanted with the war and the Johnson administration, learned from the press exactly what it wanted to hear. The press went along, untroubled by factual errors from the field or from reviewing editors at home.[10]

And the Southeast Asia period has been described as "a shameful episode in the annals of the American media."[11]

IF Vietnam was the first war to be brought into the American living rooms during a TV supper, that coverage was primitive by 1980 standards. The Tet offensive newsreel footage was 24 hours old by the time it had been processed for home consumption. If Tet occurred today, the news would be transmitted instantaneously. Portable videotape cameras and worldwide satellite coverage give real-life and precise pictures; transmission costs are no longer only for the rich nations, and satellite ground stations are spreading throughout the Third World. One consequence has been the recent increase in foreign news coverage on U.S. television. The coverage on NBC news alone has tripled since 1976, and there is increasing evidence that would-be leaders are realizing the potential power of such exposure. From the late President Anwar Sadat in Jerusalem in November 1977 to the Pope in Poland in 1979 and now Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, those with a message see their opportunity. The pressure of real-time reporting leaves the possibility of any censorship or news denial more and more in the hands of the newsman on the spot rather than in those of the producer in the studio and even less to the government of the day. The effect on national policymakers, and those of us who may have to implement the policy in the future, will be far-reaching. The power of the media has always been there but never so instantaneously and with such clarity.

President Johnson was not the first leader to fall afoul of the news reporter. The Crimean War in the middle of the nineteenth century, one of the more ignominious episodes in British history, produced the first war correspondent, William Howard Russell of the London *Times*. It was Russell's disclosures of political and military incompetence, of blunders and inefficiency in the conduct of the war, and the hardships experienced by the troops that led to the downfall of the Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen. Half a century later, another young war correspondent, Winston Churchill, saw at close hand during the Boer campaign in South Africa the beginning of Britain's loss of empire and, by using the wireless telegraph, added his own acerbic pen to the worries of the administration in London. Both Churchill, in the Second World War, and his predecessor David Lloyd George in the First World War, exerted domination over the internal press and rudimentary radio and were able to regain control of the media and even turn it to their advantage. Tight censorship in both wars helped the Allies maintain the confidence of the people. "I might add that 5 minutes after the attack started, if the British public could have seen the wounded struggling to get out of the line, the war would have possibly been stopped by public opinion," wrote Private J. F. Pout of the 55th Field Ambulance Brigade after the appalling first day of the Somme offensive in 1916.[12] But he could tell others of his diary entry only *after* the war. If he had writtten such a sentiment in a letter during the war, it would have been deleted by the official censor.

Imagine the effect of a hand-held color camera projecting the horrific pictures to 1916 English firesides! How long could Prime Minister David Lloyd George have maintained the

pressure, and how would such a story have impacted on U.S. public opinion before the latter country's entry into the war? A generation later, Churchill and Royal Air Force Bomber Command leaders were able to sustain, with a disingenuity difficult to appreciate at this distance, a night area bombing offensive against German cities for the length of the whole war against little domestic opposition. Even as late as March 1945, critics of the policy, in and out of Parliament, were few and easily put down. The author David Divine, commenting on such terror raids as that on Dresden, has said: "The British government had been able to safeguard its secret from the day that the first area raid had been launched on Mannheim on 16 December 1940, right up to the end of the war."[13] Similarly, the U.S. Army Air Corps/Air Force, emphasizing the morality and heroic sacrifice of daylight precision bombing in Europe, has been able to divert criticism of its fire-storm raids against Japanese cities to this day. Imagine the effect of a color camera in Dresden or in Tokyo instantaneously transmitting to, perhaps, a hesitant home audience. And if those same cameras had been used inside the Jewish extermination camps, how long could the German people have professed ignorance?

S O what of the future? The totalitarian societies hold all the advantages. In Howard's words:

> There can be little doubt that societies, such as those of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which have developed powerful mechanisms of social control, enjoy an apparent initial advantage over those of the West . . . 'though how great that advantage would actually prove under pressure remains to be seen.[14]

But there are signs that Western leaders are beginning to appreciate the power of the media, too.

President Carter's decision to withhold U.S. participation in the Moscow Olympic Games was aimed at breaking through the defensive barrier the Soviet Union, with its strictly controlled and government-only press and television, puts around its people. It was interesting to see how that country explained the U.S. absence and how the United States managed to play successfully what for it was an unusual and therefore difficult card: how to get inside the minds of a totalitarian country. Meanwhile, the power of third parties and particularly that of the revolutionaries and terrorists has expanded while the power for retaliatory action of the great nations has correspondingly decreased.

Television and the press feed on terrorists; terrorists need publicity—and they are receiving it. According to Walter Laqueur, "The media, with their inbuilt tendency toward sensationalism, have always magnified terrorists exploits quite irrespective of their intrinsic importance. . . . All modern terrorist groups need publicity."[15] Rogues, despots, fanatics, and revolutionaries, from the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom to Khomeini in Iran, feed on the same publicity. At the moment, Western democratic nations, with their untrammeled television and press, are prepared to give that publicity in a form that, for immediacy and scope for manipulation, is unprecedented. Some argue, "the concept of power has been altered in the modern world by the revolutionary developments in technology and communication."[16] Others fear that the likelihood of our free institutions being overthrown by the very freedom they sustain is becoming particularly real. So what can we conclude from this new revolution?

"Political scientists have rightfully written for years about the abuses of executive power and congressional power," but "the relatively unrestrained power of the media may well represent an even greater challenge to our democracy."[17] Give that power to the wielder of the hand-held micro television camera transmitting the use and abuse of U.S. power instantaneously into not only every American

home but into the homes of the ally and the enemy alike, then total power has escaped forever from the hands of the politician.

For the military personnel, the auguries are no less worrying. Because of the nature of our society, the liberal democrats will probably argue that since societies let their governments fight wars, there is every reason why those societies should see the implications and the outcomes of their choices. Tom Wolzien, an NBC news producer, asked recently: "Would live broadcasts of troops dying shorten the time it took this country to become disillusioned with a war, or would those same pictures raise the level of anger toward the enemy and build support for the war at home?" and again: "Is it ethical to show war live on television—is it moral not to?"[18]

Questions such as these were unnecessary to our fathers' generation. They were unimaginable to Clausewitz. But, from now on, his "social dimension," at least for the Western democracies, is likely to have a greater effect on the use of force than ever before.

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Notes

1. Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, pp. 976-78.
2. Ibid., p. 978.
3. Ibid., p. 977.
4. Michael Mosettig and Henry Griggs, Jr., "TV at the Front," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1980, p. 68.
5. Max M. Kampelman, "The Power of the Press: A Problem for Our Democracy," *Policy Review*, Fall 1978.
6. Ibid., p. 18.
7. Peter Braestrup, *Big Story*, vol. 1 (Boulder, Colorado, 1977).
8. Ibid., p. 705.
9. Ibid., p. 707.
10. Paul R. Schratz, "Sea Breezes," *Shipmate*, March 1980, p. 5.
11. Kampelman, p. 20.
12. Martin Middlebrook, *The First Day on the Somme, 1 July 1916* (New York, [ca. 1972]), p. 297.
13. David Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden* (London, 1974), p. 227.
14. Howard, p. 984.
15. Kampelman, p. 23.
16. Ibid., p. 39.
17. Ibid., p. 7.
18. Thomas Wolzien, "Watch Your Loved One Brave Bombs and Bullets," *TV Guide*, January 26, 1980, p. 6.

WHY THE ALLIES WON THE AIR WAR

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IN his Harmon Memorial Lecture at the Eighth Military History Symposium at the USAF Academy, 1978, Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret), stated: "Distortions of history often are used to conceal present truths. The number of such distortions concerning air power and its leaders are too numerous even to mention, yet few corrections have been written." In Parrish's opinion, the influence of air power on most historians is largely negative, and it is a fact that although many facts about the air war of 1939-45 are well known, a comprehensive understanding of the entire war still is not possible.

Dr. R. J. Overy, a lecturer at King's College, London, has taken an important step toward remedying this situation. His book *The Air War 1939-1945* is purported to be the first

general history of the air war to appear in English.† It is indeed a general history, covering the whole war period and all the warring powers, and as such it is, in Overy's own words, not a "blood and guts" book. Consequently, it deals less with people than with motives, purposes, and choices, but one might argue that the characters and views of the leaders of air power before and during the Second World War are to a great extent revealed by Dr. Overy's analyses.

The First World War had given significant impetus to the development of air power, and by 1939 many people believed that the air weapon was coming of age. Men like Italian General Giulio Douhet, the British Marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Lord Trenchard, and, in the United States, General William "Billy" Mitchell and Major Alexander de Seversky had firm ideas on the use of air power. Basically, two main opinions found outlet in papers and studies: a number of people considered air power an effective weapon that could go a long way toward bringing home a victory in a future war while many opposed the use of air power on the grounds that air bombardments would be inhuman. The debate shaped to some extent the ideas of politicians and military leaders, but the main source for the development of air doctrine (and, as a result, of the hardware with which to execute this doctrine) was World War I experiences. As Dr. Overy puts it: ". . . the formulation of air theory before 1939 was crucial in understanding the actual development of air forces and the choices made about how they should be used." (pp. 5-6) He then distinguishes four separate "though not mutually exclusive" areas of strategic thinking on air power: cooperation between ships and aircraft, cooperation between armies and aircraft, "independent" or "strategic" bombing, and aerial defense.

In the United States, General Mitchell, like Lord Trenchard in Britain, firmly believed that aircraft would be the main offensive weapon of the future. He demonstrated convincingly that aircraft could destroy major surface ships and concluded that a strong and independent air force would be necessary. As we know, the U.S. Navy accepted the challenge and used aircraft carriers to attack the enemy fleet. In Japan, the government did not anticipate enemy air attacks with land-based aircraft, but it was well aware of the potential and dangers of the aircraft carrier. As a result, the Japanese government pleaded, during the 1932 World Disarmament Conference in Geneva, for the abolishment of aircraft carriers. The Japanese naval leaders, however, "happily embraced all aspects of combined naval-air strategy" (p. 6) and accepted, in 1936, Commander Genda's theory of the mass carrier strike force.

In Europe, only one country, Great Britain, possessed aircraft carriers, but even so, the Royal Air Force was skeptical about the abilities of carrier-based aircraft. In the other European countries, the role of air forces was to a large extent determined by military tradition. In Germany, for instance, the Luftwaffe, although nominally independent, was strongly influenced by the traditional army thinking of the air force staff. The independence of the air force was a political rather than a doctrinal one, according to Dr. Overy: "As far as the function of the air force was concerned it remained closely tied to the needs of the army, and was subject to the directives of the army-dominated supreme headquarters." (p. 133) In the Soviet Union, the air force was an integral part of the army, subordinate to the front commanders. In France, the situation at the outbreak of hostilities was similar to the German situation: a nominally independent air force, to be used for close support of the army front units. Only in Great Britain, where the Royal Air Force had been in existence since 1918, did a truly inde-

pendent air doctrine exist. Even within the RAF, opinions differed, however: Should Bomber Command have first priority in order to better fulfill its mission (namely, the attack on German air power), or should the air defense organization be enlarged? Nevertheless, British air doctrine stressed that aircraft should be used as flexibly as possible. One way would be the use of strategic bombardment as means of bringing about the defeat of the enemy. Undoubtedly, the geographical position of Great Britain accounts in part for the broader view the British had, a view in line with the long-existing naval blockade strategies. Dr. Overy presents another reason, namely that the championship of strategic bombing as a war-winning strategy was used as a shield to protect the RAF from any attempt to compromise its autonomy.

In sum, one can say that at the outbreak of hostilities the European continental countries were committed to tactical air power, that only Great Britain had acknowledged the theories of strategic bombing, and, in the Pacific region, that naval air power constituted the dominating factor in the struggle for the initiative.[1]

Based on these points of departure, Dr. Overy describes the course of World War II. Two chapters are dedicated to the European air war (Chapter 2: 1939-41; Chapter 3: 1941-45), one to the air war in the Far East, and one to the strategic bombing offensives. This grouping is not accidental. When the war broke out in 1939, activities in the air were few, with the exception of Poland. In Poland, the Luftwaffe destroyed the Polish Air Force in a series of attacks on airfields. This job completed, the Luftwaffe turned to giving direct support to the advancing Wehrmacht. The campaign did not result in new viewpoints on the use of air power, which it should have, because the Luftwaffe lost not less than 285 airplanes, with another 279 planes damaged, for a total loss of 333 Polish machines. (p. 28) The lesson to be learned was that the conquest of the command of the air would have to be repeated over and over again, and that a permanent result could

be reached only if one of the belligerent powers would continually be superior: ". . . sheer quantity became a factor capable of achieving domination in the air." (p. 2) This, the Luftwaffe (and the RAF) experienced on 1 August 1940, when the Luftwaffe received orders to overpower the Royal Air Force in the shortest possible time: the beginning of the Battle of Britain.

So much has been written about the Battle of Britain and the following blitz that the course of the campaign is well known. Still, the air war in Europe in 1940 and 1941 included more than just the air war over England. Dr. Overy points out that both the air war at sea (or rather over the seas) and in the Mediterranean were of great importance for the course the war was going to take. Germany could not effectuate a blockade of the British Isles, and in the Mediterranean the RAF gained a local advantage, which unfortunately could not be exploited because the airfields in Greece, Crete, and Cyrenaica fell into German hands. Dr. Overy's conclusion is that after two years of war

> the impact of aircraft on the war . . . was both less decisive and less terrible than had been expected before 1939. In combination with the army the Luftwaffe had confirmed that tactical support was an essential component of ground offensives . . . But in many other respects the impact of air power was disappointing and the air theory out of touch with operational reality. (p. 44)

The German invasion of the Soviet Union was "a watershed for the development of the air war." (p. 47) Both the Germans and the Soviets made a massive but limited use of their air power in accordance with existing doctrine. The Allied powers, however, developed not only their tactical air forces but also worked hard at building a strategic bombing force. When the Axis powers discovered the extent of the air threat, it was too late for them to adopt a more general air strategy. Dr. Overy notes that "the lack of attention in doctrine, strategy and preparation given to air defense,

bombing and the naval war paved the way not only for the Allied victory in the air but for the land victory as well." (p. 47)

THE struggle in the Far East was characterized by the close relationship of air power and naval power although the land-based aircraft retained its value in Southeast Asia. The belligerents were convinced that a permanent air superiority was a *conditio sine qua non* for the execution of other ambitious plans. The fact that Japan did not succeed in keeping the command of the air it had obtained with the daring attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines led to final defeat. On the American side, especially, military leaders were convinced that the Japanese defeat could be enforced by strategic air bombardments. The air offensive commenced in November 1944 with precision attacks on economic targets, but in March 1945 precision bombardments were abandoned in favor of general urban attacks with great quantities of incendiaries. The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki finished the job, but we now know that Japan had already decided to surrender. And no wonder: in August 1945, the area destroyed by conventional bombardments was 30 times the size of the area destroyed by the two nuclear devices.

Dr. Overy has devoted a separate chapter to the strategic air offensive, but the preceding paragraphs demonstrate that this division is somewhat artificial: The air war in Europe after 1941 and the air war in the Far East should by definition include the strategic bombardments. Still, a separate essay is useful. It is a well-known fact that at the outbreak of war different opinions existed with regard to the strategic air offensive. Notwithstanding Douhet's theories, many officials did not believe that the airplane could play a decisive role in a future war.[2] Those who had read Douhet or had otherwise concentrated on the possibilities of strategic bombardment were divided as to its moral admissibility, as was demonstrated

by George H. Quester in his book *Deterrence before Hiroshima* (1966). Others were convinced that the industrial and military efforts would be out of proportion in view of the results that could be expected, or—as in Germany—they underestimated the necessity of such efforts. Only Great Britain and the United States stuck to their plans, and the fast-growing industrial capacity made possible the building of the gigantic bomber fleets.

In the beginning, the Allied powers were worried about the increase of German industrial production, notwithstanding heavy Allied attacks. Dr. Overy states that the original German plans foresaw a much greater increase. The Allied bombardment curtailed German production effectively, as has been admitted by Albert Speer, Hitler's chief industrial expert.

So far, Dr. Overy's book is an excellent compilation of the events that took place during World War II, reviewed in light of the existing theories of that time. It is doubtless to Dr. Overy's merit that he deals in three more chapters with leadership, organization, and training, with aircraft economies, and with science, research, and intelligence. These three chapters are quite interesting for everyone who really wants to know why the Allies won the air war.

It would detract from the value of these chapters if we tried to summarize them here. Two examples may suffice:

• The war made it necessary to concentrate power in the hands of a limited number of persons. In the West, though, most decisions were reached by committee work. In Germany, on the other hand, the concentration of power had led to corruption and a lack of efficiency that proved to be disastrous for the Luftwaffe.

• The air war caused a multiplication of staff work. In Great Britain, the RAF ran its own staff courses and possessed a sufficient number of capable staff officers when the war broke out. Also, there was close cooperation with competent civilians in the air ministry. In the

United States, the situation was different. Until 1941, no separate air staff existed, and the total number of Air Corps officers in 1938 amounted to 1600. The problem was solved by recruiting business and industrial leaders, who applied well-proven management techniques for the explosive expansion of the Army Air Corps. In Germany, many promotions resulted from political loyalty or because one was favored by Hermann Goering. The Prussian staff tradition, on the other hand, placed great demands on the Luftwaffe staff, which could not always be fulfilled. In addition, the requirement that all staff officers should have combat experience caused the death of almost 25 percent of the staff officers. Gaps were sometimes filled with army officers who knew their staff procedures but failed to understand the requirements of the Luftwaffe.

I N his preface Dr. Overy states that the purpose of his book is to show two things. "First of all why the Allies won the air war . . . . Secondly, to show how important air power was to the achievement of overall victory." (p. xi) Has he succeeded?

In my opinion, he has. As Dr. Overy states: ". . . during the war there developed a dichotomy between those powers that practised a limited air strategy and those who developed a general air strategy." (p. 203) This contrast was indicative for the way in which the war was fought and organized and for the degree to which industry was mobilized for war purposes —but, there was more to it. In the United States and Great Britain, once the Battle of Britain was won, the industrial base was safe from enemy air attacks, whereas in Germany an increasing number of interruptions from bombing attacks brought about a general social impact. Dr. Overy has very ably demonstrated how the many facets of the air war were related to each other. Without detracting from the dangerous work of the air crews, the book shows that it was the totality of the warring nations — this is valid both for the Allies and for the Axis powers — that was responsible for the way the air war was fought by their air forces.

As for the second question, Dr. Overy maintains that "the difficult question is not whether air power was important, but how important it was." (p. 205) His conclusion is that aircraft certainly did not replace navies and armies during the Second World War. On the other hand, air power became "the component without which the military machine could not be made to work." (p. 203) However, the findings of Dr. Overy deny the exaggerated significance that the air war assumed at the time (and to a certain extent still holds today) in the popular mind. In fact, one might say that the air war was part of World War II but that this war was definitely not an air war per se. As Alexander P. de Seversky wrote in 1950: "Europe and Germany provided no conclusive tests of the efficacy of all-out air strategy, simply because the war was not planned or fought that way."[3] We shall have to keep this in mind when we try to draw lessons from the 1939-45 war. Dr. Overy's book can assist us in this process.

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Notes

1. See, for example, Professor Edward Homze's "The Continental Experience," in *Air Power and Warfare*, Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).

2. Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1965) contains an interesting study of Douhet's theories. See also Edward Homze, op. cit., who maintains that many in the air services of Europe during the interwar period had neither heard of him nor read his books. A French translation of *'Il Dominio dell'Aria'* appeared in Paris in 1932; a German translation in Berlin in 1935. In the United States, this and some other works were translated by Dino Ferrari and published under the title *The Command of the Air* (New York: Coward McCann, 1942).

3. Alexander P. de Seversky, *Air Power: Key to Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), p. 72.

SOME PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESIDENCY

DR. JAMES H. BUCK

EVERY four years the American people — well, half of them anyway — exercise that marvelous right of electing their president. This quadrennial rite, despite some folderol, is indeed salutary for the republic. Fortunately, it calls forth evaluations and judgments of policies (past, present, and future) and of the man who lead the nation. Past performance, stirring declarations of future progress, and spending $20 to $30 million may win the election, but there is no certainty that the promised New Deal, the Fair Deal, or the Great Society will, in fact, materialize.

We are only a mite more sure of our ground when it comes to judgments about former U.S. presidents who seem to change with the passage of time. Harry S. Truman was seen as a mean former haberdasher, far beyond his depth, suffering from comparison with his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Today many consider him to be one of our truly great presidents. Dwight D. Eisenhower was a "do nothing" president, suitable for a nation that produced the "beat" generation of the 1950s, but he is now associated longingly with a time when inflation was imperceptible and mortgage money could be got for 4½ percent.

THE two books reviewed here are a bonus from the 1980 election year. John Hersey's *Aspects of the Presidency* is essentially reportorial.† Hersey is widely respected as journalist, war correspondent, Pulitzer Prize winner, and author of *A Bell for Adano, Hiroshima,* and *The War Lover.* The material in *Aspects of the Presidency,* which provides intimate glimpses into the daily routines of Harry S. Truman and Gerald Ford, has been published earlier. The portion on Truman appeared in *The New Yorker* in late 1950 and early 1951. Hersey's account of observing Gerald Ford minute-by-minute for a week in 1975 was first published in the *New York Times Magazine* and shortly thereafter as *The President* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).

In the early pages of his book, Hersey stated that the episodes "give a different picture of Truman from that given in Merle Miller's *Plain Speaking,*" for he (Hersey) saw no Truman that was "profane, abusive, vulgar and sometimes just plain lowdown." (p. 9) Surely Hersey both liked and respected Truman and was deeply impressed with his ability to keep separate the man and the office. Toward himself, Truman could be mischievous and even disrespectful in the first person; toward the President, in the third person, he was reverent.

President Ford allowed Hersey to spend six days with him in March 1975, a week when attention was focused on Southeast Asia: the insurgents were closing in on Phnom Penh, and North Vietnam had just begun what was to be the last offensive of the Vietnam War. In some ways Hersey felt frustrated, mainly because the President excluded him from all discussions of foreign policy. "The most alarming thought I had had all week," wrote Hersey, was that Ford heard only one voice on foreign affairs, that of Henry Kissinger. (p. 228) Furthermore, Hersey was "deeply troubled by some of his [Ford's] policies, by the long reach and

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rigidity of his conservatism." (p. 242) Ford did not think his administration was an era for change, a judgment not shared by Hersey. Compared to Truman, Ford had a "limited historical data bank," but there was no doubt of his "man-to-man decency." (pp. 144-45)

IF gifted reporting about intrinsically interesting men and times marks Hersey's work, genuinely thoughtful scholarship characterizes John Morton Blum's *The Progressive Presidents*.† Woodward Professor of History at Yale University, Blum is an internationally respected scholar.

Progressivism, as described by Blum, was "never a neat or systematic creed, had almost as many guises as there were different groups of men and women, groups of divergent views or interests, who shared a general purpose, sometimes altruistic, sometimes selfish, to reform American society." (p. 62) The progressive presidents all strengthened the power of their office, used that office to sponsor social and economic reform by an active federal government, and managed very demanding international affairs.

Theodore Roosevelt, unlike his predecessors, made the presidency a "bully pulpit" and invigorated the federal government with talented men like Elihu Root and Gifford Pinchot. Roosevelt made it his mission to educate the average citizen about foreign politics and national defense. Confident that Congress would, in the long run, do the right thing in domestic politics, he focused on dispelling two illusions held by the general public: that the United States, insulated by oceans, could avoid involvement in world affairs; and that peace was a normal international condition. (p. 51) For this reason, Roosevelt wanted more powerful military forces, announced his corollary

to the Monroe Doctrine, got the Panama Canal, became a Nobel Prize winner for his role in ending the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and ordered the Great White Fleet around the world. The latter act, without congressional approval and without funds to carry it out, Roosevelt called "the most important service I rendered to peace." (p. 57)

Woodrow Wilson, an astute scholar of American government and one-time president of Princeton University, had a transcendent faith in America and a strong belief in the orderly growth of political institutions. In domestic affairs, Wilson reformed banking (Federal Reserve Act of 1913), reduced tariffs and compensated for that loss of revenue by imposing the federal income tax, further restricted trusts, and passed progressive legislation forbidding child labor, authorizing cheap loans to farmers, and reducing hours of work. In foreign affairs, Wilson believed in the "special virtue and mission of the American people" (p. 79), held that American democracy was a model for other nations, both old and new, and that "the force of America is the force of moral principle." (p. 80) Yet Wilson's powerful and moving idealism was frustrated by the harsh realities of international affairs. During his administration, the United States intervened in Mexico, established an "American protectorate in Santo Domingo and Haiti," and "sustained an authoritarian regime in Nicaragua." (p. 83) Furthermore, our entry into World War I conditioned Americans to "accept war on the basis of national honor and moral purpose." (p. 95)

Franklin D. Roosevelt saw the presidency as the principal energizer of government and set out to reverse a dozen years of Republican entropy. In his inaugural address in 1933, he asked for "broad executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power

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† **John Morton Blum,** *The Progressive Presidents: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson* (New York: **W. W. Norton Company,** 1980, $11.95), 209 pages.

that would be given to me if we in fact were invaded by a foreign foe." (p. 108) FDR attacked the "emergency" with acronymic virtuosity, and many of his priority measures for reform and recovery have endured. Blum offers the intriguing judgment that much more could have been done had Congress had the "economic sophistication and political courage to spend at a multiple of ten times or more the amount appropriated from 1933 to 1940. That's why 1938 was as bad as 1933." (p. 129)

During the thirties, FDR could not follow a policy based on realistic internationalism; from 1940 until his death, he committed the United States to the Allied cause and pursued victory with vigor. A president who put a premium on "doing," Blum sums up, FDR "succeeded in war and peace in being his kind of liberal, his kind of conservative, his own best example of his firm belief that no fear was more crippling than the fear to act." (p. 162)

Lyndon B. Johnson served in Congress for twenty years during the long, dry season of the progressives, and his striking accomplishments as president reflected the release of the pent-up national impetus to reform. The Great Society promised too much and delivered too little — there was "inadequate spending for too short a period." (p. 175) LBJ's ideas concerning foreign affairs owed something to both Roosevelts as well as Woodrow Wilson. In short, Johnson sought a balance of power in both Europe and Asia to prevent a potential enemy of America from dominating either continent while keeping United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. As for the Vietnam War, Blum writes that LBJ "was not the creature of the military who continually urged more escalation than he permitted." (p. 193) He controlled foreign policy, and its failures led to bitterness and frustration. LBJ "was a force, but his mass and velocity left ruin in the wake of his heady striving." (p. 203)

All in all, Blum rather likes the progressive presidents, and believes that "government floundered" without a strong president during the last decades of the nineteenth century, so again in the 1920s, the 1950s, and in the latter years of the 1970s. (p. 209) The progressive presidents faced up to moral ambiguities, sometimes erred, shifted priorities from domestic to international concerns with occasional excesses, but for the most part they promoted the general welfare and "provided a vibrant direction that in the large raised the quality of national life."

TAKEN together, these two books make a nice week's reading—a president a day for six days —informative and provocative judgments about some presidents and the presidency.

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You don't set a fox to watching the chickens just because he has a lot of experience in the hen house.

Harry Truman,
on Vice President Nixon's
candidacy for the presidency,
QUOTE, October 30, 1960

Potpourri

Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps by Allan R. Millett. New York: Macmillan Co., 1980, 782 pages, $29.95.

One hundred and fifty years of Marine Corps history in a single volume sounds like a pretty tall order, and it is . . . . Or rather it was: Allan Millett has done the trick very neatly in 626 pages of text, solidly backed up with three appendixes, a 26-page bibliography, a bibliographical essay that will surely remain definitive for years to come, and a comprehensive and competently prepared index plus 95 pages of some of the most impressively thorough footnotes that I have encountered. Macmillan's editors can be justly proud; *Semper Fidelis* is a worthy addition to their prestigious Wars of the United States series.

Boiling an impressive breadth and depth of source material down into a fast-paced and highly readable text, Millett has successfully negotiated the fine line between excessive embroilment in tactical detail and reduction of the reality of battle into detached abstraction. Without ever losing sight of the Marines' ultimate purpose—combat—Millett has woven the Corps' never-ending struggle for institutional survival into a masterful story. Indeed, tension between the Corps' efforts to remain victorious in battle and effective in the political arena gives the book a strong central strand of continuity.

Semper Fidelis abounds with intriguing subplots, fascinating stories, and interesting facts—many of them unexpected and all intelligently worked into the narrative. The celebrated Archibald Henderson, Commandant from 1820 to 1859, emerges from the smoke of myth and legend to stand as a three-dimensional figure; so does John Lejeune, Commandant from 1920 to 1929. It says a great deal for Millett's thoroughness and objectivity as a scholar and soldier (he is a colonel in the USMC Reserve) that his treatment of these two remarkable men is most captivating when dealing with their early careers.

An important minor theme is the Marines' consistent —and hardly accidental—success in "getting their story" to the American public. From John Philip Sousa's professionalization of the U.S. Marine band in the 1870s and '80s to the Spanish American War, World War I, and World War II when, according to sour Army legend, every Marine rifle squad included a reporter and a press photographer, and on through Korea and Vietnam we see how the Marines did the trick. Technical military issues receive an appropriate share of attention: the birth of close support aviation in Nicaragua in the '20s and its rebirth in 1944 are put in perspective; so is the recasting of the Marine divisional, battalion, and company tables of organization and equipment in 1944; differences in tactical doctrine between the Marines and Army in World War II and Vietnam are analyzed fairly and dispassionately; the whole complex issue of evolving amphibious assault doctrine and its importance to America's defense posture

is an underlying theme for the second half of the book.

Best of all, the book conveys a real sense of the historical origins and vitality of the unique Marine identity, the source of the cohesion and esprit that steeled Marines to carry on through Belleau Wood, the jungles of Guadalcanal and Peleliu, the frozen horror of the retreat from Chosin Reservoir, and public ambivalence over Vietnam.

Millett's treatment of the issue of institutional survival is of particular interest, not least of all to air power professionals. The Marine Corps' permanent love/hate relationship with the Navy suggests comparisons and contrasts with the prelude and aftermath of the U.S. Air Force's traumatic separation from the Army in 1947. In the warm afterglow of the USMC's remarkable success in World War II, it is easy to forget how many times the Corps has squarely faced the genuine threat of extinction, emasculation, or dismemberment. In the long view of history, President Harry Truman's famous disparagement of "the Navy's police force" comes across as an almost friendly joke. We can usefully learn from Millett's study of how they did it.

It is worth noting parenthetically that honest, competently written military history—warts and all—has served the Corps well in its fiscal and political battles. Lots of good, sound, scholarly, military history has been written about the Corps; the Air Force could use more. In reading *Semper Fidelis*, I frequently found myself wishing that Macmillan's editors and Millett had chosen the Air Force as their subject.

I recently asked one of the most capable and respected military historians I know what he thought of *Semper Fidelis*. "I wish I had written it," he replied. That can't be improved on; I won't try.

J.F.G.

Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View by Robin Higham and Jacob W. Kipp, editors, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, 328 pages, $33.00.

In today's Air Force there is a new awareness of what we are all about as a service. When war comes, the United States Air Force will be called on to do what it exists to do—fight. It is quite likely that when we next go to war it will be with the Soviet Union.

Air Force officers need to know as much about our potential enemy as possible. The Soviet Air Force of the 1980s would make a formidable foe. Our understanding of what that institution is all about may be the edge we need to bring us victory.

Professors Robin Higham and Jacob Kipp have compiled an excellent history of Soviet air power. In *Soviet Aviation and Air Power*, several authors trace the develop-

ment of Soviet aviation from Nicholas II to the present in well-written chapters dealing with different aspects of air power, including naval, military, and civil aviation. Throughout, the reader is led to understand the impact that history—the violent saga that has been the Russian experience in the twentieth century—has had on Soviet air power.

While all the chapters are worthwhile, three are of particular importance. Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting's chapter on aviation development under Stalin is informative in that it covers a subject about which little is known. A gem in this jewel of a book is Dr. John T. Greenwood's chapter, "The Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945." A hallmark of Greenwood's work is his exhaustive research and well-polished style, both evidenced throughout his chapter on Soviet aviation in World War II. Dr. Greenwood scores another hit in the chapter that he wrote with Colonel Otto P. Chaney, Jr., on the Soviet aircraft industry.

The book is expensive at $33.00 for 328 pages; however, it is worth the price. All professional Air Force officers should put *Soviet Aviation and Air Power* on their "must read" list.

Major Earl H. Tilford, Jr., USAF
Air University Review

NATO, Turkey and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective by Lieutenant General Ihsan Gürkan. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1980, 67 pages illustrated.

Throughout its entire history, the land known today as Turkey has been at the geographical and historical center of a broad-spectrum conflict. From Tamerlane to the Ottoman Empire, from the "Sick Man of Europe" (i.e., the former Turkish Sultan or Empire) to NATO's southern endpoint, Turkey's military importance grows continuously. Recognition of this importance has been limited to the aegis of the Soviet Union.

Turkish Lieutenant General Ihsan Gürkan examines Turkey and its future with NATO in the National Strategy Information Center Agenda Paper No. 11, *NATO, Turkey and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective*. A pro-Turkish bias is readily apparent, but it should not confuse the reader. Gürkan correctly identifies the problems that face Turkey and NATO and offers solutions or alternatives to these.

Clearly, NATO and the United States should support Turkey in the resolution of these dilemmas, Gürkan asserts, for failure to do so will only serve to tempt the Soviet Union to intensify its historically aggressive behavior toward Turkey.

The work should not be neglected by non-Middle East students, because it addresses the unpleasant topic of U.S./NATO aid to a nation in minor conflict with the ideals and goals of both the United States and NATO. Ultimately, Turkey stands as a potentially formidable ally, contingent on U.S./NATO aid, against an infinitely greater foe.

Robert Smith Hopkins III
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Beyond the North-South Stalemate by Roger D. Hansen. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, 329 pages, $12.95.

Beyond the North-South Stalemate is one of several volumes produced by the 1980's Project of The Council on Foreign Relations which is concerned with a broad spectrum of problems under the heading of North-South relations. Professor Roger Hansen, of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and former Project staff member, helped design much of this program. Since its inception the Project has sought to examine means that would enable governments to resolve their conflicts through orderly process and thus decrease violence as a recourse for the settlement of disputes. Recognized as an expert on Latin American economic relations, Hansen argues with clarity and conviction for the need to redefine economic goals and alter traditional diplomatic methods.

Starting from a historical survey of the present North-South stalemate, the book moves smoothly into a detailed examination of North and South as separate diplomatic entities with their own domestic determinants. Major trends of both North-South are reviewed, and three separate "modal" sets of policy responses are scrutinized. The concluding chapter presents a compelling argument for new diplomacy and norms.

According to Professor Hansen, failure for the North-South to cooperate will doom any prospect of global reform. If the world in the 1980s is to progress toward a more humane, peaceful, productive, and just world, then a global understanding of and by both North and South is imperative. A careful study of this excellent book could go a long way toward the achievement of these goals.

Dr. Robert H. Terry
York College of Pennsylvania

Air Power and Warfare: Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium, 18-20 October, 1978 edited by Colonel Alfred F. Hurley and Major Robert C. Ehrhart. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979, $6.50.

Air Power and Warfare is a useful compilation of articles covering many aspects of warfare and air power. It will prove valuable to both historians and officers (and the large number who are both) interested in something beyond the giant picture books that often comprise military writings. Colonel Alfred Hurley and Major Robert C. Ehrhart manage to include contributions from a wide area of research and still give an understanding of the symposium's central theme. Much credit should go to those who organized, edited, and planned the selection of papers and subtopics.

The articles are of high quality, lucidly presented, coherent, and readable. The commentaries are also good, often raising an overlooked point or adding a new perspective to the discussion. Many of the articles exemplify the fact that some authors can say more in thirty pages than others can in three hundred; this is especially true in the section on various national air forces in World War II. One feels that if the symposium had dedicated itself totally to this topic it might have produced a definitive historical collection. The period between 1945-53 is also examined criti-

cally, a pleasant change from the rabid partisanship that seems to dominate it. This era saw a bitter division between the U.S. Air Force and Navy over doctrine, technology, and policy. It is refreshing to see a more objective viewpoint is beginning to emerge.

The symposium also dealt with such often neglected topics as logistics and technology. While some of the papers will appeal more to the specialist than the general reader, their inclusion was a good idea. The misuse or misunderstanding of technology and logistics has plagued air forces from World War I on. Today, when a projected weapon system may be obsolete by the time it nears completion, it is important that the interaction between doctrine and the means of implementation be understood.

At present there is a tendency for both officers and historians to specialize. This symposium demonstrates that specialization must be grounded in a broad general knowledge of air power and military science, as well as the history of organizations that failed to do this.

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Dr. Brian M.Linn
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Space Stations: International Law and Policy by Delbert D. Smith. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, 254 pages, $22.50.

The advent of the Space Shuttle has made large space structures and space stations feasible in the very near future. *Space Stations* investigates the adequacy of international law and U.S. policies concerning the related unique problems.

Delbert Smith, with obvious expertise in international law, dissects both ratified and proposed space treaties. Although slightly entangled in semantic arguments, the appraisal is intriguing, challenging, and of clear military and civil importance.

Some issues are far from resolution, with one possible approach advocated in *Space Stations*. Smith's hope that Earth's problems will not be projected into space may be overtaken by the critical timing and rapidly advancing technologies exemplified by the Space Shuttle and the Salyut space station.

The book's greatest asset is its comprehensive overview of space law and policies, focusing on the applicability to military and civil space planning. Accordingly, *Space Stations* is an especially important and appropriate book for those interested in space policy planning.

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Captain L. Parker Temple III, USAF
Luke AFB, Arizona

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Shahhat: An Egyptian by Richard Critchfield. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1978, 233 pages with an introduction by George Foster and an afterword by the author, $12.95 cloth, $6.95 paper.

For the researcher in anthropology or sociology, there often comes a time when the application of a conceptual framework to the object of investigation seems somehow inappropriate, almost an alien consideration. This may be

a mystical moment for, without thinking, the investigator ceases to force reality into the mold of preconceived notions and becomes instead inperceptibly possessed by—becomes, indeed, the vessel of—the reality itself. We call this empathy with the subject; and no matter how improbable a tool in the canon of scientific enquiry, empathy remains an indispensable quality for understanding at the participant-observer level.

Reading Richard Critchfield's *Shahhat: An Egyptian*, one feels as if he is reading the work of a man of unusual artistic and scientific sensibilities, a man possessed of a gift for empathizing with people and the place in which they live. Shahhat's story is compelling, not because the author insists that Shahhat represents the archetypal Egyptian peasant or that Berat represents the archetypal Upper Egyptian village—or that Shahhat should be by some fortuitous combination of circumstances the suitable object for a study in Third World developmental economics whereby all the shibboleths of modern social science may be happily reconciled—but because the author insists on Shahhat's basic humanity. Shahhat is us.

Who does not recognize in Critchfield's narrative the essentials of a human situation known to all of us? Throughout the book we observe the selfishness of all unhappy people: in Shahhat a selfishness manifest as an obstinacy that conceals failure under the guise of resignation; in Ahmed, his uncle, the fierce pride of a man denied respect; and in Ommohamed, Shahhat's mother, an inveterate romanticism that fuels her profligacy, all united as Critchfield tells us by their common misery, their lives played out in a succession of misunderstandings which render futile any attempt to cope with the impersonal forces that threaten to overwhelm them.

Set against the background of an Egypt struggling for economic stability, where the Aswan High Dam by bringing to a halt the perennial flood of the ancient Nile will probably destroy more than it creates, Shahhat's tragedy has added poignancy. Nevertheless, the reader does not come away with the impression that all is lost. Critchfield shows us that despite irreparable damage to its human and social fabric, Shahhat's family maintains its dignity. And that will surely weigh heavily in favor of its survivability. Therein lies the value of this excellent book.

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Dr. Lewis B. Ware
Air University Library
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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Camp David Aftermath: Anatomy of Missed Opportunities by Michael Rubner. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, Occasional Paper No. 7, 1979, 60 pages + footnotes and preface.

Michael Rubner's pamphlet, *Camp David Aftermath: Anatomy of Missed Opportunities*, proves once again the old adage that good things can come in small packages. In his short, 50-page summary of the tortuous road to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the author provides us with the best précis to date of the diplomatic history of that momentous event.

But this slim volume is more than a succinct retelling of the facts; it is also an attempt to identify and explain the

nature of the demands made by both sides and the substance of the compromises they later accepted. Rubner concludes by enumerating the factors he believes contributed to the length and acrimony of the debate over the treaty and, by implication, points to the areas of possible future conflict.

For the serious student of contemporary Middle East crises, it would make good sense to have a copy of this valuable volume at hand in his library.

Dr. Lewis B. Ware
Air University Library
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

A Few Great Captains by DeWitt S. Copp. New York: Doubleday, 1980, 550 pages, $17.95.

All too often we hear that the U.S. Air Force has no sense of history. In truth, it has a rich history whose meaning has been clouded by myths and overstatements. DeWitt Copp's *A Few Great Captains* is a rare effort to correct that deficiency with a usable, objective narration of air power's early years. The story is told by focusing on the men who, through Herculean efforts, kept U.S. military aviation alive. It was refreshing to read about men like Arnold, Spaatz, Foulois, Eaker, and others who committed themselves to an idea. When they got together they talked airplanes, not about pay and the real estate market. They risked their careers (aviation was the stepchild of the old line Army brass) and their lives in testing new techniques and theories. In fact, I believe these early air power advocates have much more in common with today's Air Force than they had with the Army of which they were a part. It is this kinship with our past that Copp has so effectively developed.

One realizes that while the Air Corps of the '30s was not a separate service, its leaders had already made a mental break with the Army. The war simply confirmed what was a reality in the minds of the "few great captains." The problem is not that the Air Force has no history, rather, it lacks a sense of its heritage because too few writers such as Copp can clearly explain the past without over romanticizing.

Lieutenant Colonel Pat O. Clifton, USAF
Kelly AFB, Texas

Out of the Sky: A History of Airborne Warfare by Michael Hickey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979, 272 pages, $14.95.

Michael Hickey's *Out of the Sky* is a good, concise overview of airborne warfare. Hickey tells the familiar story of German and Anglo-American airborne operations in World War II as well as the less-well-known operations in the Pacific and Soviet theaters. The book is especially useful in discussing the development of paradrop operations and takes the story beyond World War II to include Korea, Suez, Israel, and Vietnam. It is well written and illustrated with both maps and photographs, and it contains a bibliography.

The potential reader should be warned of two possibly degrading aspects of this book. First, the author spends some time dealing with observation aviation, which is both distracting and unnecessary. Second, it should be emphasized that this is essentially a survey. Anyone who has done very much study of the subject will find little if anything new here. While *Out of the Sky* can be recommended as a broad overview for someone with little or no knowledge on the subject, it would be of little value to the serious student.

Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

A Turning Wheel: Three Decades of the Asian Revolution as Witnessed by a Correspondent for the New Yorker by Robert Shaplen. New York: Random House, 1979, 397 pages, $15.00.

Most of us know very little about Asia. In school we learned about Europe, but Asia is like those ancient maps charting a coast with the interior marked "unexplored." Yet Asian events have had a notable influence on the United States, and it is high time we learned more.

A Turning Wheel is a helpful addition to our knowledge. It is a history of selected Asian countries since World War II, with particular emphasis on the last decade or so; the most recent events described occurred in early 1979. The nations discussed are all on the Asian littoral: Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, and Japan. The People's Republic of China is a minor character in the book, but its influence is felt throughout.

Each section of the book is a detailed "snapshot" of one of the subject countries; history, culture, economics, politics, and foreign affairs are touched on. Author Robert Shaplen has a good deal of empathy with his subjects, which makes *A Turning Wheel* worthwhile. He emphasizes that these are real countries and real peoples; each has unique circumstances, characteristics, and goals. Differences between these countries and the United States jump out at the reader; similarities are less obvious.

Shaplen is a journalist who has spent 16 years in Asia, and *A Turning Wheel* reflects this experience. It seems to mirror what he has seen, and the absence of bibliography makes one wonder how much of the text is observation and how much is research. The inevitable results are twofold. First, emphasis focuses on individual nations rather than on the littoral as a whole, and interactions among them are hard to see. Second, Shaplen's analyses and predictions become suspect because alternatives are not explored, and there is little argument to support opinions. This hardly matters, though, because the book is primarily a journalistic survey rather than an analysis. These two flaws serve to emphasize the need for further Asian study and do not detract from the book.

A Turning Wheel is long and difficult reading. Yet the effort is worthwhile, and the book serves well as a reference thanks to its organization, fine index, and great detail. The average soldier would be well read indeed to be familiar with much of the content of *A Turning Wheel.*

Captain Julius F. Sanks, USAF
Grand Forks AFB,
North Dakota

Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (June 1977) by Herbert Goldhamer, edited by Joan Goldhamer. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1979, 123 pages, appendixes and bibliography.

"The tendency for beliefs to deviate from or even be the reverse of reality" in military matters is the subject of *Reality and Belief in Military Affairs*, prepared for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The monograph examines the differences between perception and reality in war and especially during peacetime, as these affect both military preparation and employment. Goldhamer's approach is historical, richly weaving examples from the sixth century B.C. in China to the present.

The tragedy of this work is that Herbert Goldhamer died in 1977 before it was completed; the book was edited for posthumous publication by his wife. What is missing are chapter sections and a concluding chapter applying the past to the present and future. Still, the work is well worth reading for its anecdotal detail, thematic development, appendixes replete with suggestion, and a marvelously exhaustive 43-page bibliography.

Dr. Donald M. Snow
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Build-up, 1965 by Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, USMC. Washington: History and Museums Division, Hq U.S. Marine Corps, 1978, 261 pages.

U.S. Marines in Vietnam is an official document compiled by the History and Museums Division of the U.S. Marine Corps. The authors have used formerly classified research materials and personal commentary as the basis for this second volume of nine covering the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War.

The account is historical, the format chronological, and it includes accurate and well-documented orders of battle. Topically, Shulimson and Johnson trace the initial deployment and development of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang to the major battles of 1965, such as Starlite, Piranha, Stomp, and Harvest Moon. These accounts include numerous photographs, maps, and battle charts.

The remainder of the book considers other activities such as Marine aviation, fire support and reconnaissance, logistics, and advisory activities.

U.S. Marines in Vietnam provides insight into the deployment and maintenance of significant combat forces in a quasi-hostile environment. Cross-force planners of such deployments, particularly those involved in aerial and sea-support logistics, will find the book stimulating and instructive.

Robert S. Hopkins III
Blacksburg, Virginia

Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton by Martin Van Creveld. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 284 pages, $14.95.

The art of logistics is certainly not the most glamorous aspect of military science. Historians have tacitly confirmed this fact by ignoring the study of military logistics. Hence, there has been no definitive study on supplying a military body.

For this reason Martin Van Creveld's *Supplying War* is so important. He supplies a limited but valuable tool documenting the historical progression of logistics, which may give rise to further studies to bridge the gaps in this neglected area.

One must consider these gaps because they are so evident in Van Creveld's work. Yet the author cannot be blamed for this omission: one can hardly cover 3000 years of military logistics in less than 250 pages. *Supplying War* might accurately carry the subtitle "a selected study of offensive logistics in support of land campaigns on the European continent from the seventeenth to the twentieth century." The limitations of the book become obvious: It does not broach the problem of supplying defensive positions; it does not consider the logistics problems of other theaters of operation (the North African campaign of 1941-42 is considered from the German standpoint); it does not consider the unique aspects of supporting the fleet during naval campaigns or, more recently, air forces in defensive and offensive operations; efforts to counteract the enemy's supply network by interdiction or strategic warfare are not covered; and the scope is limited both in time and the campaigns covered. Another omission is also evident: the field of maintenance is largely ignored.

What *Supplying War* does cover are the seventeenth century-German and English campaigns, the logistics system of the Napoleonic army, the Germanic defeat of France in 1870, logistics planning and execution in support of the Von Schlieffen Plan, and three campaigns in the European Theater of World War II. Planning, organization, and the implementation of those plans are effectively discussed. Unfortunately, Van Creveld points out that some of the poorest precampaign planning led to the most effectively supplied armies (Germany in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870). Conversely, some of the most elaborate logistics plans have led to disaster (witness Napoleon in the 1812 campaign against Russia). The author also examines some of the greatest logistic failures, such as Operation Barbarossa of 1941, to determine if support was economically feasible from the inception. The result is a credible digest of efforts to support some of history's most spectacular military campaigns, with ample parallels for today's logistician. Consequently, *Supplying War* is must reading for the professional logistician.

Captain David J. Boyles, USAF
Hill Air Force Base, Utah

Avenger at War by Barrett Tillman. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980, 128 pages, $17.50.

"The Turkey" was underpowered, overly heavy, and lacked speed and performance. Nevertheless, "the Turkey," as the Grumman TBF Avenger was called, was the most important carrier-attack plane of World War II.

Avenger at War describes the development of the Avenger, its deployment in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, and

gives recollections of people who operated and maintained it. The Avenger was designed by the Grumman Corporation and produced jointly with the General Motors Corporation in an encouraging example of industrial cooperation. In the Pacific, the Avenger was used successfully for torpedoing, bombing, smoke-laying, target coordination, and antisubmarine warfare. The aircraft helped sink 60 Japanese ships. It proved most valuable in the Atlantic in its antisubmarine role. Besides destroying several U-boats, Avengers provided effective deterrence against U-boat raids on Allied shipping.

Barrett Tillman provides a fascinating picture of the Avenger by letting the people who knew it best tell much of the story. Crew members as well as maintenance men and the company's technical representatives contributed personal insights. The book is well written and illustrated, comprehensive but not overburdened with technical data. It is highly recommended for anyone interested in aviation history.

First Lieutenant Lawrence P. Melancon, Jr., USAF
Officer Training School
Lackland AFB, Texas

P-40 Hawks at War by Joe Christy and Jeff Ethell. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980, 128 pages, $15.95.

Everyone is familiar with Chennault's American Volunteer Group ("Flying Tigers") flying their P-40s in China against the Japanese. Few know the rest of the Curtiss Hawk heritage.

Authors Joe Christy and Jeff Ethell, both noted aviation writers, have produced excellent coverage of the Curtiss Hawk's development and operational history in World War II. Flown in every theater of operation and by several Allied nations, the P-40 may not have been the flashiest fighter, but it made a solid contribution in the air war.

P-40 Hawks at War is thoroughly illustrated and contains several appendixes of useful P-40 data on production and performance. The overall result is a concise, well-written account of the P-40 and the men who flew it in combat.

Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF
Office of Air Force History
Bolling AFB, D.C.

Soviet Naval Diplomacy by Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, editors. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, 450 pages, $25.00 cloth, $8.95 paper.

Soviet Naval Diplomacy is an important and most timely book. The Soviet fleet shows much more sophistication in recent years in the practice of naval diplomacy, i.e., the employment of naval power directly in the service of foreign policy. Naval diplomacy can be either *cooperative*, for goodwill port visits or to furnish humanitarian or technical assistance; or *coercive*, to threaten or impose violent sanctions. The Soviet Union began its use of coercive naval diplomacy in 1967, coinciding with the sharp

reduction of the United Kingdom in that sphere. The consequences for world politics have been profound.

Editors Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell and the dozen or more contributors to the volume are all analysts at the Navy's Center for Naval Analyses in Washington, specializing in Soviet naval policy, operations, and related topics. *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* represents the results of theoretical and analytical work of the last seven years. Much of the material is new; interpretations are sound; the style is nontechnical and organized for quick reference with an abundance of charts and appendixes. The book is highly recommended for background reading or analysis at all levels.

Dr. Paul R. Schratz
Homosassa, Florida

Making Foreign Economic Policy by I. M. Destler. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1980, 244 pages, $11.95, $4.95 paper.

Foreign economic policy is grounded in the need to balance domestic and international concerns. Policy decisions inevitably affect both, but policymakers do not always weigh these concerns in a balanced fashion. Farmers want overseas markets for their grain, but consumers want stable food prices; some producers like free trade, but steel and textile manufacturers seek shelters from foreign competition. How can the government manage such conflicts?

In *Making Foreign Economic Policy*, I. M. Destler, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, addresses questions like these by focusing on recent American experiences in formulating trade policy. He did most of his research as a member of the Brookings Foreign Policy staff, examining transactions such as the Russian wheat deal in 1972 and the successful campaign to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers during that same period. His study even includes the current administration and controversies in the vast area of solvable unsolvables.

Destler has brought together a tidy book that reads easily and clearly. Since this kind of material calls for the checking of notes and references, the index should have been better researched and edited. But that criticism aside, I was well taught by Destler and found many of his accounts not only instructive but dramatic.

America's goal, according to Destler, must not be the impossible one of burying international economic policy conflict within the larger governmental machine; rather, it should be the building of administrative processes for surfacing the conflicts and resolving them. He frames his suggestions succinctly and thoughtfully, directing them toward a lightly staffed, flexible coordinating system that can help the entire government confront the possible tradeoffs for resolving the conflicts effectively.

Making Foreign Economic Policy is a timely study and recommended reading.

Dr. Porter J. Crow
Center for Leadership Development
Washington, D.C.

Soviet Military Power and Performance edited by John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979, 219 pages, $25.00.

This collection of nine essays by long-time specialists in Russian and Soviet military affairs assesses the performance and effectiveness of the Soviet military machine. Originally presented at a scholarly conference in Greenwich, England, in 1977, the papers focus on doctrine, style, procedure, and problems of the Soviet military. The authors, nearly all British, while developing their theses from different standpoints, arrive at a remarkably consistent view in their main conclusions. Collectively, they present a well-researched and objective assessment of Soviet military strengths and weaknesses.

Organized into four parts that deal with "the system," "the arms," "the men," and "strategic perspectives," *Soviet Military Power and Performance* does an excellent job of covering much ground in little space. Especially good is the section on "the men," in which Chris Donnelly provides interesting insights into the behavior, performance, and effectiveness of the Soviet soldier; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone discusses the Soviet military as an instrument of national and ethnic integration.

Although it contains some minor technical flaws (e.g., a few typographical errors, a sketch map showing thirteenth-century Russia without borders), this anthology is an important contribution to the debate about the military power of the Soviet Union and the danger it poses to world stability. The book will be useful to both the specialist in Soviet affairs and the general military reader.

Lieutenant Colonel Dallace L. Meehan, USAF
Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

The Devil's Horsemen:The Mongol Invasion of Europe by James Chambers. London: Morrison & Gibb, 1979, 190 pages, $11.95.

"In the 13th century the mongol army was the best army in the world. Its organization and training, its tactical principles and its structure of command would not have been unfamiliar to a soldier of the twentieth century." So James Chambers describes the Mongolian version of the "art of war," and well does he prove his point. Almost always the underdog, the Mongol general uses mobility to defeat the siege warfare-minded and heavily armored tacticians of the Western armies.

Chambers spins a fine story; from the early unification of the tribes under Chingis (Genghis) Khan to Tole-Buka, the sixth Khan of the Golden Horde, one's interest is maintained despite the awful proper names and unfamiliar geographical identities. The tribal epic and the account of the invasions of Europe are fascinating and demand our understanding; the Russians, Hungarians, Persians, Arabs, and Poles all felt the sting of superior tactics. On the positive side, however, Europe was opened west to east, and later Marco Polo would follow with his travels and subsequent chronicles.

On the battlefield the Mongol units were superb at following complicated maneuver movements. Young boys learned archery and horsemanship by legal obligation. Later as young men they eagerly prepared for the annual "great hunt," which today would be akin to a combined arms exercise. The hunt was a dramatic expression of team spirit and discipline that lasted three months and involved every soldier. Ultimately it gave each participant profound training and solidly impressed unity of command on each of them.

Chambers has filled a valid need, the Mongol military exploits are necessary and good reading. Had the American Indian fought with more of the Mongol acumen, we indeed would have had several more Custers to venerate popularly and condemn privately.

Major Theodore M. Kluz
Gunter AFS, Alabama

State of War: Michigan in World War II by Alan Clive. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979, 301 pages, $15.00.

During the last several years Americans, in the words of author Alan Clive, "began to reach back to World War II to recapture a remembered sense of certainty and security." (p. 243) Memory, of course, is selective, and our recollections of the home front during the Second World War tend to be simplistic. In recent years, however, historians have begun to analyze the World War II experience in all its complexity, documenting not only the sense of purpose Americans recall but those aspects of the war years we have forgotten: overcrowded housing and schools, long lines and slow service at understaffed retail stores and banks, racial strife and labor discord. Until now, historical research dealing with the home front has either been national in scope or else centered on special themes, such as Harvard Sitkoff's examination of racial relations. Alan Clive, who has taught history at Northeastern University and the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, has added a carefully researched and thoughtful new monograph to the growing body of historical literature on the domestic side of World War II by studying events in Michigan.

Michigan provides a superb setting for a study of the home front. Its primacy in automobile manufacturing made it one of the four or five states that contributed most to the war effort. "Other towns make arms," observed a reporter in 1942, "but whether we win this war depends in great measure on Detroit." (p. 2) Michigan's massive involvement in military production meant substantial population changes. More women worked than ever before, children received less parental supervision, more than 250,000 newcomers settled in the Detroit area, placing an unprecedented burden on schools and social services.

Continuity, argues Clive, was also evident. For instance, the Big Three automobile manufacturers were reluctant to begin converting to military production in 1941. They finally did so under direct orders from the War Production Board in 1942 and retooled their plants to produce tanks, trucks, planes, and other military hardware. With the end of the war, smaller manufacturers such as Nash and Hudson, and newcomer Kaiser-Frazer hoped to gain

competitively since car production would be starting anew. But the Big Three had inherited advantages in capital, expertise, and influence that enabled them to retain their lead with the resumption of civilian car manufacturing in 1945.

In race relations change also took place; but here, too, there was continuity as well. Blacks gained in employment opportunities during the war, but whites resisted their advances. Gerald L. K. Smith and other bigots preached race hatred. A bitter race riot resulted in Detroit in 1943. At the end of the war, blacks were laid off in large numbers while the housing they occupied was substandard by any definition. In this instance change was most conspicuous, for despite the many disadvantages they still had to endure, blacks were able to retain at least some of their advances in employment.

Clive's discussion of unions, the role of women, and the family are informed, too. He also presents a creditable, though brief, analysis of trends in Michigan agriculture. *State of War*, in sum, is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on the home front.

Lloyd J. Graybar
Eastern Kentucky University

A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History by John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979, 507 pages, $6.50.

Military history cannot be relied on for specific examples from the past that apply directly to problems of the present or future. Its study and analysis by the military professional, however, can provide a framework for decision-making based on a broad understanding of military art and science, the military and society, and use of the military in both war and peace. Concern within the United States Army about the lack of study in areas of military history prompted this book.

Produced by the Army's Center for Military History, the *Guide* is a collection of more than twenty essays on various aspects of military history. The contributors are noted military historians in the Army's Center, the Department of History at West Point, and the academic world. The first three essays deal with the discipline of military history and how to study it. Seven chapters focus on great military historians as well as different periods of world and American military history. The remainder of the book covers aspects of the Army's history program and those of the other military services.

The bibliographic essays are broad in scope due to the vast amount of material covered, but each is followed by a lengthy list of pertinent books and articles for further reference. The essays are very comprehensive, yet the only references on air power topics are the old Craven and Cate standby on World War II and R. F. Futrell's history of the Korean air war. A definitive essay on air operations in the twentieth century would have been a valuable addition.

This book was designed for the young officer just beginning a career, but its format will enable anyone to pick it up and begin a serious study of military history. It serves a long-standing need, giving direction in the study of the profession of arms.

Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF
Office of Air Force History

Insurgency in the Modern World by Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, 291 pages, $26.50.

Contemporary concern is again focused on insurgency because of the diverse and increasingly high level of violent insurgency-related manifestations such as El Salvador, Lebanon, Liberia, Nicaragua, assassination attempts, "political" bombings, skyjackings, hostage-taking, etc. The wide variety of goals and rationales espoused by insurgents and the vast panoply of means (terrorism, assassination, propaganda, guerrilla warfare, hijackings, economic warfare, political actions, etc.) utilized by insurgents to advance their varied causes make it imperative that Americans learn more about what British Brigadier Kitson has termed "low intensity warfare." Particularly, given our status as heirs to a major insurgency (the American Revolution), it is unfortunate that many Americans often look for simple, if not simplistic, definitions of the causes of specific insurgencies and search for quick-fix solutions to insurgencies that are often multifaceted (political, economic, sociological, religious, psychological) in their genesis.

The editors of and contributors to *Insurgency in the Modern World* have a very broad background and expertise in insurgency and counterinsurgency theory and practice and share one common, vital attribute, a sensitivity to the blending of traditional and less-traditional military instruments with various nonmilitary (diplomatic, economic, police and security forces, psychological, etc.) assets to prevent or deter insurgency. The relative values of these means vary in any given preinsurgency or insurgency situation, depending on a number of factors; these include the stage of insurgency, the effectiveness of the government that is at risk, and, most important, the rapport of that government with "the people."

The writers have done the reader a service by utilizing the case study approach (Northern Ireland, Thailand, Guatemala, Uruguay, Iraq, Oman, Angola), rather than overindulge in the esoterica of hardware, gadgetry, and tactics. The case approach lends itself well to the depiction and discussion of various insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns in a variety of climes, socioeconomic milieus, and political settings. The case approach also is excellent for discussing some vital insurgency-related factors such as the role of a geographic sanctuary, moral/ethical and pragmatic implications of the use of terror and counterterror techniques by both insurgent and progovernment forces, the need for timely and well-collated intelligence, the insurgents' need for financial support, and the complex world of urban insurgency.

The range of antiestablishment pressures in both the Third World and in the more developed nations makes it imperative that *Review* readers be well grounded in the

sublimited warfare topics so readably covered in *Insurgency in the Modern World*.

Major John A. Hurley, USAFR
Hq USAF

The Fall of Fortresses by Elmer Bendiner. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1980, 258 pages, $11.95.

The bombing attacks against the German city of Schweinfurt were among the most famous of the entire combined bombing offensive of World War II. They are noted both for the targets, the German ballbearing factories, and the terrible losses in men and aircraft suffered by the Americans.

Elmer Bendiner, a navigator aboard the B-17 *Tondelayo* during the missions over Schweinfurt, opens his account with a description of the premission briefing in preparation for the Schweinfurt attacks. He then digresses to the interwar period and gradually returns to the actual moments in flight over Germany. The recounting of those missions is much less detailed than one would like from an active participant.

Although the author sets out to examine the great issues of strategic bombing and air power that led to the Schweinfurt raids, his results fall far short of the goal. The many original records and archives he alludes to are not supported by documentation or direct reference. The resulting book is little more than a generalized discussion of the concepts of strategic bombing interspersed with personal recollections of fellow crew members and life in wartime Britain.

Unfortunately, the book provides little new information or insight on the air battles over Schweinfurt. Its primary value will be as a glimpse of one man's vantage point on the air war over Europe.

Captain Don Rightmyer, USAF
Office of Air Force History

Knights of the Air by Ezra Bowen et al. New York: Time-Life Books, 1980, 192 pages, $12.95.

This book should sell well, for it is designed to do precisely that. The elegant binding, the impressive array of photographs and drawings—many of them in color—are almost awesome. Matched with the high drama of World War I combat flying and Ezra Bowen's lively prose, it seems a sure winner. It is easily attractive enough to grace the shelf of any book lover, and it is expensive enough to serve as an excellent gift when "you care enough."

Still, the costly efforts to make *Knights of the Air* profitable also serve to decrease its potential value. The carefully selected stories and events used by Bowen to portray the World War I aces are a part of the journalistic tradition that began during the Great War and has been marketable ever since. The sad fact is that the vast, abysmal contests on the ground could offer almost none of the heroes so essential in great wars. Only the aviators—and

even then partly because they lacked reliable machines, air-to-air communication, and basic team efforts—had the mark of individuality of which heroes are made. Simply to be a combat pilot meant recognition, to be a successful one meant fame.

Given the nature of World War I, this is as understandable as it was unavoidable. The trouble is that air combat made unusually good copy, and man's taste for this form of vicarious adventure has been whetted by it ever since. The result has been a seemingly irresistible tendency toward sensationalism, with emphasis on the supposed rashness, fearlessness, and self-reliance of it all. Why is it that both during and after the war many Westerners could easily name one or more of the aces but faltered badly in naming which generals commanded the major battles? And why is it that René Fonck, probably the most effective combat pilot of all time but one who had a colorless personality and did not take unnecessary risks, is almost forgotten among the aces while the intrepid, even careless types like Frank Luke or Georges Guynemer are praised to the skies? (Indeed, a serious French author said of Guynemer, "Surely, he was a god!")

Thus, the modern image of the aces is partly a false one, and Bowen, along with the editors of Time-Life Books, can share in the credit. As for me, I would rush to buy *Knights of the Air* and then carefully sandwich it between more serious and reliable books such as John Cuneo's *The Air Weapon, 1914-1916* and Aaron Norman's *The Great Air War*.

Dr. Philip M. Flammer
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Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East by Walid Khalidi. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979, 213 pages with glossary, maps, notes and appendixes, $12.95 cloth, $6.95 paper.

Professor Walid Khalidi's modest essay on the Lebanese Civil War is proof that good things still come in small packages. It is both a history and an explanation of what must seem to the casual observer an impenetrable mystery. But it is a mystery that Professor Khalidi deftly, confidently, and patiently reveals as consistent with its own internal logic in a manner that attests to the author's keen and insightful interpretation of the facts. For Khalidi is an insider, someone whose own experience, unhampered by scrupulous theorizing, suffices to establish an authority for his perceptions rarely found among his fellow scholars. He presents a full picture of events culled from a variety of primary and secondary sources up and subsequent to the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1978. The tone of the book is one of a person *engagé* in a national and personal tragedy; it is always correct, if somewhat mordant, which makes for its excellent readability. And this reviewer is certain that the author would be the last to excuse himself for espousing his own particular point of view when, in an age of intense politicization, lesser per-

sonalities claim the right to foist on us the benefits of their own prejudices.

Professor Khalidi's book is divided into five chapters of history and a conclusion in the middle of which he inserts two fascinating chapters, entitled "The Actors" and "The Interplay between External and Internal Factors." His observations there are particularly compelling.

As the author points out, the interrelationship of actors and events is extraordinarily complex, having simultaneously an internal and external aspect. Looking into the Lebanese "box" from the outside, Khalidi shows how the Syrians saw in their support of Maronite separatism an encouragement to the "centrifugal minoritarian tendencies within Syria itself" and in their support of the PLO/National Movement an invitation for a hostile regime to supplant Syrian influence "while at the same time serving as an alternative repository of Soviet favors." (p. 83) This perception helps explain the Syrian side-switching that accompanied their deepening involvement in the crisis. Egypt and Iraq took sides with a view to embarrassing Syria while Libya donated money and weapons to keep alive the Nasserist organizations in Lebanon in order to punish Sadat for his "anti-Nasserist revisionism." (p. 86) And then there is Israel, ready to vindicate the establishment of the Zionist state by demonstrating how the partition of Lebanon "ironically [debunks] the Palestinian concept of a secular, democratic state." (p. 91)

From inside the Lebanese "box," the brittleness of the Lebanese situation may be measured, according to the author, against four factors: a liberal regime that permitted the expression of anarchic politics; a radicalization of the Muslim population; a mutual proscription by the traditional sectarian leaders; and a loss of power of the Sunni oligarchs. (pp. 95-97) This last point proved exceptionally interesting. With a keen talent for sociological detail, Khalidi sums up the failings of the Sunni establishment: they possessed no feudal base in the people as landlords; they were not organized in hierarchical clans; they enjoyed no rural constituency geographically situated in one place; they based their appeal on public service, on charisma, and on the office of the prime minister; their power shifted in alliances across the Muslim-Christian cleavage line; they created no political party; they possessed not even a rudimentary secretariat; and they identified with no legislative program. Their failures reflect "a fundamentally proprietary state of mind which regards leadership as a matter of ascription rather than achievement." (p. 97) In a word if I may take the liberty of putting that word in Professor Khalidi's mouth the Sunni oligarchs had become perfect Levantines divorced from their social origins.

There is so much more that is accessible in this book than meets the eye. But I leave it to the reader to discover its value for himself and hope he will agree with me that Professor Khalidi has written an enduring work. When all the commentators have had their say, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon* will stand out for its freshness and accuracy of view. *Verba volant, scripta manent.*

Dr. Lewis Ware
Air University Library
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A Short Research Guide on Arms and Armed Forces by Ulrich Albrecht et al. New York: Facts on File, 1980, 112 pages, $17.50.

Every rule seems to have an exception. This slim volume is certainly the exception to the old saw, "You get what you pay for." When one spends $17.50, one expects more than 112 pages of incomplete and obviously biased material. Compiled under the auspices of the International Peace Association, this book purports to be a research guide to military literature around the world. It is more a listing than a guide and an incomplete list at that. For example, in the periodicals listing, *Air University Review* is exhaustively (and totally) described as "The Professional Journal of the US Air Force." The listing of books is even less helpful since it contains no descriptive material whatsoever. The lack of book descriptions is matched only by the lack of book listings—a total of 79. I have more in my personal professional library.

One suspects the bias of the volume from its auspices. The bias is reflected in a lengthy critique of *The Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The authors included this lengthy evaluation ". . . to demonstrate that care and analysis were necessary in using even the most well known and established sources." What the authors demonstrate is that care and analysis are needed when reading their critique. According to the authors, *Military Balance* constantly overstates the Soviet threat and understates Western power. Their claims are substantiated, in part, by quotes from a Soviet journal and an obscure source in the Finnish Army.

For those who still might be tempted to purchase this book, I must end this review as it began, with an old saw: "A fool and his money are soon parted."

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew, USAF
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Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics by Timothy J. Colton. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979, 289 pages, appendixes, notes, index, $25.00.

The concern of this extensive study of the military's role in Soviet politics is direct and important. In an era when military intervention in the political system is widespread in the developing world (and for many purposes, the Soviet Union remains a developing state), why has the Soviet military displayed continuing "political quiescence" to the Soviet state? Moreover, what are the potentials and likelihoods for an expanded role?

Liberally borrowing from and building on theories and formulations designed to study military politics generally, Colton's analysis is detailed and painstaking. He begins by examining those formal organs for coordinating and monitoring military political activities (the so-called Main Political Administration) and follows with detailed case studies of outstanding events (e.g., the Great Purge of high-level officers during the 1930s). He generally concludes that the relationship between party and military

has been stable, cooperative, and mutually supportive. The military is given privilege within society and has normally approved of policy, and the regime derives legitimacy and power from a robust military establishment. Although the military has considerable potential to inject itself forcibly into Soviet politics, Colton feels this is unlikely.

The book is excellent, but it is for the serious student, not the casual reader. The style is academic and somewhat formal, reflecting the dissertation format from which it derived. The specialist who wishes to broaden understanding of Soviet military politics, however, will find it a rewarding experience.

Dr. Donald M. Snow
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

A-20 Havoc at War by William N. Hess. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980, 128 pages, $17.50.

William Hess, in *A-20 Havoc at War*, tells the story of the A-20 and the A-26 from the beginning of World War II through the Indochinese War. The story is told in a series of vignettes written by those who flew the aircraft. Hess ties the stories together with his narrative and an excellent collection of combat photographs.

The book is worth reading for those who would reminisce about their experiences in past wars or for those interested in good war stories. The only thing missing is a chapter on experiences with the A-26 during the Vietnam War.

Major John Graham, Jr., USAF
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Fighter! Luftwaffe Fighter Planes and Pilots by Werner Held. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979, 224 pages, $14.95.

Recent years have seen a rise of considerable nostalgia for World War II. Little wonder, then, that there has been an outpouring of books as authors and publishers capitalize on this phenomenon. But the unwary should beware, for it is easy to be deceived. Werner Held's *Fighter!* is just one example. The title suggests much, as do the color-book jacket illustration of a German pilot with an Me 109 in the background and the table of contents. Not until he reaches the foreword does the reader learn that this book is a collection of official wartime photographs, that this is strictly a picture book. While the black and white photos are good, and mostly unpublished thus far, the text is elementary and the captions brief. No index is provided.

In short, look before you buy and trust not the title, book jackets, or the table of contents. Otherwise, you may be in for a surprise.

Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell
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The Future of Conflict edited by John J. McIntyre. Washington: Defense University Press, 1979, 145 pages.

"Armed conflict between modernized states has lost virtually all its utility as an instrument of state policy." So writes Ambassador Francis T. Underhill, Jr., Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University. Though recent armed conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan offer empirical evidence to the contrary, Underhill provides us with still other surprising assertions: war is premodern; nuclear war is suicidal; the cost associated with modern imperialistic wars exceeds the benefits; war is no longer morally acceptable; and terrorism has become the "recreational" equivalent of war. Such assertions should not stand unchallenged.

They do not. In this book, a collection of six thesis papers and discussion sessions held at the National Security Affairs Institute during 1978-79, rebuttal statements accompany each thesis. Inverting the ambassador's thesis, for instance, his critics held that because modern states are so economically and politically interdependent, they are extremely vulnerable to disruption through war. Hence, aggressor states find that war is more, not less, useful.

Which of these two positions describes reality? Which can be used as a basis for structuring forces and policies in the future? Resolution of these and other questions is a valid task for an officer corps concerned with strategy, force levels, tactical deployments, and the nature of future conflicts.

Other concepts investigated in this frank, future-oriented study include the following: prospects for future conflicts, arms and arms control, new forms of conflict, unconventional warfare and planning for security in the modern nation-state, and management of future conflicts. With varying degrees of persuasiveness, experts sketch their theories, predictions, and prescriptions. Counterarguments, succinctly summarized, follow each theoretical essay.

Anyone desiring to join this speculative search for workable concepts about future conflicts may find this book useful. At the least it demonstrates that the line between wisdom and foolishness can be narrow.

Dr. Pat Harahan, Historian
*Hq Strategic Communications Area*
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AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The Gatsby Effect in U.S. Strategic Affairs" by Colonel Alton L. Elliott, USAF, as the outstanding article in the November-December 1981 issue of the *Review.*

attention

The *Air University Review* is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The *Review* should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Training Command, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed.